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 Executive Summary 
 
1. This report presents the results of a review of the economic literature about the 
problem of Difference in Composition of Seemingly Identical Branded Product (DC-
SIP). The problem is also referred to as dual quality. The DC-SIP problem emerges 
when a firm supplies products of different characteristics (such as ingredients, 
recipe, weight) without consumers being properly informed about the differences. 
The difference must be ‘relevant’, meaning that consumers might take a different 
purchasing decision if informed correctly. 
2. Academic literature about DC-SIP is almost non-existent. Consequently, this report 
focuses on contributions that are indirectly related to the topic and yet are able to 
foster an understanding of the economic principles of DC-SIP. The report provides 
a conceptual analysis in order to explain the rationale for brand owners to use DC-
SIP practices and policy related issues; it does not bring empirical evidence as it is 
not available in the literature. 
3. The DC-SIP problem has an objective component (the difference in 
composition/weight) and a subjective component (consumer information and 
choice). The report addresses the economics of the objective component in 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3. The subjective component is discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 
5 presents an illustrative example of the possible consequences of regulation. The 
possible policy implications of the findings presented in this report are emphasised 
throughout the report. 
4. Chapter 1 reviews the industrial organisation (IO) literature regarding firms’ 
“strategic quality choice”. From an IO perspective, product composition is a 
dimension of quality. It should be noted that in the IO literature quality is not 
necessarily hierarchical: products of different quality are just different (without one 
being necessarily better than the other). The core topic of the review presented in 
this chapter is the determination of market equilibrium when firms can compete on 
quality. the review reaches the following conclusions: 
a. Differences in composition within the Single Market may be socially efficient if 
consumer preferences, cost functions, market structure, and institutions are 
spatially heterogeneous. However, this result requires consumers to be 
perfectly informed. 
b. The number of varieties that firms can offer to consumers is limited. As a 
consequence, regulating DC-SIP may not result in a higher number of varieties 
in the market. Furthermore, the constraint on the number of varieties implies 
that firms must choose the most profitable ones. Because the profits from each 
variety might vary over space, firms may have an incentive to supply different 
varieties in different Member States. 
5. Chapter 2 focuses on multi-country models of parallel trade and quality 
discrimination. The literature builds on the market equilibrium models in Chapter 1, 
assuming that firms can sell to different groups of consumers. In the absence of 
arbitrage, DC-SIP can be rationalised as optimal differential treatment of consumers 
by firms in separated national markets based on the features of demand.  
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a. Quality discrimination among consumers in different markets is the result of 
profit-maximising behaviour by firms taking advantage of differences in 
demand conditions when markets are separated.  
b. A firm with market power optimally reacts to policies (or to changes in 
institutional/legal environment) that impose a constraint on firm behaviour by 
adjusting the decision variables that are not subject to the policy. For instance, 
a policy that limits the ability of a firm to engage in price discrimination between 
national markets (e.g., ban on territorial supply constraint practices) may 
induce a quality response by a firm with market power, potentially leading to 
larger quality differences between national countries. 
c. It is conceivable that national variations could be introduced by a firm in 
response to a policy that limits the ability of a firm to engage in price 
discrimination (e.g., ban on territorial supply constraints) between national 
markets. This response would represent as an attempt to maintain firm’s ability 
to discriminate between markets in a situation in which national markets are 
otherwise well integrated. Nevertheless, whether introducing DC-SIP is useful 
for firms to maintain firm’s ability to discriminate remains an empirical question. 
This could be the case if DC-SIP were able to undermine the ability or 
willingness of retailers to procure the product in the country where the product 
is cheaper. For example, a retailer could possibly be unwilling to source a 
product with varying quality to avoid consumers being dissatisfied.  
6. Chapter 3 expands the discussion about international models by reviewing the 
marketing management literature. International marketing and international 
business researchers and practitioners have long debated the question of 
whether to adapt (‘go local’) or to standardise (‘go global’) the marketing mix 
across countries. Adapting some elements of the marketing mix (e.g., product) 
but not others (e.g., brand) can be rationalised as an optimum strategy of an 
international firm to improve performance.  
a. The main factors supporting the ‘Go Global’ approach (standardization of 
products across countries) are the benefits of cost reduction, improved 
resource allocation, cultural convergence, and technology development. 
The main factors supporting the ‘Go International’ approach (adaptation 
of products to local conditions) are related to the persistence of a large 
degree of difference in consumer taste, needs, and preferences across 
markets, the existence of country-specific laws and customs, and 
heterogeneity in the ecological and competitive environments. 
b. A third vision emerged more recently supporting the idea that firms 
engage in both adaptation and standardisation as both have positive 
relationships with performance. A theoretical framework by Schmid and 
Kotulla (2011) identified four factors affecting the decision between 
standardisation and localisation: (a) cross-national homogeneity of 
demand; (b) potential for cross-national economies of scale; (c) cost of 
modification of the product; (d) foreign price elasticity of demand. 
c. A key finding in the literature is that the marketing mix is jointly 
determined, meaning that any regulation concerning quality or product 
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composition (e.g. ingredients) is also expected to affect price, placement, 
and promotion (and ultimately market shares). The magnitude to which 
these components are affected depends on market conditions and product 
type. 
7. The discussion in Chapter 4 focuses on consumer purchasing decision under 
imperfect information. A review of the extensive literature concludes that 
consumer perception and purchase motivation are key variables in DC-SIP 
issues. When extrinsic attributes have an important signalling role about the 
quality of the product, firms might be unwilling to communicate to the consumer 
changes in ingredients and recipe (intrinsic attributes), if this impacts on the 
perception of price, health, origin, the values of the brand, and ultimately the 
perception of quality and therefore on the purchase intentions of the consumer. 
8. Chapter 5 presents a numerical example illustrating the equilibrium in a two-
country market. The aim is to discuss the possible implications of DC-SIP 
regulation. The results of the simulation are conditional on the assumptions in 
the model and are not general. They must be interpreted as an example of 
possible unintended consequences of regulation, not as predictions of policy 
outcome. 
a. We found that DC-SIP reduces social welfare and may have unexpected 
redistribution effects across firms and across consumers. It is possible 
that groups of consumers benefit from DC-SIP strategies. Similarly, it is 
possible that local firms may enjoy higher profits if the international firm 
engage a DC-SIP strategy (e.g. when tailoring versions to local demand 
conditions). 
b. It is possible that regulation imposing the same product composition in 
all Member States is socially inefficient, especially if the demand and/or 
production costs are spatially heterogeneous. Such regulations may harm 
certain consumer groups and local firms in specific circumstances. 
c. Policies ensuring that consumers have enough information to assess 
products properly (Information Disclosure) are socially efficient but may 
have a redistribution effect too. However, these policies might be difficult 
to implement in practice. 
d. In theory, information disclosure regulations perform better than 
mandatory quality regulations. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
In this report the authors illustrate the result of a review of the economic literature 
about the problem of differences in composition of seemingly identical branded food 
products (DC-SIP) in the Single Market.1 The Authors are scholars from the Technical 
University of Munich (TUM) and the University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale. The 
report was commissioned by the Joint Research Centre. 
DC-SIP can be defined as marketing across Member States of goods as being identical 
when, in reality, they have a significantly different composition or characteristics may 
mislead consumers and cause them to take a transactional decision that they would not 
have taken otherwise (European Parliament legislative resolution of 17 April 2019 8_TA-
PROV(2019)0399, points 51 and 52). 
The European Parliament states that:  
‘the issue of dual quality […] may be seen [… in…] the following activities: 
▪ manufacturer places products on the market with varying flavors and 
compositions (i.e. different main ingredient) but with the same or 
similar (indistinguishable for the consumer) packaging appearance, 
▪ a manufacturer places products of differing qualities on the market but 
with the same or similar (indistinguishable for the consumer) packaging 
appearance, 
▪ a manufacturer places products of differing weights on the market but 
with the same or similar (indistinguishable for the consumer) packaging 
appearance, 
▪ when launching a new product on a particular market, a manufacturer 
uses a product with a higher quality composition (e.g. higher meat 
quantity or quality of ingredients in the product) in order to attract 
consumers' attention and "teach" consumers to buy/adopt the product; 
after a certain period, however, a "recipe change" occurs without any 
obvious change in the product's packaging (except for the product 
composition given in small print on the back of the label). 
The manufacturer carries out all of these activities without highlighting to 
the consumer clearly, emphatically, transparently and without misleading, 
the fact that the product is another product of different composition, weight, 
quality or other related characteristics.’ (European Parliament 
2018/2008(INI))2 
 
1 The official documents cited in this introduction use the term dual quality instead of DC-SIP, following the 
initial perception of the problem. In this report, the authors opt for a more neutral definition because changes 
in composition do not necessarily result in products of different quality. 
2 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-8-2018-0267_EN.pdf 
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The DC-SIP problem has objective and subjective components. The objective 
component is a non-negligible difference in quality, ingredients, weight, or other 
relevant characteristics. The Joint Research Centre released guidelines to test for such 
differences (JRC: “Framework for selecting and testing of food products to assess quality 
related characteristics: EU harmonised testing methodology” April 25, 2018).  
The subjective component is imperfect consumer information. DC-SIP is only an issue 
if consumers are unable to take an informed purchasing decision. Under perfect 
information, market incentives are enough to achieve a social optimum. On the other 
hand, if consumers are not able to assess the difference between products sold under 
the same brand and packaging, inefficient market allocations are possible. The key issue 
is the distortion of consumer decisions due to lack of information. In fact, the European 
Commission stated that a public intervention is required if: 
‘[…the variation in quality] has the potential to alter the economic behaviour 
of the average consumer who would take a different purchasing decision if 
he/she were made aware of such difference.’ (Commission notice C(2017) 
6532 final)3 
This report aims to investigate the incentives that firms may have to provide different 
varieties of the same product in different Member States. The analysis is essential in 
understanding the possible unintended consequences of possible regulations of the DC-
SIP phenomenon. The existing economic literature was explored for contributions 
explaining the drivers behind product differentiation, with a specific focus on 
international marketing.  
Although there is almost no scholarly contribution regarding DC-SIP explicitly, there is 
an extensive literature about related issues in the fields of Industrial Organisation and 
Marketing Management. Figure 1 illustrates the organisation of the discussion. 
Chapters 1 to 3 focus on the issue of difference in composition, regardless of whether 
the products are seemingly identical or not. This is the objective component of DC-SIP. 
Chapter 1 reviews the Industrial Organisation literature on strategic quality choice and 
product differentiation in one market. The discussion in Chapter 1 addresses the 
following study questions: 
• Why do firms offer different varieties of the same products? 
• Why do firms not offer all varieties to all consumers and then let them choose? 
According to the literature, quality is an endogenous choice based on a profit 
maximisation criterion. The factors affecting this choice are investigated and it is 
concluded that firms may have an incentive to supply different varieties if market 
conditions are different across Member States. 
This discussion is expanded in Chapter 2 which explores firm strategies such as 
discrimination and strategic response (in terms of quality) to changes in policy or in the 
institutional/legal environment. The focus of the discussion is on strategic quality 
choices in multiple markets and the consequent equilibria. In fact, DC-SIP can be 
considered to be a special case of spatial segmentation based on quality. Although DC-
 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=47227 
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SIP concerns the Single Market, multiple-market models provide interesting insights 
into the problem. In fact, the Single Market is so large that consumers are spatially 
dispersed. As a consequence, they cannot all shop in the same stores and spatial 
segmentation is still possible despite the common institutions. The study questions in 
this chapters are: 
• Can DC-SIP be rationalised as the result of quality discrimination? 
• Can DC-SIP be rationalised as the result of a possible strategic firm response in 
anticipation (or as a consequence) of a policy or an institutional change that 
limits the ability of firms to engage in third-degree price discrimination (e.g., a 
potential limitation of their ability to impose ‘territorial supply constraints’)?  
It was found that a firm with market power optimally reacts to policies that impose a 
constraint on a strategic choice (for example: on quality) by adjusting the decision 
variables that are not subject to the policy (for example: quantity and/or price). This 
conclusion suggests that unintended consequences of DC-SIP regulation are possible 
due to the strategic reaction of firms. 
 
Figure 1: The Structure of the Review 
 
Chapter 1 
Drivers of Product differentiation 
Why DC? 
Difference in Composition of  
Seemingly Identical Branded Products 
(DC-SIP) 
Objective Component 
Differentiation 
(Difference in Composition) 
Subjective Component 
Consumers’ Imperfect Information 
(Seemingly Identical) 
Chapter 2 
Segmentation, Parallel Trade 
What Equilibrium in multiple markets? 
Chapter 3 
Firms’ Strategic Decisions 
Adaptation or Standardization? 
Chapter 4 
Consumers’ Purchasing Intention 
Why Seemingly Identical Goods? 
Chapter 5 
An Illustrative DC-SIP Model 
What Policy Implications? 
Economic rationale behind differences in the composition  
of seemingly identical branded food products in the Single Market:  
A review of the literature 
 
 
 
13 
In Chapter 3, the survey is expanded to the international marketing field. The aim is to 
address the following study questions: 
• What strategies do firms adopt for quality-based market segmentation? 
• What are the market drivers providing incentives for those strategies? 
An extensive literature debates the choice between a standardisation versus localisation 
approach to brand internationalisation. The former strategy is based on the supply of a 
standardised product in all markets, and the latter adjusts the goods to the 
characteristics of local markets. Consistently with the results from Industrial 
Organisation studies, it was found that four drivers guide the choice between the two 
approaches: (a) cross-national homogeneity of demand; (b) potential for cross-national 
economies of scale; (c) cost of modification of the product; (d) foreign price elasticity 
of demand. In addition, hybrid approaches are possible. 
The managerial literature supports the conclusion that the marketing mix is determined 
jointly. This confirms the conclusion that regulation of composition and quality might 
affect the other dimensions of the mix, including price, promotion, and positioning. 
In Chapter 4 the following study question is investigated:  
• Why may firms be incentivised to use seemingly identical brands and labels when 
marketing products with differences in composition? 
This section provides fundamental information about consumer behaviour and 
addresses the subjective component of DC-SIP.4 
The conclusions of the literature review are illustrated in a numerical simulation in 
Chapter 5. A market equilibrium model is used to show the possible implications of a 
policy scenario. It was found that socially inefficient regulations are possible and that 
all options may have unintended redistribution consequences harming specific groups 
of consumers or local firms. Information policies seem to be preferable compared to 
imposing quality standards 
 
 
  
 
4 For a more detailed analyses of the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ purchase choices and welfare see 
Colen et al. (2019). 
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1 Drivers of product differentiation and implications 
for DC-SIP. A review of the Industrial Organisation 
literature  
 
Carlo Russo and Edward Kyei Twum 
 
University of Cassino and Lazio Meridionale 
Department of Economics and Law 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The first question a researcher is faced with when addressing DC-SIP is: what are the 
incentives driving firms to offer seemingly identical products with a different composition 
to different groups of consumers? The question addresses the objective component of 
the DC-SIP problem (why firms supply seemingly identical goods with a different 
composition). The subjective component (why firms do not inform consumers) is 
discussed in Chapter 4. The understanding the incentives for differentiation is the first 
step in the economic analysis of DC-SIP in Chapter 5.  
The review has two aims. Firstly, a critical discussion of the economic incentives for 
product differentiation, and secondly the main conclusions from the literature regarding 
the equilibrium in differentiated markets are presented. The analysis of the literature 
supports the discussion in Chapter 5, allowing speculation about the possible 
consequences of regulation. The focus in this Chapter is on one-market equilibrium 
models, with the analysis of multiple markets being presented in to Chapter 2. 
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Figure 1-1: Drivers of product differentiation and implications for DC-SIP 
 
 
Figure 1-1 summarises the structure of the Chapter. The focus is on the analysis of the 
economic rationales for supplying a good with different compositions. This issue is the 
main topic of an extensive literature on Industrial Organisation (IO) regarding product 
differentiation and strategic quality choice. The main assumption is that firms behave 
rationally. They supply whatever variety (composition) maximises profits. 
Firms choose the composition that maximises profits under a set of constraints and 
market conditions including technology, consumer demand, and the structure/conduct 
parameters of the industry. The review presented in this chapter summarises the 
relevant parameters in four categories: (i) consumer preferences (Section 1.3), (ii) cost 
functions (Section 1.4), (iii) competition (Section 1.5), and iv) regulation and technical 
issues (Section 1.6) (see Lancaster 1990). 
The review identifies several key conclusions regarding DC-SIP. The literature about 
monopolistic competition and consumer love of variety concludes that the number of 
varieties that firms can supply in a market is limited. This conclusion suggests that it 
may not be viable to impose regulations forcing to sell all existing varieties to all 
consumers (in order to avoid discrimination and expand consumers’ choice set).  
Because the number of varieties is limited, firms must strategically select the optimal 
compositions. The literature states that consumer preferences, cost structure, market 
structure, and institutional environment are the key variables to be considered. A key 
policy conclusion supported by the literature is that imposing the same product 
composition in all markets may be socially inefficient if the four variables diverge across 
Member states. 
The reminder of the Chapter illustrates these conclusions in detail. 
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1.2 Defining the scope of the analysis 
Differences in composition is a well-known issue in the economic literature, and is found 
under the definitions of ‘strategic quality choice’ and ‘product differentiation’. These 
issues are classical topics in Industrial Organisation (Tirole 1988; Pepall et al. 2014; 
Waldman & Jensen 2016). The extensive literature includes thousands of contributions 
and is too large for the purpose of the study presented in this paper (e.g., Eaton & 
Lipsey 1989).5 As a consequence, the analysis presented here is limited to studies that 
are directly related to the study question. From the point of view of the DC-SIP problem, 
the review presented here investigates the factors determining the choice made by firms 
regarding product composition. 
The main distinction in the literature is between prefect information versus incomplete 
information models (e.g., Wolinsky 1984). Because the focus in this Chapter is on the 
objective component of the DC-SIP problem only, the analysis is restricted to perfect 
information models alone. Imperfect information is discussed in Chapter 4 and here is 
only considered when instrumental to the topic. Similarly, the focus is on contributions 
that may have direct or indirect reference to the agri-food supply chain, ignoring the 
vast research about differentiation in the service markets such as insurance (e.g., 
Spence 1978) or utilities (Woo et al. 2014). The delimitation of the scope of the review 
allows a compact illustration of the main findings in the literature. 
According to Industrial Organisation (IO) theory, product composition is part of the 
general idea of ‘quality’. Following the typical setting by Lancaster (1966, see Section 
1.3), quality is just a set of product attributes. A difference in composition between two 
products means that the goods offer consumers a different set of attributes and 
therefore the quality is different. However, it must be noted that this does not 
necessarily imply that one product is better than the other, but they are simply different. 
This idea is discussed further in sections 1.3.4 and 1.3.5, where vertical and horizontal 
quality models are presented. In this Chapter the mainstream economic jargon and 
differences in quality simply mean that the product is offered in different varieties, with 
no speculation about the relative values of the varieties.  
 
5 A search in Google scholar using the keywords ‘Product differentiation’ and ‘Industrial Organization’ returned 
30,500 results. 
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1.3 Consumer preferences as a rationale for differences in composition 
The incentives to adapt the composition of products to consumer preferences are 
discussed in this Section. The literature concludes that if consumer preferences 
regarding recipes are spatially heterogenous, firms might want to supply products with 
different compositions to each group. Consequently, preference heterogeneity can be a 
driver in the objective component of DC-SIP. 
The consequences of postulates regarding consumer preferences are investigated in 
relation to the optimal choice of product composition firms can make and – consequently 
– in relation to market equilibrium. In particular, two key postulates are discussed: love 
of variety (Section 1.3.2) and heterogeneity of individual preferences (Sections 1.3.3, 
1.3.4, and 1.3.5). The postulates have resulted in two vast streams of contributions 
providing key insights into the objective component of DC-SIP. 
The foundation of the IO models about consumer demand for quality is the seminal work 
by Lancaster (1966). The Author modelled consumer choice when ‘quality matters’, 
building the foundations of analysis of demand for differentiated products. The approach 
is founded on three main postulates: (i) consumers buy the products because they 
derive utility from their characteristics or properties (the product ‘attributes’), (ii) 
products differ in the type and intensity of the attributes they offer to consumers, and 
(iii) consumers have heterogeneous preferences over the set of available attributes.  
Consumers consider products as bundles of attributes. In general, each product contains 
more than one attribute and each attribute is contained in more than one product 
(although with differing intensities). Consumers optimise the combination of products 
they buy in order to maximise the utility they derive from the attributes. When taking 
their decision, consumers face a budget and a technical constraint. The budget 
The meaning of “quality” in economics 
In the economic literature (especially in the Industrial Organization 
literature), the word “quality” is used in many different contexts to refer to 
any type of product differentiation. It refers to the nature and intensity of 
product attributes or characteristics (Lancaster 1966). Products serving the 
same purpose but with a different attributes or characteristics are “of different 
quality”. It must be noted that the term may refer to a vertical idea of “quality 
level” (e.g., high quality versus low quality products) and a horizontal notion 
of “different variety” (such as different flavour or colour) alike. In this sense, 
it includes the case of differences in composition of seemingly identical 
branded (food) products (DC-SIP). An important distinction is the attribute 
classification in search, experience and credence. This classification is based 
on the ability to consumers to learn about the “quality” of a product before 
purchase (search quality), after purchase (experience quality) or not at all 
(credence quality). DC-SIP concerns differences in experience or credence 
attributes. 
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constraint requires the total expenditure for the basket of goods to be equal to or lower 
than the available consumer wealth. The technology constraint requires the bundle of 
attributes to be obtained through a feasible combination of existing products (e.g., 
involving non-negative quantities, or in any case compatible with the nature of the 
goods). Under the assumption of rationality, consumers choose the basket of goods 
from the feasible ones that yields the highest utility. 
At the optimum, the Lancasterian consumer chooses the basket of goods yielding the 
highest intensity of the desired attributes for their Euro. Defining quality as the set of 
desired attributes, the Lancaster model provides the theoretical foundations for the 
definition of consumer value as the quality/price ratio.  
Consumer value of a given good is subjective and relative. It is subjective because it 
depends on individual preferences, which means the value attached to the same product 
may differ from consumer to consumer. It is relative because the consumption choice 
is defined by comparing quality and price of all available goods. A product is chosen if 
it provides higher value than the available alternatives.6 The subjective nature of value 
is addressed in the next section 1.3.1 and in Chapter 4. The implications of relative 
nature of value on competition are discussed in section 1.5.  
 
1.3.1 Drivers of heterogeneity in consumer demand for attributes 
Subjective demand for quality is one of the most important motivations for the objective 
component of DC-SIP. It explains why firms offer products with different attributes (i.e., 
of ‘different quality’) to consumers with different preferences. Producers may 
differentiate their product as an adaptation technique, a strategy to introduce a new 
product onto a market (country) meeting the taste of consumers. Mathur (2017) and 
Vignali (2001) suggest that McDonalds adapted their offer to consumer taste by 
changing their original menu in their attempt to go international. For example, McAloo 
Tikki and Chili Paneer Pockets are being sold in India, McSpaghetti is increasingly being 
sold in The Philippines, McLaks (grilled salmon sandwich) in Norway, Chilled yogurt 
drinks in Turkey, and Samurai Pork Burger with sweet sauce in Thailand. McDonalds 
enter the new market offering a set of products including ‘localised’ varieties in order to 
attract customers who value local food. Preferences are heterogenous across space and 
so is the range of products that McDonalds supplies.  
A sizable literature has developed over the years investigating the implications of 
preference heterogeneity for firms operating in differentiated industries. A brief 
overview is provided in Sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3in order to illustrate the different 
modelling approaches. The drivers of heterogeneity in consumer demand for attributes 
are divided into two main groups: (i) models of heterogeneous individual preferences, 
and (ii) models of individual demand for variety. The former group investigates 
systematic difference in preferences across segments of consumers, the latter assesses 
the consequences of the assumption of quasi-concavity in the utility functions of 
individual consumers. 
 
6 Assuming that the goods give the consumer a utility that is at least equal to the reservation utility, that is, 
the utility that consumers would obtain if they abstain from the purchase.   
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1.3.2 Demand for variety and non-address quality models 
Non-address quality models explain why firms supply a limited number of product 
varieties to a market, and DC-SIP can be considered to be a consequence of this 
limitation. In an ideal world where there is no constraint on product differentiation, firms 
can supply all possible varieties to consumers and then let them choose the one they 
prefer (charging a price premium). On the other hand, if the number of varieties is 
limited, firms must choose which ones to supply. Obviously, the optimal choice in this 
regard may differ across Member States if market conditions and consumer preferences 
are heterogeneous. As a consequence, differences in composition may emerge across 
Member States.     
The typical textbook models of consumer choice assume strictly quasi-concave 
preferences (smooth indifference contours strictly convex to the origin) and infinitely 
divisible products (e.g., Nicolson & Snyder 2011). Strict convexity of indifference curves 
implies a ‘taste for variety’ because, by the definition of convexity, for any basket of n 
goods it is possible to find a basket of m>n goods that provides higher utility and does 
not cost any more money.  
This result is often defined as ‘demand for variety’, meaning that – keeping all other 
factors constant – the consumer prefers to experience a large number of goods instead 
of restricting the purchase to few selected items. In fact, under the common assumption 
that indifference curves are asymptotic to the origin, the consumer will buy all available 
products, although in a small quantity. This approach is particularly suited to models 
investigating the ‘representative consumer’, the hypothetical buyer whose optimal 
basket exactly replicates the aggregate sales in the market. Obviously, this 
representative consumer has to purchase all marketed varieties. 
The ‘demand for variety’ assumption has resulted in a large literature on differentiated 
markets. These contributions are often referred to as non-address model because 
consumers have a demand for all existing products without focusing on a specific variety 
(or address) (Eaton & Lipsey 1989). The two main focuses of this set of contributions 
are the assessment of the degree of product differentiation in the market and the entry 
conditions for firms. The foundations of the theory were established by Chamberlain 
(1933) in his book about monopolistic competition. In the general rendering of the 
theory, consumers exhibit a fixed total demand that is allocated among the entire set 
of products in the market (regardless the number of goods). Each firm produces one 
variety so that the number of products in the market is equal to the number of firms. 
In the absence of entry barriers, firms enter the market as long they expect positive 
profits and equilibrium is reached when firms are at zero-profits. In the presence of 
economies of scale (as in the Chamberlain model), the presence of monopolistic 
competition is inefficient because it yields excessive differentiation. In contrast, other 
models that assume different utility functions (Dixit & Stiglitz 1977) or cost structures 
(Spence 1976; Perloff & Salop 1985) produce opposite results such as under-provision 
of differentiation or even social optimum. 
More recent contributions focus on generalising the CES demand function that was 
introduced by Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) (such as Behrens and Murata 2007; Zhelobodko et 
al. 2012; Bilbiie et al. 2012). A recent contribution by Parenti et al. (2017) proposes a 
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flexible framework encompassing most of the existing models by considering a large set 
of demand and competition features. The model uses the general concept of elasticity 
of substitution between varieties in a symmetric consumption pattern to derive the 
equilibrium, finding that the higher the elasticity of substitution is (i.e., the lower 
consumers’ love for varieties), the less differentiated varieties are, and so the lower the 
mark-ups made by firms are.  
Monopolistic competition models are increasingly used in studies of international trade 
and heterogeneous firms (e.g., Melitz 2003 providing an extension of Krugman 1980). 
In general, the purpose of these models is to derive the entry/exit conditions in the 
export market, and consequently, the degree of product differentiation. In this regard, 
Nocco et al. (2014) provide a characterisation of international monopolistic competition 
based on ‘variable elasticity of substitution’ and linear demand, concluding that: 
“[…] product variety is too rich (poor) when varieties are close (far) 
substitutes, the sunk entry cost is small (large), market size is large 
(small) and the difference between the highest and the lowest possible 
marginal cost realizations is small (large).” (p. 309) 
This finding summarises the key drivers of the equilibrium in non-address models: 
‘demand for (love of) variety’ (often measured by the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties), entry costs, possible economies/diseconomies of scale, and the size of the 
market. The equilibrium is obtained by comparing decreasing profits from entry (the 
marginal benefit from entry decreases with the number of firms) with a constant or 
increasing cost of entry. The benefit from entry depends on how much consumers are 
willing to pay for variety and on how large the market is (the larger the market, the 
larger the share for the individual firm and therefore the profit from entry). A fairly 
common result in the literature is that if consumers are price-sensitive in their choice of 
variety, price margins are lower (because of competition) and there are fewer products 
on the market (because the zero-profit condition is achieved with a smaller number of 
firms). Similarly, if entry costs are high, fewer firms (usually the most efficient ones) 
enter the market. 
Non-address models can be used to understand why firms may prefer to supply 
consumers with a limited selection of products instead of offering all existing varieties 
to all consumers in the Single Market. If consumer demand for variety is low (i.e., they 
are ‘highly’ sensitive to price in their choice of variety), and the cost of marketing a new 
variety is high, firms might prefer to restrict varieties. An important example of 
marketing cost in the agri-food system is the access cost to limited shelf-space in 
supermarkets. This cost can be due to upfront payments (such as slotting allowances) 
or to the opportunity cost of foregoing alternative varieties due to a physical constraint 
on capacity (shelves can only fit so many different product) (e.g., Bloom et al. 2000).  
The main conclusion concerning DC-SIP is that even in the presence of love for variety, 
firms cannot offer all existing varieties to all consumers. Given the constraint on the 
number of varieties, firms supply the most profitable ones. The literature explaining why 
the most profitable varieties may vary across Member States and why differences in 
composition may emerge as a consequences presented in the next section 1.3.3.    
 
Economic rationale behind differences in the composition  
of seemingly identical branded food products in the Single Market:  
A review of the literature 
 
 
 
21 
1.3.3 Heterogeneous individual preferences and address quality models 
Address quality models explains why firms may decide to supply products with different 
compositions. The goal of this approach is to assess whether or not it is profitable to 
supply a differentiated product. The question is directly related to the objective 
component of DC-SIP.  
The majority of contributions in this Chapter focus on the case of differentiation between 
single-product firms in a single market. This simple setting facilitates the illustration of 
the fundamental economic principles in a relatively simple setting. Yet, the analysis can 
be easily extended to the case of multi-product, multi-market firms. Multiple markets 
are discussed in Chapter 2 and a multi-product analysis is provided in Chapter 5. 
The theoretical foundations of address models establish a link between product 
attributes and consumer willingness to pay for goods that meet their preferences. 
Differentiation emerges as a consequence of a principle of profit maximisation. In order 
to charge consumers higher prices, firms supply different products to different 
consumers. Differences in composition across Member States are expected as a 
consequence of the attempt to adjust recipes to local taste. According to the literature, 
heterogeneity of preferences may be a major driver in the objective component of DC-
SIP.7 
The literature on the address model is extensive. The general models for consumer 
demand are presented in this section. Sections 1.3.4 and 1.3.5 illustrate the 
corresponding market equilibrium models. 
 
Address models are based on the seminal work by Lancaster (1966). In the standard 
Lancaster framework, the preferences for the attributes are defined at the individual 
consumer level. Each consumer has his/her own preference system. The differences 
across consumers are summarised in the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between 
attributes, representing the relative preference of an attribute over another one. Due to 
heterogeneous preferences, different consumers may choose a different bundle of goods 
in order to maximise the utility of the goods.   
Although preferences are taken as given by economists, an extensive literature has 
investigated factors affecting preferences and ultimately consumer choice (e.g., Roos 
et al. 1998; Aertsens 2009). Cultural, social, demographic, and economic (such as 
income) variables are routinely used as explanatory variables to estimate demand ‘when 
quality matters’ (for instance, Rosen 1974 on hedonic price models; Berry 1994; Berry 
et al. 1995; Train 2009 on discrete choice models; see Bonnet & Richards 2016 for a 
recent survey of methodologies). 
These factors can be used to explain why demand may vary over space. For example, 
cross-country examination suggested that the relationship between income and beer 
consumption has an inverse U-shape (Swinnenn & Colen 2011). Nam et al. 2010 argued 
 
7 As mentioned already, the literature in this Chapter refers to perfect information models. The discussion of 
the subjective component of DC-SIP can be found in Chapter 4. 
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that the increasing demand for meat consumption in Asia is influenced by the traditional 
use of chopsticks and eating etiquette at the table. A study across 11 EU countries found 
that cultural differences determine food-related behaviour notwithstanding the Single 
Market (Valli & Traill 2005). Similar differences between urban and rural areas were 
found by Celik, Ates, and Ceylan (2010). Seegebart et al. (2016) found that the 
statistically significant difference in the demand for organic food in Germany and the 
USA was explained by the different shares of similar cross-border consumer segments 
in the two markets. 
In general, there is consistent evidence of statistically significant systematic differences 
in preferences and consumer behaviour across groups (either consumer clusters or 
countries). The heterogeneity can be driven by the difference in social and cultural 
background or even by the different weight that each cluster has in the market. In both 
cases, firms face a different consumer demand and may have an incentive to supply 
different products. This result is the foundation of classical market segmentation and 
product differentiation strategies (e.g., Smith 1956, see also Chapter 2 of this report).  
The postulate of heterogeneous consumer preferences has motivated an extensive 
literature on quality choice and product positioning (e.g., Gwin & Gwin 2003). In this 
class of models, consumers have specific preferences over a continuous space of 
parameters describing the attributes of products (the attribute space). These studies 
are often referred to as address models because   
“different consumers have different most preferred locations in this space 
and thus can be thought of as having different addresses in that space” 
(Eaton & Lipsey 1989, p. 727).  
A key difference in address versus non-address models is the nature of competition 
between suppliers of different products. In address models, the competition is localised. 
A given product only competes with those located nearby in attribute space. On the 
other hand, the demand system in the non-address model defines an elasticity of 
substitution matrix for all available alternatives. Consequently, each product competes 
with all other goods. 
Address models are divided into two main groups: vertical and horizontal quality 
models:  
“In horizontal differentiation, consumers do not agree on a preference 
ranking among the available products in the model, whereas in vertical 
differentiation, consumers share the same ordinal ranking but differ as to 
the intensity of their preference for higher-ranked products.” (Saitone & 
Sexton 2010, p. 344) 
 
1.3.4 Vertical quality model 
In vertical quality models, if products are offered at the same price, all consumers prefer 
the same one. Such a unanimous choice is defined as the highest quality product. 
Consumers agree on the ranking, but they differ in their evaluation of the perceived 
quality differences and, therefore, they are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for 
such differences. An extensive literature has developed on the topic (Giannakas 2011). 
Economic rationale behind differences in the composition  
of seemingly identical branded food products in the Single Market:  
A review of the literature 
 
 
 
23 
The original studies are by Mussa & Rosen (1978), and Gabszewicz & Thisse (1979, 
1980). 
The contributions focused on the choice of the optimal quality level and price 
competition in a differentiated industry. A key result is that firms can attenuate price 
competition (escaping the Bertrand zero-profit outcome) by introducing quality 
differences in their products (Shaked & Stutton 1982). In addition, vertically 
differentiated industries can result in natural oligopolies with a small number of brand-
producing firms (Shaked & Stutton 1983). 
In a typical vertical quality model, consumers choose between a finite number of 
products. Usually, each firm supplies only one branded product. Consumer choice is 
determined by the maximisation of a surplus or indirect utility function of some sort 
where the price is subtracted to the consumer willingness to pay (WTP) for the product. 
In turn, the WTP is a function of product characteristics (i.e., quality) and consumer 
preferences. Firms choose price and quality strategically in order to maximise profits.  
The setting has been applied to a large number of topics. For example, Giannakas 
(2002) used a vertical quality model to describe the effects of mislabelling of organic 
food, Lapan & Moschini (2004) addressed the issue of innovation, trade and Genetically 
Modified (GM) Products, Bontems et al. (1999) investigated private labels, Zago & Pick 
(2004) considered labelling policies, Moschini et al. (2008) modelled Geographical 
Indications, and Crespi & Marette (2001) applied the model to food safety certification. 
The researchers in all these examples debate the properties and the implications of the 
market equilibrium when the industry provides high-quality goods (such as organic, GM 
organism free, branded products, GI or certified products) and low-quality goods (such 
as conventional, GM, unbranded, or uncertified products).  
These studies are organised as three-stage games. In the first stage, the firms or the 
regulator take a strategic decision regarding an issue of interest such as whether to 
entry the industry, to impose a standard or a certification, to create a private label, to 
impose a regulation or a ban on importing. In the second stage, the firms decide the 
quality of their products, and in the third stage they compete on price. Consequently, 
the researcher can model the impact of the first-stage decision on quality and prices. 
The results can be used to compute consumer welfare, profits, and ultimately social 
welfare.  
A limited set of contributions considers the possibility of multiproduct firms. The topic 
was introducing by Katz (1984) who noted that multiproduct firms might refrain from 
differentiation because of possible cannibalisation of same-brand products. Gilbert & 
Matutes (1993) proposed a model describing the market outcome when firms can supply 
up to two varieties (basic and premium). Cheng & Peng (2014) generalise the results 
for any finite number of varieties and for positive costs of expanding the assortment. 
The multi-product models provide interesting insights into the assortment strategies 
adopted by firms. Katz (1984, p. 164) found that: 
“There may be spillovers between the submarkets for high- and low-quality 
variants, where the degree of competition in one submarket affects the 
degree of competition in another. As a result of these spillovers, some firms 
may choose not to offer full product lines even in cases where such 
specialization is inefficient from a social perspective. This specialization is 
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particularly likely to occur when there is intense competition at the low end 
of the quality spectrum.”  
Multi-product models highlight the interdependencies of products offered by the same 
producer. In particular, they stress the profit opportunities from supplying different 
varieties to different market segments. A multi-product firm can offer high-price, high-
quality goods to the consumers with high WTP and low-price, low-quality goods to 
consumers with low WTP. Instead, a single-product firm must satisfy both markets 
segments with the same quality/price combination.  
The issue will be developed in Chapters 2 and 5 where multi-country models are 
illustrated. Yet, the intuition is directly derived from the above discussion. The objective 
component of DC-SIP emerges because a multinational firm may increase profits by 
offering a specific quality/price combination in each country instead of supplying the 
same quality in each market. 
 
1.3.5 Horizontal quality models 
Horizontal quality models describe a market where the quality ranking of the goods 
depends on individual preferences and varies across consumers. This approach is suited 
to differences in composition that do not result in ‘objectively lower quality’ of the goods. 
These contributions provide insights into the differentiation strategies of firms. In 
particular, they identify the conditions determining whether firms have an incentive to 
provide different varieties compared to competitors. A key finding is that firms may 
have an incentive to supply products of different compositions to consumers if 
preferences are heterogeneous. Furthermore, all firms in the market choose the optimal 
variety simultaneously, meaning that their decisions are interdependent. The 
composition of the product also depends on the compositions of all other goods in the 
market.  
Horizontal quality models build on a seminal paper by Hotelling (1929) describing a 
spatial model of price competition between two firms choosing their location on a 
hypothetical Main Street. Consumers face total cost for the goods that is the sum of 
price and a ‘transportation cost’, a function of the distance between their location and 
that of the firm. Consumers choose the outlet that is associated to the lower total cost. 
In this setting, both firms locate their business at midpoint, serving half of the street 
each. This result is widely known as the minimum differentiation principle because both 
firms choose the same location even if the entire street is available. Salop (1979) found 
that in a large market without boundary effects (the so-called circular road) a symmetric 
equilibrium exists and the minimum differentiation principle does not necessarily hold.8 
The spatial model by Hotelling was extended to cover location in non-spatial context, 
originating the so-called characteristics approach (Lancaster 1990).9 Firms in this 
 
8 The problems of uniqueness of equilibrium in the simple Hotelling-type model are debated in Salop (1979), 
Novshek (1980), and Economides (1984). Quite early it became evident that the minimum differentiation 
principle is not a general result (Lerner & Singer 1937; Eaton & Lipsey 1975). 
9 In this regard, see Horstmann & Slivinski (1985) for a formal discussion. 
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approach choose the characteristics of the product just like the firms in Hotelling choose 
their location on Main Street. The direct application of the Hotelling model to product 
differentiation concludes that, at the equilibrium, the number of products supplied 
increases with the size of the market and decreases with the substitutability between 
products in the group (the transportation cost) and the size of fixed costs in production. 
Furthermore, the model finds that the market overprovides variety (Lancaster 1990).10 
In the attempt to overcome the limitations of the Hotelling model, researchers 
developed a number of location-analog models (Lancaster 1990). Firms in these models 
locate their product in the attribute space by choosing the product specifications (i.e., 
the bundle of attributes). Each consumer has an ideal variety, which is a preferred 
combination of the relevant product attributes. Transportation cost becomes a monetary 
evaluation of the disutility that consumers incur when consuming a product offering a 
combination of attributes that is different from the ideal variety. The disutility is usually 
modelled as a compensating function, which is convex in the Euclidean distance in the 
attribute space between the ideal variety for the consumer and the location of the 
product (Lancaster 1979). Merél & Sexton (2011) provide a discussion of the generalised 
Hotelling model and its extensions. 
Horizontal quality models are widely used in a variety of studies including (for example): 
strategic assortment (e.g., Alptekinoğlu & Corbett 2008; Gaur & Honhon 2006), 
competition and anti-trust issues in differentiated market (for example, the extensive 
literature about the breakfast cereals industry in the U.S.A. such as Schmalensee 1978; 
Scherer 1979; Nevo 2000), consumer search, differentiation, and agglomeration (Sthal 
1982; Sajeesh 2016).  
Horizontal quality models can be used to investigate DC-SIP when consumers do not 
agree about the ranking of the products. For example, consumers may have different 
opinions about the flavour of a products or the size of the packaging. 
 
1.3.6 Credence goods. 
As a final remark, it must be noted that food product attributes are not restricted to the 
organoleptic characteristics alone, but might include immaterial characteristics that are 
not directly observable by consumers, the so-called credence attributes (Darby & Karni 
1973; Allaire 2018). Credence attributes such as origin (e.g., Carter et al. 2006; 
Menapace et al. 2011), ethics (e.g., De Pelsmacker et al 2005; Zander & Hamm 2010), 
or status (e.g., Wiedmann et al. 2009) are also relevant for consumers and should be 
considered to be part of the definition of quality from a Lancasterian perspective. They 
are of particular relevance to the DC-SIP issue. The presence of credence attributes is 
a condition for the breaching of the Unfair Commercial Practice Directive 2005/29/EC 
(UCPD). In fact, quality differentiation is a violation if: 
• “consumers have legitimate specific expectations from a product 
compared to a “product of reference” and the product significantly 
deviates from these expectations;  
 
10 Noticeably, these results are similar to the Chamberlain model of monopolistic competition (Section 1.3.2). 
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• the trader omits or fails to convey adequate information to consumers 
and they cannot understand that a difference with their expectations 
may exist;  
• this inadequate or insufficient information is likely to distort the 
economic behaviour of the average consumer, for instance by leading 
him or her to buy a product he or she would not have bought otherwise.” 
(Commission notice C(2017) 6532 final) 
If the consumer is able to assess the attributes of food products perfectly, DC-SIP/dual 
quality is not an issue because bullet points 2 and 3 are not met.11 This discussion will 
be expanded in Chapter 4.  
 
1.4 Cost functions as supply-side determinants of differences in 
composition 
The analysis of consumer preferences in Section 1.3 debated the demand-side 
determinants of difference in composition. In this section, the literature addressing the 
main supply-side determinants is reviewed. In principle, firms may have an incentive to 
supply goods with different compositions even when consumer preferences are 
homogeneous if production cost differ across countries or if input prices are different. 
Differences in composition emerge in these cases because of cost-minimisation. A 
classic example is the use of a less expensive ingredient in an export market. Other 
examples include the use of local production plants (and local varieties) or different 
input proportions.   
The existing literature suggests that the choice of quality (and consequently of 
composition) depends on the nature of the cost functions. In this regard, the literature 
points out two broad classes of costs: production costs, and the cost of providing quality. 
 
1.4.1 Production costs 
Cost functions measures the cost of producing a given quantity of a good. Brécard 
(2010) noted that the assumption regarding cost structure may affect the equilibrium 
outcome in vertical quality models. Although this is a general conclusion, the focus in 
this section is on two main issues: returns to scale and production non-convexities 
(Eaton & Lipsey 1989).  
If the technology exhibits economies of scale, there might be an incentive to avoid 
market segmentation and quality differentiation (Levitt 1983). On the other hand, 
diseconomies of scale favour small scale and possibly local or differentiated production. 
As discussed in the section on monopolistic competition models, the assumptions 
 
11 Noticeably, the seminal paper of Darby & Karni (1973) refers to a similar frame in the service sector. In the 
case of car repair services the Authors noted that “the consumer is unaware of the ability of the repair service 
to satisfy a given want” (p. 67). As a consequence, reputational incentives do not hold, frauds are possible, 
and “Under such circumstances the consumer is sold services which, if he were adequately informed, would 
not have been purchased” (p. 68).  
Economic rationale behind differences in the composition  
of seemingly identical branded food products in the Single Market:  
A review of the literature 
 
 
 
27 
regarding the returns to scale may drive the equilibrium outcome and the consequences 
for welfare. 
Production non-convexities result from factors such as product research and 
development costs, set-up costs, or indivisibilities of fixed capital. These factors imply 
decreasing average costs over an initial range of output and may limit the number of 
varieties that firms may be willing to supply. In general, these non-convexities are 
modelled using simple costs functions that assume a fixed cost of entry, without 
stipulating the actual determinants. 
International advertising is an example of the two issues. The literature debates the 
scale economies or diseconomies in adverting (see Melewar & Vemmervik 2004). A 
centralised approach may exploit the competencies of the home headquarters and 
deliver global messages through a common brand identity (e.g., Ryans & Donnelly 
1968; Peebles et al. 1978; Link 1988; Laroche et al. 2001). On the other hand, 
diseconomies of scale in advertising result in generic messages that fail to generate 
consumer involvement (e.g., Hite & Fraser, 1990; Cavusgil et al., 1993). Furthermore, 
international advertising may generate non-convexity in the cost function, if it results 
in a fixed cost for the launch of a new variety. 
In general, if the economies of scale outweigh the benefits from market segmentation, 
firms may prefer to sell large volumes of homogeneous goods. On the other hand, in 
the presence of diseconomies of scale, the incentive to supply goods of different 
composition increases because firms do not gain from high volume production. 
 
1.4.2 Costs of producing quality 
The optimal quality level in industrial organisation models is obtained by comparing the 
marginal benefit of increasing quality (usually, the increase in consumer willingness to 
pay for the goods) with the corresponding marginal cost. Consequently, the predicted 
quality of the marketed goods depends on the assumptions regarding the cost function. 
In general, it is expected that if – for whatever reason – the cost of providing quality in 
two markets is different, the quality provided also differs. 
The majority of contributions model the cost of providing quality as: i) a fixed cost of 
quality improvement (e.g., Ronnen 1991), and/or ii) an increase in variable costs that 
is proportional to quality (e.g., Mussa & Rosen 1978 or Lehmann-Grube 1997). The first 
type of cost refers to situations where upfront investments (such as new plant, R&D 
expenditures, or advertising) are required to increase quality. The variable cost of 
quality refers to situations when quality depends on raw materials or skilled labour.  
All other factors being constant, the quality outcome depends on the assumptions made 
about the cost function. In his classic paper about business location, Hotelling (1929) 
considered a linear cost function for differentiation (a transportation cost) and obtained 
a ‘minimum differentiation’ principle where all firms produce a homogeneous product.12 
 
12 It must be noted that d’Aspremont et al. (1979) showed that the principle of minimum differentiation was 
not proved by Hotelling in his model because the game has no Nash equilibria in prices when firms are 
sufficiently close to each other - due to the assumption of linear transportation cost. 
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Tirole (1988) assumes that there is no cost in providing quality (so that production costs 
are independent of quality) and derives a ‘maximum differentiation’ result where one 
firm provides the maximum quality level and the other firms provide minimum quality. 
Convexity in variable costs of providing quality may lead to a variety of results. For 
example, Mussa & Rosen (1978) and Ecchia & Lambertini (1997) derived a finite 
differentiation result where firms offer products of different quality but do not adopt 
extreme solutions.  
In general, the optimal quality level is derived by equating the marginal benefits and 
the marginal costs of increasing quality. All else being constant, the more the cost grows 
with quality, the lower the equilibrium quality is. 
 
1.5 Competition 
Perfect competition models assume homogeneous goods and undistinguishable 
suppliers. They are not suited to study product differentiation because suppliers produce 
undifferentiated product by assumption. As a consequence, the extensive literature 
product differentiation was developed using imperfect competition models (Saitone & 
Sexton 2010; Bonanno et al. 2018). Two main modelling issues are addressed in this 
section: the competition type (quantity versus quality), and the timing (sequential 
versus simultaneous). 
Several contributes investigated the consequences of assuming Cournot versus 
Bertrand competition in product differentiation models. The idea that product 
differentiation may not require price competition was introduced by Gal-Or (1983), who 
developed a model of quality and quantity competition. She found that a new entry in 
the market results in a decrease in quality and an increase in aggregate output, with 
ambiguous welfare effects. Bonanno (1986) built a three-stage game where firms first 
decide whether to entry (stage 1), then the quality level (stage 2) followed by their 
prices or output (stage 3). He concluded that the solution of the game depends on the 
solution concept that is adopted at the third stage. If the firm play a Bertrand-Nash 
game, the outcome is product differentiation (albeit the level of differentiation may be 
small). On the other hand, if they play Cournot-Nash, the firms offer homogeneous 
products according to the minimum differentiation principle put forward by Hotelling. 
Motta (1993) generalised the results of Bonanno by using more flexible cost functions 
and found firms may produce differentiated products in both quality and quantity 
competition (i.e., the minimum differentiation principle only holds as a special case). He 
also found that the degree of differentiation is higher under price competition than under 
quantity competition. A similar result was derived by Brander & Spencer (2015). 
Symeonidis (2003) and Breton et al. (2003) introduced R&D fixed costs with possible 
spillover and found that the relative efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition 
depends on the model parameters (although the results of the two papers differ because 
of the different assumptions about dynamic modelling). Aoki (2003) showed that the 
effect of a credible quality commitment on social welfare and quality levels depends on 
the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. Metrick & 
Zeckhauser (1996) suggested that the choice between quantity versus price competition 
may be endogenously determined in the presence of asymmetric information.  
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The timing of the game may affect the outcome of the model too. In this regard, the 
literature about vertical quality is divided between two type of models: simultaneous 
versus sequential actions. In the first group, firms decide their strategic behaviour at 
the same time. In the sequential model, there is a first mover who acts first. A variety 
of contributions found that the behaviour of firms and market equilibrium depend on 
the assumptions about timing of entry and/or quality choice. For example, quality level 
may differ between the models (Donnenfeld & Weber 1992) and strategic behaviour is 
possible by both incumbent firms (e.g., entry deterrence as in Lane 1980) and entrant 
firms (e.g., Noh and Moschini 2006).  
A general conclusion of vertical quality models is that the firm offering the highest 
quality earns more profits (e.g., Motta, 1993; Aoki and Prusa, 1997; Lehmann-Grube, 
1997; Aoki, 2003). As a consequence, the common understanding in the literature is 
that a first mover advantage exists. First movers provide high quality, leaving the lower 
market segments to the followers. However, models with endogenous timing of entry 
suggests that this advantage can dissipate when firms are free to choose the timing of 
entry and can compete for early entry positions (Lambertini 1999; Anderson & Engers 
2001). In these cases, at the equilibrium all firms opt for simultaneous entry. However, 
other contributions imposing asymmetries on consumer preferences or on production 
costs found a possible late-entry advantage (e.g., Carpenter & Nakamoto 1990; Auer & 
Sauré 2017).   
It can generally be noted that the assumptions regarding the nature of competition 
affect the predictions of economic models about the equilibrium in differentiated 
markets. As a consequence, the modelling choices (and their consequences) are 
consistently given attention in the literature. The conclusion has direct implications for 
the DC-SIP issue. The composition of the goods might reflect the different competition 
environment. For example, a firm might decide to adjust the composition of the goods 
depending on the strengths of competitors. Consequently, if the degree of rivalry differs 
across markets, differences in composition may emerge even if consumer preferences 
and production costs are homogeneous. 
 
1.6 Regulation, Institutions, and Technology 
The strategic choice of quality is conditional on the institutional framework. There is an 
extensive literature that discusses the influence of regulation on food quality and safety, 
especially considering the increasing public interest in issues such as health, the 
environment, and ethics (Marette 2008). In general, public intervention has two aims: 
(i) resolve possible information asymmetries and (ii) prevent the trade of unsafe and/or 
low-quality products.  
The first aim is usually associated with the adoption of labelling and certification systems 
so that experience or credence attributes are transformed into search attributes (e.g., 
Caswell & Mojduszka 1996). Because self-certification is generally not sufficient to 
guarantee correct consumer information, public intervention may be necessary to 
prevent market failure (Roe & Sheldon 2007). In general, the use of third-party 
independent certification can reduce the risk of negative consequences from mislabelling 
(Giannakas 2002, Giannakas & Fulton 2002, Hatanaka et al. 2005). In a DC-SIP context, 
certification and labelling might in theory be used to favour information disclosure, 
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providing the consumer with sufficient information for an unbiased choice. Yet, the 
efficiency of the regulation depends on the ability of the certification to provide the 
relevant information and the ability of the consumer to process the information (e.g., 
Rozan et al. 2004; Jahn et al 2005). The issue of quality cues and product choice will 
be addressed in Chapter4. 
The public regulator may choose to prevent unsafe or low-quality products from being 
traded. The result is usually obtained by imposing safety or minimum quality standard. 
The literature is also extensive in this regard (e.g. Henson & Caswell 1999; Henson & 
Reardon 2005; Hammoudi et al. 2009). Researchers investigated the impact on welfare 
(e.g., Bockstael 1984; Ronnen 1991; Saitone & Sexton 2010) and trade effects (e.g., 
Saitone 2012; Marette & Beghin 2017; Beghin et al. 2015; Swinnen 2017). Boom (1995) 
derives a result of particular interest for this study. The Author derives an equilibrium 
in a two-country model of vertically differentiated duopoly under a minimum quality 
standard regulation. She found that asymmetric standards may influence production 
and quality choice in both markets. Imposing quality regulation in a country may also 
affect welfare in the other. We will provide a detailed analysis of this point in a numerical 
model presented in Chapter 5. 
Other institutional factors affecting quality choice concern the governance of the 
transaction. The quality choice of a collective enterprise (such as a cooperative or a PGI 
consortium) may differ from the one of a private corporation (Winfree &McCluskey 
2005; Merél & Sexton 2011; Di Fonzo & Russo 2015). The literature suggests that the 
regulation of DC-SIP might consider the type of organisation. 
Finally, technology can affect quality choice. As local weather condition such as 
temperature or humidity may affect the goods, firms may alter the recipe of their 
product in order to preserve organoleptic characteristics. This topic is not covered in the 
IO literature and it is not covered in this review. 
 
1.7 Summary and conclusions 
Chapter 1 focuses on the objective component of the DC-SIP issue. The IO literature is 
reviewed to assess the economic rationale for differences in product composition across 
different Member States. Mere changes of the food recipe are not sufficient to claim a 
DC-SIP problem (the subjective component is also necessary). Nevertheless, the 
discussion of the key economic incentives for recipe differentiation supports relevant 
policy conclusions. In particular, it suggests that a regulation willing to prevent DC-SIP 
by imposing homogeneity of recipes in the Single Market might be socially inefficient. 
The Industrial Organisation literature considers quality (and, therefore, composition) as 
an output of the solution of the profit maximisation problem firms have. In the standard 
IO setting, rational, selfish firms choose the product composition that maximises profits. 
The optimal product composition depends on several contingent factors including 
consumer demand, cost structure, competition, and institutions. This explains why firms 
might decide to provide products of different quality across the Single Market. If the 
factors vary, there is an incentive to adjust the quality of the products. As a 
consequence, different varieties of a product can be found different areas.  
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Economic theory noticeably concludes that such differentiation is socially efficient. As a 
consequence, a regulation imposing the same product composition across the Single 
Market would reduce social welfare if – as expected – local conditions differ across 
Member States. A degree of spatial differentiation in the assortments is necessary to 
consider differences in consumer taste, market structure, and even safety and quality 
regulations. 
A regulation requiring firms to supply all existing varieties to all consumers might also 
prevent DC-SIP issues. In principle such a regulation is appealing because it allows 
consumers to compare recipes and then choose according to their preferences.  
However, economic theory suggests that such regulation would also be socially 
inefficient. The authors agree that the benefits from supplying an additional variety 
decreases with the number of varieties that are marketed already. If firms incur non-
decreasing marketing costs (such as slotting allowances, promotions, or advertising), 
there is a finite number of varieties that can be supplied profitably. As a consequence, 
differences in assortment may emerge across space because firms have an incentive to 
introduce the most profitable varieties first in each Member State. 
These conclusions will be discussed further in Chapter 2 where multi-country models 
are discussed in detail. Chapter 5 provides an illustrative application of these principles 
and a more extensive discussion of the policy implications. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This section draws from the Industrial Organisation literature. Specifically, it reviews 
the literature on the following related topics: 
▪ Quality discrimination 
▪ Third-degree (price/quality) discrimination  
▪ International market segmentation  
▪ Parallel trade (or grey market trade or grey goods)  
Before summarising the relevant findings of this literature, several notions are 
introduced to help understand how this literature relates to and can help in 
understanding DC-SIP. 
Firstly, it is a widely accepted notion in the Industrial Organisation literature that a 
profit-maximising firm with market power will optimally set all decision variables in its 
control. These decision variables not only include price but also quality (e.g., product 
composition) and (quality-related) investments. It is also useful to remember that it is 
a common firm behaviour across industries to rely on intellectual property rights 
(brands, patents etc.) and trade barriers to charge different prices or deliver different 
qualities in different countries in response to different national market conditions. 
Consequently, when markets are separate (when arbitrage between markets is impeded 
for legal, institutional, strategic reasons - e.g., exclusive territories, and territorial 
supply restraints), a profit-maximising firm with market power will exploit such market 
segmentation opportunities to extract profits from consumers.  
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The term discrimination is correctly used when the different national market conditions 
are due to differences in demand (and not in the cost structure). In particular, when 
firms are able to discriminate between different market segments or groups of 
consumers (as might be the case for consumers in different national markets), it is 
called third degree discrimination. The literature has investigated third-degree price 
discrimination extensively, that is, charging different prices to different groups of 
consumers for the same good. While the third-degree price discrimination literature is 
large, a smaller literature has considered (third-degree) quality discrimination, that is, 
selling different variations of the same good to different groups of consumers. 
As already noted above, price and quality discrimination are only possible in the absence 
of arbitrage. For example, third-degree price discrimination between international 
markets occurs when it is not possible to buy the good at a low price in one country and 
resell at a higher price in another country. In other words, firms can only engage in 
discrimination across borders when it is possible to keep the national markets separate. 
The inability of firms to maintain price (or quality) differences across national borders 
can arise for a variety of reasons, among which parallel trade figures prominently.  
Parallel trade (or grey market trade) is the resale of bona fide goods in a market (e.g., 
different country, a different market channel) other than that intended by the 
manufacturer of the good.13 Parallel trade is a form of arbitrage. When parallel trade 
between countries is possible, firms are not able to engage in third-degree price 
discrimination across national borders. The result is a uniform price in all the markets 
that are supplied. With regard to quality, starting from a situation in which a firm sells 
country-specific variations, arbitrage would imply that the different variations are made 
available in markets other than that meant by the manufacturer of the good, and that 
different variations of the same good would coexist on the same markets. It is then 
conceivable that this coexistence would require the manufacturer to label the different 
variations to avoid generating confusion among consumers and negatively affecting its 
brand. 
 
13The expression bona fide goods (i.e., “good faith” goods) is used to indicate authentic goods, i.e., as opposed 
to illegal counterfeits. Grey goods can be defined as products traded though channels other than those 
authorised by the manufacturer. 
Discrimination versus market segmentation 
Discrimination and market segmentation are not synonymous. Discrimination 
refers to a firm exploiting differences in demand between different 
consumers/buyers. Because of discrimination, the consumers/buyers are 
charged different prices (or receive different goods). Market segmentation is 
the ability of the firm to divide the market in groups of consumers who are 
sold different goods or charged different prices. Price discrimination results in 
market segmentation. Nevertheless, market segmentation can also occur 
based on differences in marginal costs to supply different consumers (and is 
not limited to differences in demand).  
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Beside arbitrage, a uniform price for otherwise separated markets could also be 
achieved through a policy that imposes uniform prices, that is, a policy imposing uniform 
prices for all markets would have the same implications of parallel trade (or other forms 
of arbitrage) on prices, but would possibly have different implications for the other 
decision variables considered by the firm (i.e. quality, composition). As long as the 
uniform-price policy does not otherwise constrain the separation of markets, a firm with 
market power would rationally continue exploiting the separation of the markets. In 
other words, a firm would use the other decision variables in its control, for instance 
quality, to maximise profits. As a result, a firm could find it profitable to offer different 
qualities in different markets.  
Exclusive territories, territorial restraint, and territorial supply constraints represent 
strategies that a firm with market power can adopt to separate or segment markets, 
gaining degrees of freedom for profit maximisation. Moreover, with separated markets, 
a profit-maximising firm can set market-specific values for each of the decision variables 
under its control. For example, in the case of quality, if markets are separated, a firm 
can offer different qualities in different markets. If markets are not separated, either 
the firm offers only one quality or it offers more qualities that coexist in the same 
market. In other words, separated markets are a precondition for firms to be able to 
offer country-specific variations (as in the case of DC-SIP) that are selectively available 
only in the countries for which they are meant. If markets are not separated, the 
likelihood that more than one product variation is available in any given markets 
increases (provided that consumers in that market have heterogeneous preferences).14 
In the case of the presence of different variations of the same product, the following 
three cases are possible: 
• If markets are separated, country-specific variations may possibly emerge. 
DC-SIP is possible if barriers between national markets within the Single Market 
exist (such barriers could be due, for example, to territorial supply constraints 
and/or national laws). 
• If markets are not separated,15 country-specific variations are likely to be 
available in countries other than that for which they are originally intended. This 
means that different variations of a given product would coexist in a given 
national market. It might then be profitable for a firm to either remove 
 
14 It is in principle possible that preferences are such that only one variation is demanded in each market. 
Nevertheless, this case seems not to be empirically relevant as the only explanation for DC-SIP. As pointed 
out in section 1.2.2, the presence of marketing cost in the agri-food system to access supermarkets’ limited 
shelf-space might limit the number of variations of the same good that are present in any given market.   
15The following quote from Gallini and Hollis (1999) is instructive:  
“Many goods with identical TMs [trademarks] are produced in different locations under different 
specifications, vary according to local tastes, have different packaging and instructions, and 
comply with different safety standards. A common TM may be used because of economies of 
scale in brand development, or because information flows easily between countries through 
newspapers, television, and travel. However, if a common TM is used and prices differ between 
countries, then grey markets may emerge as unauthorised importers try to pass off one product 
for another. This undoubtedly will cause confusion and may cause distributors to reduce their 
investment. Hence, market segmentation is needed to ensure that their efforts will not be 
undermined by grey marketers.” (Gallini and Hollis, 1999, page 5). 
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differences (so that ultimately only one product variation is available) or label 
the different variations (e.g., to use labels/branding to allow the consumer to 
distinguish the different variations). The use of distinctive labels/brands is to be 
expected in order for the firm to avoid negative effects of consumer uncertainty 
regarding product quality.16 It follows that DC-SIP is less likely to occur when 
markets are not separated (i.e., when the EU market is indeed a single market) 
and information on product quality is readily available or easy to acquire. DC-
SIP could still emerge when preferences between different markets are 
significantly different and preference overlap is very modest. Likewise, DC-SIP 
could still emerge when arbitrage across countries is difficult (e.g., high 
transportation cost and low price-quality differential between countries).   
A third case is possible at least from a theoretically point of view, that is, the introduction 
of national variations causes the emergence of a barrier between countries. In other 
words, there is a third case if the introduction of variations helps a firm creating 
some sort of barriers between countries. This would be the case if a firm manages 
to separate markets by introducing market-specific variations. A possible example of 
how the introduction of variations might contribute to create trade barriers between 
countries is the use of different languages on the package.17 Another possible 
explanation is that retailers might be reluctant to place “similar” (although not identical) 
products from the same manufacturer (or with the same brand) on their shelves to 
avoid consumers dissatisfaction due to inconsistent quality. The author is not aware of 
any theoretical analysis of these cases in the Industrial Organisation literature and it is 
unclear whether they are empirically meaningful. 
The legal analysis by Gallini and Hollis (1999) provides an example of how the 
introduction of small product differences has been exploited to create trade barriers.18 
Gallini and Hollis argue that if trademark law allows the banning of grey goods being 
made of trademarked goods that are at least slightly different (with the intent of 
protecting consumers from “getting the wrong good”), firms would have an incentive to 
produce slightly different variations to take advantage of the market separation that 
comes with a ban of grey goods.19 A policy that bans grey goods that are slightly 
differentiated could incentivise firms to differentiate their products across countries –at 
least slightly. Therefore, “slight” product differentiation under the same trademark 
would be a way of disguising anticompetitive motives and behaviour aimed at 
eliminating competition between distributors. In footnote 39, Gallini and Hollis note that 
several grey goods have been prevented access to other markets under trademark law 
 
16 If the product features distinguishing the different variations are search attributes, they do not require 
branding, labelling, or certification, as consumers can establish the features of the product before purchase.  
17 This is not to be confused with the case in which consumer self-select by purchasing their preferred 
variation. See examples below. 
18 Note that the work by Gallini and Hollis (1999) consists of a legal analysis. As this paper falls outside the 
scope of the Industrial Organisation literature, it is not discussed in more detail in the remainder of this 
document.  
19 The analysis by Gallini and Hollis (1999) focuses on the US market. Given the US regime, grey goods are 
generally allowed. See the box on “Parallel trade” for further detail on grey good (parallel trade) regimes. 
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based on “small” differences. Gallini and Hollis provide the following examples (none of 
which refer to the European Union):  
• Venezuelan Pepsi excluded from Puerto Rico because of different can size and 
product proportions;  
• Several products have been excluded based on language or instruction language;  
• Heinz ketchup was excluded from Canada because of a slightly different formula 
in the USA. 
These examples suggest the theoretical possibility of introducing small differences (e.g., 
in composition, ingredients, size) as a tool to segment markets when trademark law 
would prevent trade in identical grey goods. Whether this possibility mentioned by 
Gallini and Hollis (1999) is relevant for DC-SIP in the European Union is a legal question 
and outside the scope of this literature review.20 
Finally, it is also important to bear in mind that the Industrial Organisation literature 
displays a high degree of mathematical formalisation that limit the degree of 
sophistication regarding brands and/or branding decisions present in real-world 
business. It is often implicitly assumed in this literature that a product of a given firm 
corresponds to “a brand”. Brand and branding decisions in the Industrial Organisation 
literature are particularly relevant21 in the context of asymmetric information between 
buyers and sellers regarding product quality and the role of firm reputation to overcome 
market failures due to such asymmetries of information. It is assumed in this literature 
that a firm has “reputation” if consumers believe its products to be of high quality. When 
product attributes that are relevant for consumers are difficult to observe prior to 
purchase (by definition, these are experience attributes/goods), consumers are 
expected to use the quality of the products produced by the firm in the past as an 
indication of the current quality of the products of that firms. Brands are then the 
instrument that allows consumers to identify the source of the product (i.e., the firm 
that produces a given product) and hence serve as “carriers” of the reputation of the 
firm (see Shapiro (1983) for an example).   
 
2.2 Query of the Industrial Organisation literature 
With this in mind, the authors of this paper searched for literature regarding 
manufacturers/firms with market power that are active in more than one market (e.g., 
multi-product or multi-market firms). Specifically, the literature analysing quality-
related decisions taken by firms was examined.  
One important focus in the literature searched is the topic of discrimination. This report 
makes clear that the relevant form of discrimination is third-degree discrimination, that 
is, discrimination occurring between groups of consumers that the firm can directly 
 
20 It would require a trademarked good imported from one to another Member Country to be seen as infringing 
the trademark rights of the “same” trademarked good in the importing country because the imported good is 
“similar” but not identical to the domestic good. 
21 In the sense that brands assume an important economic function.  
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separate because, as in the case of DC-SIP, they are located in different, separated 
national markets.  
An alternative common case of discrimination is second-degree discrimination. When 
discrimination concerns the quality dimension, second-degree discrimination is also 
called “versioning” (Varian 1997). Following Varian (1997), “versioning” or “quality 
discrimination” is a form of differential pricing. Specifically, these are situations in which 
a firm produces different qualities (also called versions or variations) of a good that are 
sold at different prices. The motivation of versioning is to get consumers to self-select 
themselves into different groups according to their willingness to pay. This is used when 
a firm is unable to charge different prices to different groups of consumers based on 
observable characteristics of the consumers (e.g., age, student status). In this case, 
firms provide more than one quality and rely on consumers to (self-)select their 
preferred quality from those available based on their preferences. A firm engages in 
second-degree discrimination when it is not able to engage in third-degree 
discrimination, essentially because the firm cannot distinguish which consumers belong 
to which group/segment. This literature does not appear to be particularly useful in 
understanding DC-SIP because consumers in different countries typically do not have 
access to more than one variation of the product of the same brand/firm. In the case of 
DC-SIP, the coexistence of different variations of the same trademarked product within 
the same national market is not observed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most common case of third-degree discrimination in the literature is discrimination 
in terms of price. The literature addressing third-degree quality discrimination is very 
sparse.  
Price-Quality discrimination (Mussa and Rosen 1978) 
Mussa and Rosen (1978) represent the classic paper in price-quality 
discrimination: emphasising that a firm with market power will act on both 
price and quality to maximise profits. This paper is also often cited for the 
utility structure that has been widely used in the literature since then. In 
contrast to the less cited article by Paroush (1978), Mussa and Rosen (1978) 
focus on a type of second-degree price discrimination. In principle all 
consumers have access to the different qualities placed on the market by the 
firm and they select their preferred quality based on their own preferences. 
This represents the main distinction from Paroush (1978), who in contrast 
focuses on third-degree price discrimination, a situation that is possible when 
markets are separated. Cremer and Thisse (1994) extend the Mussa and 
Rosen (1978) paper to an oligopolistic setting. 
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In addition, the literature that addresses the strategic responses of firms to policy 
changes or changes in the institutional environment that affect discrimination was 
explored. Specifically, non-price responses in general and quality-related responses in 
particular were examined. The literature considers the case of a policy that imposes 
uniform pricing on separated markets and more generally the case of a policy that 
affects the ability of firms to engage in international arbitrage. A frequently encountered 
case is a change in the policy regime concerning parallel trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, the literature on exclusive territories and territorial restraints was also 
scrutinised. Furthermore, the literature searching explicitly for “territorial supply 
Standard result of the third-degree price discrimination literature 
It is well known that third-degree price discrimination has ambiguous welfare 
effects. An extensive literature has analysed the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for third-degree price discrimination to have a positive or negative 
aggregate welfare effect. A classic case in which third-degree price 
discrimination increases welfare is one in which third-degree price 
discrimination results in serving new markets and achieving scale and 
learning economies. This is a static-framework result. The literature on third-
degree price discrimination also considers dynamic settings where 
investments (e.g., in quality) play a significant role. Dynamic settings allow a 
wider range of possible firm strategies and welfare considerations. 
 
Parallel trade 
Parallel trade is a form of arbitrage that undermines the ability of a firm to 
engage in third-degree price discrimination. There are different doctrines 
concerning parallel trade. In the USA, the prevailing doctrine is the “first sale” 
doctrine. This means that once a product is sold, the original owner of the 
property rights over the product loses his/her rights to determine how the 
product is subsequently sold or distributed. The effect of this doctrine is 
preventing price discrimination against the consumers in the jurisdiction that 
applies this doctrine. The European Union has a regime called “Community 
Exhaustion”. This means that once products have been sold in any Member 
State, the intellectual property right holder has lost the right to 
control/restrict any further movement of the products within the European 
Union. Nevertheless, this doctrine allows the original property holder to 
prevent products sold at low prices outside the European Union re-entering 
into the European markets. The reason for this regime is to promote the 
integration of the European Union market.  
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constraints” was also queried without any relevant academic work that uses this 
terminology being found.  
The authors of this report also searched the literature discussing policies that affect 
discrimination in terms of quality. No paper addressing the imposition of a uniform 
quality across markets was found. Nevertheless, there are contributions that explore 
quality choices and quality-related investments made by firms in response to changes 
in the ability of a firm to set different prices.  
As far as the authors of this report know, Paroush (1978) is the only paper that directly 
addresses third-degree quality discrimination. In order to extend the literature search 
regarding quality discrimination, the literature on bundling was considered. This 
literature is only relevant to quality discrimination to the extent to which it is appropriate 
to interpret bundling in terms of quality as is the case in Paroush and Peles (1981). It 
was found that in addition to Paroush and Peles (1981), other contributions to the 
bundling literature do not interpret bundling in terms of quality.  
Finally, no literature looking at branding decisions in the context of third-degree 
discrimination was found. 
 
2.3 DC-SIP-related questions that can be answered by the Industrial 
Organisation literature 
The Industrial Organisation literature does not directly address the issue of DC-SIP. 
Nevertheless, it addresses the following broad questions related to the “quality-related 
choices of a firm with market power active in more than one market”. 
▪ Does such a firm engage in quality discrimination? 
▪ Does such a firm adjust quality as a strategic response to a limitation in its ability 
to engage in price discrimination?   
We will use the Industrial Organisation literature addressing the above questions to 
provide insights into the following questions regarding DC-SIP. 
▪ Can DC-SIP be rationalised as the result of quality discrimination? 
▪ Can DC-SIP be rationalised as the result of a possible strategic firm response in 
anticipation (or as a consequence) of a policy or an institutional change that 
limits the ability of the firm to engage in third-degree price discrimination (e.g., 
a potential limitation to their ability to impose “territorial supply constraints”)?  
Specifically, a paper by Paroush (1978) specifically considers quality discrimination in a 
third-degree sense. This means that the firm is able to recognise which consumers 
belong to which “group/segment”. International quality discrimination is a form of third-
degree discrimination where consumers located in a given country belong to a group 
(or segment). This paper shows that in general, quality and price of the “same” product 
differ across international markets. This is the outcome of the optimal behaviour of a 
profit-maximising firm that has two degrees of freedom, price and quality, for each 
independent market. 
Similarly, the paper by Paroush and Peles (1981) considers international discrimination 
(discrimination between separated independent markets). It reiterates the result of 
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Paroush (1978) that quality can be used to discriminate between separated markets. 
This paper discusses “packaging” (also referred to as “blending”) as an implicit form of 
price discrimination between separated markets. Here the packaging decision can be 
interpreted as a decision taken by firms regarding the quality of the product.  
There are many studies that consider second-degree quality discrimination, including 
the seminal paper by Mussa and Roosen (1978). These papers have not been included 
in the overview that follows because, as explained above, second-degree quality 
discrimination requires consumers to select the quality (product variations) they prefer. 
This does not match up well with the typical case of DC-SIP, where consumers in any 
given Member State are offered one product variation only (hence, consumers are not 
confronted with a choice between different variations of the same branded product).  
Papers that answer the question of how firms strategically respond to a policy change 
that limits the ability of a firm to price discriminate were identified. Two papers 
(Szymanski and Valletti, 2005; Valletti and Szymanski, 2006) look at the incentives for 
firms to introduce a low-quality product variation (in addition to the original quality 
offered by the firm) to discriminate more effectively. A third (empirical) paper (Kyle, 
2011) looks at the incentives for firms to change the features of the same product for 
different markets in order to maintain their ability to discriminate between markets.  
In short, Szymanski and Valletti (2005) find that parallel trade does not provide 
incentives to introduce a low-quality product variation for the purpose of discrimination. 
Valletti and Szymanski (2006) find that the presence of competition from a generic 
brand provides incentives for firms to introduce a low-quality product variant. Under 
“regular” assumptions about preferences, these papers predict co-existence of different 
variations on the market, a fact that is at odds with DC-SIP. The implication is that ad 
hoc assumptions regarding preferences would be needed for “national” variations to be 
optimally introduced. Kyle (2011) provides evidence that firms in the pharmaceutical 
sector will indeed have an incentive to modify the features of products (i.e., to introduce 
national variations) with the intention of contrasting parallel trade and so maintaining 
their ability to discriminate between markets.  
Two papers (Valletti, 2006; Alexandrov and Deb, 2012) look at the incentive to invest 
in quality when a policy or institutional change limits their ability to price discriminate. 
They show that when the ability to price discriminate is affected, investment in quality 
declines, with negative welfare effects. Unfortunately, these papers exclusively consider 
an “overall” quality investment while they do not specifically take into consideration the 
possibility ofa firm offering different quality variations in different markets. 
Consequently, insights for DC-SIP from these papers are limited while the conclusion is 
that limiting the ability of firms to price discriminate (for example by preventing 
territorial supply constraints) might reduce overall investments in quality.  
The literature reviewed considers two ways of incorporating quality into preferences and 
in the demand functions. The majority of the literature uses a preference structure 
based on Mussa and Rosen (1978). The Mussa-Rosen approach is based on unit demand 
where heterogeneous preferences for quality are captured by a parameter. Different 
assumptions can be made regarding the range and distribution of the preference-for-
quality parameter. A second approach is that of Paroush (1978). This can be 
summarised as follows: a product, R, consists of different ingredients, for example, x 
and y. The ingredients differ by quality, that is, x is the better-quality ingredient. 
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Furthermore, x and y are perfect complements, specifically R= x+y. So the ratio x/R 
can be interpreted as the quality of the product.22 
In what follows, the relevant contributions are briefly summarised and the limitations 
encountered in interpreting the result in terms of DC-SIP are explained. All papers 
described in what follows are theoretical papers with the exception of Kyle (2011) that 
consists of an empirical investigation. 
 
2.3.1 Third-degree quality discrimination 
Paroush (1978) 
Relevant question: Will a firm engage in quality discrimination? Can price discrimination 
be used as a strategic response to a uniform price policy? 
Main message: 
A profit-maximising firm facing separated markets will adjust price and quality 
depending on the demand conditions in each market. A policy restricting one of the 
decision variables (e.g., price) might amplify the differences in the other decision 
variable between markets (e.g., quantity). 
General considerations and setting: 
Paroush (1978) belongs to the very few papers in the literature addressing third-degree 
quality discrimination. The relevant setting is one in which a firm with market power 
faces separated markets (i.e., there is no arbitrage between the markets). This 
corresponds to third-degree discrimination. With separated markets, a firm can sell one 
good in two different markets so that the good can have country-specific price and 
quality. In this context, “one good” is to be interpreted as “one brand name”. Quality is 
costly to produce, but the cost for any given quality is the same irrespective of which 
market is served. 
Main results: 
There are two seemingly obvious but very important results. First, in general quality 
and price of the same product differ in separated markets. This is the outcome of the 
optimal behaviour of a profit-maximising firm that has two degrees of freedom: price 
and quality. These differences are not driven by cost conditions, but represent real 
discrimination: optimal differential treatment of consumers in different markets by firms 
is based on the features of demand.  
A second result is that a profit-maximising firm optimally reacts to regulations that 
impose a constraint on the behaviour of a firm by adjusting the decision variables that 
are not subject to the regulation. This paper discusses price restrictions (i.e., a policy 
 
22 All contributions discussed in this review use a model of vertical product differentiation (i.e., consumer 
preferences are such that all consumers agree on the preferred quality variations when all variations are sold 
at the same price). Anglin (1992) has shown that there is a correspondence between models of vertical and 
horizontal product differentiation whenever the Single Crossing Condition in satisfied. That means that the 
decision rules of consumers in the horizontal and vertical differentiation models are the same so that the 
results derived from a setting carry over to the other setting.  
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that requires firms to charge the same price in all served markets) and shows that a 
price restriction encourages more quality discrimination. Specifically, this ‘amplification’ 
result is shown for the case of a market that is more sensitive to both quality and 
quantity, that is, a market where, at the optimum, the elasticities of demand regarding 
prices and quality are larger than in the other market. This translates into a case of a 
market characterised by higher quality and lower price. For this case, Paroush (1978) 
shows that a policy that reduces the degree of price differences between separated 
markets results in larger quality differences between markets. 
Lessons and limitations in understanding DC-SIP:  
Conclusions: 
▪ Profit-maximisation leads to differences in quality (and price) for the same 
product (to be interpreted as the same branded product) in separated markets 
reflecting demand conditions in each market. This means that DC-SIP can 
emerge as the result of profit-maximising behaviour by firms taking advantages 
of differences in demand conditions when markets are separated.  
▪ A firm can react to a policy that restricts its ability to discriminate based on a 
subset of decision variables analysed by a firm (e.g., price) by increasing the 
degree of discrimination obtained using the remaining decision variables (e.g., 
quality). This “amplification” result suggests that DC-SIP could emerge (or be 
exacerbated) as a consequence of a policy that limits the ability of a firm to price 
discriminate between consumers in different countries. 
The main limitations to interpreting the results in terms of DC-SIP are the following: 
• The specific parameter case for which the “amplification” result described above 
is shown is one in which a given market is characterised by higher quality and 
lower price. Whether this case is relevant for DC-SIP observed in the European 
Union is an empirical question. Other cases with regard to the price and quality 
elasticity of demand are not explicitly derived in Paroush (1978). Furthermore, 
the case of a restriction on quality across markets and the corresponding effect 
on price discrimination is not explicitly derived although the general setting of 
the paper leaves the possibility open that a restriction on quality might result in 
amplified price differences. Further modelling is required to confirm that the 
result is robust to other demand elasticity conditions.  
• Third-degree discrimination between national markets is only possible when 
markets are separated. Accordingly, the analysis by Paroush (1978) is predicated 
on separated markets, that is, there is no arbitrage between markets: the firm 
can prevent consumers in either country having access to the product meant for 
the consumers in the other country. Whether national markets in the European 
Union for DC-SIP can do this is an empirical and legal question. As described in 
the general discussion in this Chapter, possible sources of separation of national 
markets are: (i) the persistence of territorial supply constraints, (ii) language 
differences on the packaging of the products etc. 
• Relaxing the assumption of separated markets would also imply a change from 
third to second-degree discrimination. If the markets were not separated (in the 
presence of arbitrage), both product variations could be available in the same 
market and would stimulate the firm to use labels or brands that allow consumers 
to distinguish between the different qualities. The alternative of not doing so is 
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a situation in which firms offers stochastic quality to consumers (with 
implications for consumer quality expectations and quality choices). Whether a 
firm would offer different variations in case of non-separated markets would 
most likely depend on the assumptions made about the cost of producing and 
distributing quality. Some cost conditions (e.g., increasing marginal cost of 
quality) would be likely to yield a Mussa and Rosen (1978) result in which 
different qualities are offered by a firm in a given market and consumers select 
their preferred quality. Other cost conditions (e.g. costless quality or marginal or 
decreasing cost of quality) are expected to yield a result as in Szymanski and 
Valletti (2005) in which the firms do not have incentives to introduce more than 
one quality in a market. 
• As is typical in the Industrial Organisation literature, the branding choice is not 
explicitly modelled. Implicitly, the “same” good sold by the firm in two markets 
is meant to be interpreted as a good with the same brand. This is a common 
feature in the Industrial Organisation literature. The fact that the branding 
assumption is “only implicit” does not compromise the ability to use this paper 
to interpret DC-SIP. 
Paroush and Peles (1981) 
Relevant question: Can “blending” (i.e., varying the feature of a given product) be 
used to discriminate? 
Main message: 
Packaging is a way to implicitly price discriminate. Here packaging can be interpreted 
as “blending” (i.e., varying the feature of a given product). Therefore, blending is a way 
to implicitly price discriminate (make additional profits by extracting more of the 
consumer surplus).  
General considerations and setting: 
These Authors consider the conditions under which profit-maximising firms with market 
power will market a “package of two different commodities” even when the demand for 
and the cost of production of each commodity in the package are independent. They 
show that packaging is a tool for indirect price discrimination when outright price 
discrimination is not possible.  
At first glance the topic addressed by this paper is at odds with the topic of this literature 
review. Indeed, the model assumptions are such that it is meaningful to interpret the 
‘package’ as a good with a quality that depends on the relative content of the 
commodities included in the package. The authors themselves recognise this 
interpretation as they mention the case of different blends of coffee, where several 
grades of beans are mixed before sale.  
The paper considers the case of two independent markets each dominated by one 
monopolist and analyses the case in which the two monopolists combine operations to 
sell packages of the products together. This analysis is isomorphic to the case of one 
monopoly selling two products to two separated markets. The paper further assumes 
that a firm cannot directly engage in price discrimination (i.e., price for any given quality 
is the same across markets).  
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Main results 
This paper shows that the monopolist makes more money by selling packages than by 
selling the goods separately. With a quality interpretation, this paper shows that the 
monopolist is better off by optimally selecting the quality of the product than by selling 
two products with two exogenously determined qualities. In other words, a firm with 
market power that can choose quality in addition to price has more degrees of freedom 
in maximising profits and, in any given market, this firm will select the “quality 
composition” that maximises its profits. 
Lessons and limitations in understanding DC-SIP:  
This paper essentially offers the same insight as Paroush (1978). It emphasises that 
quality is a decision variable that a firm can use to extract surplus from consumers 
based on their demand. In the case of DC-SIP, this paper suggests that it make sense 
for a firm to optimise the composition of a product to extract as much consumer surplus 
as possible based on demand conditions. While this paper does not explicitly consider 
the case in which the monopolist chooses an optimal blend for each country/consumer 
group (rather it considers one optimal blend for all consumers), it is a straightforward 
extension to show that there is space for additional gains in profits by further exploiting 
the separation of the two markets.23 
 
2.3.2 Incentives to introduce national variations in response to a policy or 
institutional change that limits price discrimination 
Szymanski and Valletti (2005)24 
Relevant question: Will a firm introduce a lower-quality variation in order to 
discriminate as a response to parallel trade? 
This paper investigates whether a firm would react to parallel trade by introducing 
additional lower-quality variations in order to discourage international arbitrage. In the 
authors’ words (p.719): 
“Product differentiation by country is commonplace – Nescafé is sold at 
different strengths in different countries, the amount of sugar in Coca-Cola 
also varies. Companies may try to position a product to meet local tastes, 
 
23Motivated by the quality interpretation offered by Paroush and Peles (1981), the authors of this review 
screened the literature on ‘bundling’ to search for other papers that could offer further insight into interpreting 
dual quality. The issue of ‘bundling’ is covered by a large literature. It was found that this literature does not 
offer further insights due to being unable to interpret the ‘bundle’ as a good whose quality depends on the 
composition of the bundle. Following Adams and Yellen (1976), most papers on bundling assume that the 
marginal utility of a second unit of the unbundled goods is zero for all buyers. This implies that the demand 
of the two goods is independent of the product price of the other. Alternatively, in Armstrong (2013) the 
willingness to pay for the bundle is assumed to be at least as large as the maximum willingness to pay of the 
unbundled products. These assumptions are incompatible with the interpretation that the quality of the bundle 
changes depending up on the proportions of the input products. 
24The Authors note at page 728: ‘under arbitrage they are ‘forced’ to get a global brand. If the local brands 
are kept, then the firm is damaging its overall profitability.’ This comment suggests that the authors take that 
different qualities would be associated with different brands as a fact. This contrasts with the case of DC-SIP.  
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but this activity can also play a role in discouraging international arbitrage. 
This review considers this by developing a model of vertical product 
differentiation in which a seller can choose to introduce a product of inferior 
quality to meet demand at the ‘bottom end’ of the market, which is the 
demand that would typically be unmet under the threat of parallel trade 
when the willingness to pay of consumers in different countries is sufficiently 
dispersed.” 
Main message:  
In response to parallel trade (arbitrage), manufacturers have no incentive to introduce 
different variations of the same product in different countries.  
General considerations and setting:  
Two countries are considered: a rich domestic and a poor foreign country. A linear 
downward-sloping demand curve in each market is assumed. Consumer preferences are 
modelled according to Mussa-Rosen (1978). Investment in quality are possible. They 
lead to outward shifts of the demand curve in both countries. As in Valletti (2006), 
quality can be produced at a fixed cost (a quadratic function of quality), which is called 
investment. There is no variable cost in producing higher quality. Additionally, the 
producer is able to supply a lower-quality product at zero extra-cost as a by-product of 
the investment in quality. Quality is costless to produce (i.e., the marginal cost of quality 
is equal to zero).  
Main results:  
Firstly, this paper yields the standard result that parallel trade (i.e., arbitrage) reduces 
investments. The reduction in investments has a negative impact on the quality supplied 
and on consumer surplus and welfare. A new result of the paper is that the monopolist 
strictly prefers to sell the same quality in both markets. Depending on consumer 
preferences in the rich market, the monopolist either only prefers to sell the high-quality 
in both market or to abandon the foreign market and sell the high quality in the rich 
market only. This result is due to cannibalisation in the rich market: the structure of 
preference is such that it can never be the case that consumers in the rich country only 
consume the high-quality good if the low-quality good is available for sale in the poor 
country.  
Lessons and limitations in understanding DC-SIP:  
General conclusion: 
• It is not profitable to introduce a lower-quality variation as a discrimination tool 
in response to arbitrage. In other words, a firm that offers a single product in 
the absence of parallel trade will also continue to do so in the presence of parallel 
trade (i.e., when it can no longer engage in international price discrimination). 
Whether or not quality is costless to produce (as explicitly modelled in the paper) 
or costly (as in Mussa and Rosen 1978), arbitrage does not provide incentives to 
introduce a lower quality variation.  
The main limitations to interpreting the results in terms of DC-SIP are the following: 
• Second versus third degree discrimination: The mechanism at work in this paper 
is self-selection of different product variations by consumers. Self-selection 
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works as a type of second-degree discrimination (similar to versioning). The 
underlying assumption is that the monopolist is not able to segment the markets 
directly due to arbitrage opportunities related to parallel trade: when it sells 
product A in country A and product B in country B, it cannot prevent consumers 
in country A (B) from having access to product B (A). In other words, the 
monopolist is unable to keep the two markets separated when parallel trade is 
allowed. The monopolist rather offers a menu of products (high and low quality) 
and the consumers buy their preferred variation (both consumers in country A 
and B have access to product variations A and B). In the case of DC-SIP, there 
is only one product variation present in each county. This might suggest that the 
markets are separated/segmented. 
• Low-price country is not served when the market cannot be segmented: One of 
the welfare implications is linked to the firm dropping the low-price market under 
uniform pricing.25 This concern is less applicable for regions with relatively small 
differences in income levels. DC-SIP is often referred to occur between high and 
low income countries in the EU. This suggests that differences in the willingness 
of consumers to pay in the countries could be sufficiently dispersed to the extent 
that one market would be dropped under uniform pricing.   
• The ‘single product result’ and costless quality: The fact that the monopolist has 
no incentives to produce different variations of the quality hinges on the fact that 
quality is costless to produce (once the investment in quality has been made). 
The single product result follows when quality is costless or when there is a 
marginal cost that is constant or increasing at a decreasing rate with quality. 
Under these alternative costs specifications, the monopolist has no incentives to 
introduce a lower-quality variation, whether or not he faces the threat of 
arbitrage. In the presence of variable costs that increase at an increasing rate, 
the classic Mussa–Rosen (1978) results hold, that is, the monopolist may want 
to introduce two product variations to discriminate between heterogeneous 
consumers. The lesson here is that, in contrast to the degree of convexity of 
variable costs or competition, parallel trade per se is not a reason for the 
monopolist to offer multiple variations for the purpose of discriminating between 
consumers. These authors also note that captive markets can also be a reason 
for introducing a second product variation. For example, this would be the case 
if some consumers were not prepared to switch to the inferior variation no matter 
how cheap it is. In this case, the monopolist would supply the higher-quality 
variation to the captive market and the lower-quality variation to the ‘elastic’ 
segment of the market. This would be the case irrespective of the presence of 
parallel trade. Neither of the assumptions in Mussa-Roosen (1978) nor in 
Szymanski and Valletti (2005) seem to match up well with the observation that 
in the case of DC-SIP a firm only sells one variation in a given country. This again 
seems to suggest that the markets in which DC-SIP occurs are 
separated/segmented either because of restrictions (e.g. captive markets, 
national laws), or the strategic behaviour of firms aiming at engaging in third-
 
25 This behaviour follows from the fact that parallel trade offers low quality in the poor country which implies 
offering low quality in the rich country too so that some consumers in the rich country can switch from high 
to low quality (cannibalisation). This switching is unprofitable for the monopolist. 
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degree price discrimination (i.e. via territorial supply constraints), or due to the 
combination of the two. 
 
Valletti and Szymanski (2006) 
Relevant question: Will a firm introduce a lower-quality variation in order to 
discriminate as a response to parallel trade when it faces competition from a generic 
product? 
Main message:  
Competition from a generic good motivates a firm to introduce national variations. The 
low-quality variation serves as a “fighting” brand.26 
General considerations and setting:  
These authors consider international price discrimination when there is a generic good 
(i.e., a lower-quality variation). The setting of this paper is similar to that of Szymanski 
and Valletti (2005). The firm chooses quality (i.e., quality is endogenous). Quality can 
be produced at a fixed cost. The monopolist can supply more than one variant (i.e., 
different qualities) of the product. In contrast to Szymanski and Valletti (2005), here 
there is a generic product (that is a lower-quality variant) competing in the market. The 
key idea of this paper is that the introduction of a low-price alternative can be profitable 
when consumers in the high price country do not see the inferior quality as a substitute 
thereby eliminating the negative effects of arbitrage.  
Main results:  
Valletti and Szymanski (2006) show that a monopolist has an incentive to introduce a 
lower-quality good that works as a fighting brand. Additionally, they conclude that 
parallel trade (arbitrage) has good welfare property both ex-post but also ex-ante.27 
This is due to the fact that the incentives to invest in quality are preserved in this market 
setting. In the presence of a generic, the monopolist reacts to the presence of 
competition by extending the portfolio of variations. This paper shows that a firm 
produces different qualities in both markets. As in Szymanski and Valletti (2005), 
Valletti and Szymanski (2006) confirm that arbitrage does not cause additional product 
variations to be introduced. The key assumption is that quality is costless to produce as 
in Szymanski and Valletti (2005).28 
Lessons and limitations in understanding DC-SIP:  
General conclusion: 
 
26 A fighting brand is a brand that a firm introduces on the low end of the quality spectrum to contrast 
competition from lower quality competitors.  
27 In this context, ex-ante (i.e., when it is possible to resell a given product or product variation27 from a low-
price to a high-price market) means before the investment in quality is made and ex-post means after the 
investment in quality has been made.  
28 The papers by Szymanski and Valletti (2005) and Valletti and Szymanski (2006) focus on the case in which 
quality is costless to produce although quality requires an initial investment. This assumption is possibly best 
suited to pharmaceutical products, but is less so for food products whose higher quality ingredients typically 
imply higher production costs.  
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• Competition from a “generic” product provides an incentive to introduce a lower-
quality version. Arbitrage (i.e., the lack of ability to engage in international price 
discrimination) does not provide incentives to introduce a lower quality variation.  
The main limitations to interpreting the results in terms of DC-SIP are the following: 
• While this paper explains why a firm might offer a low-quality variant, it also 
generally predicts the co-existence of different variations on the same market (a 
result that is at odds with DC-SIP). Only under specific assumptions regarding 
preference can it be expected that only one variation in any given market will be 
seen.  
• The same as in Szymanski and Valletti (2005). 
 
Kyle (2011) 
Relevant question: Will a firm introduce national variations to maintain the ability to 
discriminate as a response to parallel trade? 
Main message:  
In response to the threat of parallel trade (arbitrage), manufacturers strategically 
change the characteristics of products offered in different countries.  
General considerations and setting  
Kyle (2011) provides a setting that is useful in analysing/understanding how firms adapt 
to changes in the institutional/legal environment that alter their ability to engage in 
third degree price discrimination across countries. This paper clarifies the importance of 
considering the strategic options/reactions of firms in response to institutional/legal 
changes (here a change in the parallel trade regime) that affect the ability of firms to 
engage in international price discrimination. This paper focuses on the pharmaceutical 
sector and considers the product market strategies of pharmaceutical companies in 
response to the legalisation of parallel imports due to European integration. This paper 
makes use of the IMS Midas database on drug prices and sales across countries for a 
total of 30 countries and 36 therapeutic classes in 5 broad categories for the timeframe 
1993 to 2004. In contrast to all of the other papers considered, this paper offers 
empirical evidence.  
Main results  
The main findings are that parallel imports (which are argued to favour market 
integration in the EU) have not led to a significant reduction in price dispersion across 
EU countries. Furthermore, this paper shows that only a small number of products are 
subject to parallel trade. Overall, the paper finds evidence that the behavioural response 
of firms to adjusting to the threat of parallel imports has reduced the impact of parallel 
trade. Based on these findings, the main insights of this paper is that firms adopt 
non-price responses such as adjustment of products characteristics to 
maintain price difference across borders. Firms have moved from using third 
degree price discrimination to increased product differentiation. In other words, this 
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paper finds that national variations were introduced in response to the threat of 
arbitrage due to parallel trade.29 
A qualification is in order here. In the case of pharmaceutical companies, the 
introduction of national variations might be the preferred behavioural response 
because other forms of response (e.g., price responses, rationing, product withdrawal, 
etc.) might be illegal or unfeasible due to high political costs. For example, an increase 
in the price of a drug the withdrawals of a drug from a low-price market might be 
politically costly. The use of differentiation (different package sizes, per-package 
volume, or different brand names) can be used strategically by a pharmaceutical 
company to influence the entry decision of a parallel importer (by generating higher 
production costs and regulatory fees and licenses for the different variations). In other 
words, in the pharmaceutical sector, differentiation might be the only feasible 
instrument. The situation is expected to be different in the food sector, where a wider 
range of behavioural responses is feasible.   
Lessons and limitations in understanding DC-SIP:  
General conclusion: 
▪ A change in institutional/legal environment that affects the ability of a firm to 
engage in third degree price discrimination (e.g., a ban of territorial supply 
constraints) could potentially trigger non-price responses and lead to increased 
product differentiation across countries and the introduction of national 
variations. Potentially this implies an increase in practices of DC-SIP. This 
general conclusion is to be considered only a theoretical possibility. No empirical 
evidence is available to confirm or negate this general conclusion for the food 
sector. 
The main limitations to interpreting the results in terms of DC-SIP are the following: 
The paper is an empirical investigation of the pharmaceutical sector and does not 
consider the food sector. Nevertheless, one might ask whether the forces that trigger 
differentiation as a response to a threat to firm’s ability to discriminate carry over to the 
food sector. In the pharmaceutical industry the threat of parallel trade spurred product 
differentiation. Could the threat of making territorial supply constraint illegal spur DC-
SIP in the food sector? While this seems to be possible, the use of DC-SIP as a strategic 
response to a ban in territorial supply constraints would require certain conditions to 
hold. For example, it would require retailers’ willingness or ability to procure from the 
cheapest country to be undermined by the difference in product formulations. It is 
conceivable that a retailer might be unwilling to source a product with “inconsistent” 
quality (if the sourcing occurs from more than one country, so that different variations 
of the product would end up on a retailer’s shelves) or with a “quality” that is different 
from the one consumers are used to. Ultimately, answering the question of whether DC-
 
29 The effect of introducing national variations might be also due to the combination of other types of changes 
in the institutional/legal environment that have taken place at the same time as the legalisation of parallel 
imports (parallel trade) (e.g. price controls; politically costly withdrawals of a drug from the market), and 
might have played a role in affecting the pharmaceutical sector as examined by Kyle (2011). 
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SIP can be a strategic response to a ban to territorial supply constraints is an empirical 
question. This empirical question has not been addressed so far in the literature.  
 
2.3.3 Incentives to invest in quality in response to a policy or institutional 
change that limits price discrimination 
Valletti (2006) 
Relevant question: What is the effect on the incentive for a firm to invest in quality in 
response to a policy that prevents price discrimination? 
Main message: 
Allowing differential prices has a positive (negative) effect on investments in quality 
when price differential is demand-driven (cost-driven).  
Setting and assumptions 
This paper makes clear that different prices in different markets can arise from 
differences in consumer demand or from differences in the cost of supplying the different 
markets. In other words, this paper focuses on the case where markets are separated 
and can be segmented based on differences in marginal costs and/or consumer demand. 
This paper also considers the ex-ante investment by a firm in quality. An ex-ante 
investment means an investment made in anticipation of the different pricing regime. 
Two price regimes are considered: (1) price discrimination is possible; (2) perfect and 
costless arbitrage does not allow for price discrimination. The focus is restricted to the 
case in which both markets are served under both pricing regimes: uniform pricing and 
discrimination.  
The paper uses a standard vertically-differentiated market setting according to Mussa 
and Rosen with unit demand; a continuum of types of consumers in terms of their 
preferences for quality but with quality ranking. A monopolist chooses one quality that 
depends on the investment in R&D: the higher the investment, the higher the quality. 
Taking the quality as given, the monopoly then sets the price based on the pricing 
regime.  
Main results: 
Ex-post (i.e., after the investment in quality is made), uniform prices improve 
(decrease) consumer surplus and welfare when price differentiation is purely demand-
based (cost based). The (ex-post) quality level only affects price dispersion in the case 
of demand-based differential pricing. In the case of cost-based differential pricing, 
quality affects average price but not its dispersion.  
Furthermore, the main results for welfare effects are:  
▪ Ex-post: a regime that allows price discrimination is best for low quality; a 
regime that impose uniform pricing is best for high quality. 
▪ Ex-ante: when market segmentation is due to demand (cost), uniform prices 
leads to lower (higher) investments. That is the equivalent of saying that: 
o Parallel trade has good ex-post welfare properties (for a given level of 
quality), but leads to lower investment ex-ante when differential pricing 
is demand based. 
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o Parallel trade has bad ex-post welfare properties (for a given level of 
quality), but leads to higher investment ex-ante when differential pricing 
is cost based 
Lessons and limitations in understanding DC-SIP:  
General conclusion: 
▪ A policy that affects the ability of a firm to segment the market might have 
different effects on quality and welfare that depend on whether market 
segmentation is demand based (i.e., discrimination) or cost based (cost-based 
market segmentation). 
The main limitations to interpreting the results in terms of DC-SIP are the following: 
▪ Action by the monopolist is restricted to producing one quality for all markets. 
In addition, there is a one-time investment cost to produce quality. This is 
suitable for products that require a substantial fixed cost in R&D (drugs). For 
food products, a more reasonable assumption would probably be an increasing 
marginal cost of producing quality.  
 
Alexandrov and Deb (2012) 
Relevant question: What is the effect on the incentive of a firm to invest in quality in 
response to a policy that prevents price discrimination? 
Main message:  
In the context of a monopolist selling to two segments of consumers with different 
preferences for quality (e.g., when consumers differ in the importance they place on 
quality or quality improvements), if the firm is prevented from price discrimination, it 
will reduce the investment in quality. 
Setting and assumptions 
There are two different segments of consumers, but only one segment value quality. 
Consumers in this segment are referred to as high-quality type). Consumers who do not 
value quality are referred to as low-quality type) A monopolist can choose both price 
and quality (one quality). Quality can be produced with a fixed cost investment that is 
increasing with quality. The firm can distinguish between consumer segments (there is 
third rather than second degree price discrimination). 
Main result:  
The firm invests less in quality if is not able to price discriminate. Low-quality type 
consumers always suffer if price discrimination is not allowed. When price discrimination 
is allowed, the monopolist ensures that only the discerning segment (high-quality type 
consumers) pays more because of a higher investment. Without price discrimination, 
both segments pay for it through the uniform price and receive uniform quality. The 
driving force is that consumers have different relative valuation for quality (value quality 
similarly but have different price elasticities).  
Lessons and limitations in understanding DC-SIP:  
General conclusions are: 
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▪ By assumption the monopolist offers only one variation in both markets 
(segments). 
▪ Quality available on the market might be reduced by a monopolist who is 
constrained in their ability to price discriminate.   
The main limitation to interpreting the results in terms of DC-SIP are the following: 
▪ The setting applies to environments in which a firm can offer only one quality 
level to consumers. Otherwise similar to Valletti (2006).  
 
2.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the authors attempted to provide answers to two questions:  
1. Can DC-SIP be rationalised as the result of quality discrimination? 
2. Can DC-SIP be rationalised as the result of a possible strategic firm response to 
limitations on its ability to engage in third-degree price discrimination?  
The response to the first question is affirmative. The Industrial Organisation literature 
shows that firms with market power can engage in international quality discrimination 
(in addition to or as an alternative to price discrimination) when markets are separated 
(i.e., when there is no arbitrage between national markets). Based on the insights of 
this literature, DC-SIP can be rationalised as a optimal differential treatment of 
consumers by firms in separated national markets based on the demand conditions. For 
instance, the paper by Paroush (1978) specifically focuses on international quality 
discrimination. Perhaps obvious but important, one insight from this paper is that quality 
discrimination is the result of profit-maximising behaviour by firms taking advantage of 
differences in demand conditions when markets are separated. 
Furthermore, the Industrial Organisation literature explains that firms with market 
power will optimally react to policies (or to changes in institutional/legal environment) 
that impose a constraint on firm behaviour by adjusting the decision variables that are 
not subject to the limitations that are imposed by the policy change. For instance, a 
policy that limits the ability of a firm to engage in price discrimination between national 
markets (e.g., ban on territorial supply constraints) may induce a quality response by 
a firm with market power, potentially leading to larger quality differences between 
national countries.  
Specifically, while the theoretical paper by Paroush (1978) suggests that a reduction in 
the ability of firms to price discriminate internationally might exacerbate the quality 
differences existing between countries, the empirical paper by Kyle (2011) suggests the 
possibility of a reverse causality explanation. I.e., that quality differences (in the form 
of “national” product variations) could be introduced by firms to re-establish the ability 
of the firm to price discriminate internationally. In the context of the pharmaceutical 
sector, this paper finds that national variations were introduced in response of the threat 
of arbitrage due to the legalisation of parallel imports because of European integration. 
In other words, this paper states that new arbitrage opportunities between national 
markets induced firms to adopt non-price responses such as adjustment in product 
characteristics to maintain price difference across borders. The underlying assumption 
is that the newly introduced “national variations” are not as “movable” between 
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countries. While this reduced level of “mobility” might be a reasonable assumption for 
drugs (i.e., a new approval procedure might be required for a new variation), it is 
unclear whether the assumption is applicable to food products subject to DC-SIP. 
Several potential explanations for a reduced level of “mobility” could be hypothesised 
in the case of food. For instance, retailers might be unwilling to place products on their 
shelves that while similar/identical in appearance, have different qualities, fearing 
consumer dissatisfaction. Ultimately, whether DC-SIPs reflect the attempt of firms to 
maintain or gain ability to discriminate between otherwise well-integrated national 
markets remains an empirical question. 
Overall, the results by Paroush (1978) and Kyle (2011) point to two possible 
interpretations. On the one hand, they suggest potential unintended consequences of 
new policies (or changes in institutional/legal environment) that restrict firm behaviour 
and could further favour the proliferation of DC-SIP. On the other hand, they might 
indicate that firms have already responded to past (e.g. EU integration) or expected 
(envisaged) future changes in institutional/legal environment (e.g., territorial supply 
constraints) by strategically changing the characteristics of products offered in different 
countries. 
Szymanski and Valletti (2005) find that a reduction in the ability of a firm to engage in 
third-degree price discrimination does not generally provide incentives to introduce 
national variations. This is due to the fact that arbitrage would trigger cannibalisation 
of the high-quality variation by the lower-quality variation in the high-quality market. 
In other words, if markets were not separate, the different variations would move over 
the borders and ultimately co-exist in different markets. In the high-quality market, the 
low-quality variation (which is less profitable) would steel market share from the more 
profitable high-quality variation. This result found by Szymanski and Valletti (2005) is 
based on the assumption that the introduction of national variations does not create 
any impediments to arbitrage between countries. The opposite is true for Kyle (2011), 
where national variations do indeed represent an impediment to arbitrage between 
countries. Which assumption (a: national variations are a barrier to arbitrage between 
countries or b: national variations are not a barrier to arbitrage between countries) is 
best suited to describes the case of DC-SIP in the food sector remains an empirical 
question.  
Other papers from the Industrial Organisation literature offer more limited insights for 
interpreting DC-SIP. The paper by Valletti and Szymanski (2006) suggests that 
competition from generic products represents an incentive for firms to introduced lower-
quality variations, but it does not explain why different variations would be selectively 
present in different markets. Finally, the papers by Valletti (2006) and Alexandrov and 
Deb (2012) suggest possible negative consequences on limiting the ability of firms to 
price discriminate between different countries in terms of quality investments. 
Nevertheless, both papers are limited in their ability to explain DC-SIP as, according to 
the assumptions, firms are constrained to provide only one quality in all markets.  
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3.1 Introduction 
This section draws primarily from the international marketing and international business 
and management literature. This literature discusses whether the growing 
internationalisation of business is an indication of globalisation or rather an expression 
of regionalisation. Correspondingly, international firms need to find the right strategy 
to pursue an optimum balance between standardising and adapting their marketing 
strategies across national borders to regional/national peculiarities. Marketing strategies 
include product, pricing, distribution, and communication strategies. In the context of 
DC-SIP, the focus is primarily on product, including the product branding, and also 
encompasses considerations regarding communication strategies. 
The discussion regarding the marketing mix standardisation/adaptation dates back to 
1965 (Elinder, 1965). This literature expanded rapidly in the 1980s, following the 
publication by Theodore Levitt in 1983. According to Levitt (1983), when a firm is able 
to reduce costs (and consequently the final price for the consumer) and increase product 
quality (including reliability and suitability of the product for the consumers etc.), ‘world-
standardised’ products are going to be preferred by consumers (over local products) 
regardless of consumer nationality and taste preferences (Levitt, 1983). Some authors 
(e.g., Levitt, 1983; Vignali, 2001) have suggested that firms, which have product lines 
instead of a single product, should standardise at least some products. Others authors 
(e.g., Boddewyn et al., 1986; Whitelock and Pimblett, 1997) disagree with the role of 
standardisation. Overall, two school of thoughts can be identified: those who stress the 
advantages of globalisation (i.e., standardisation) and those who support the 
advantages of internationalisation (i.e., localisation).  
According to the first school of thought, firms should “go global” for many reasons. 
According to several authors (e.g., Buzzell, 1968; Levitt, 1983; Kreutzer, 1988; Elinder, 
1965; Ryans, 1969; Peebles et al, 1978; Theodosiou and Leonidou, 2003; Pires et al, 
2006) firms should pursue standardisation because of economics of scale and cost 
reduction. Donada and Dostaler (2005), Voss et al. (2008) and, more recently, Kreiter 
and Helm (2018) suggest that standardisation while helping firms enter a new market 
by saving financial resources required to later adapt in response to threats from 
competitors. Similarly, some authors (e.g., Szymanski et al, 1993; Navarro et al, 2010; 
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Kreiter and Helm, 2018) suggest that standardisation will increase the ability of a firm 
to allocate resources appropriately. According to Theodosiou and Leonidou (2003), with 
standardisation firms are in a better position to harmonize internal production and 
quality control, a fact that is particularly relevant with shorter product life cycles. 
Overall, several authors suggest that standardisation leads to a competitive advantage 
(Levitt, 1983; Ohmae, 1989; Kreutzer, 1988; Cavusgil et al. 1993; Poulis and Poulis, 
2011).  
Beside the benefits regarding cost reduction and improved resources allocation, Levitt 
(1983) suggested that: (i) consumer demand is becoming increasingly similar across 
different countries because of cultural convergence and (ii) global markets are becoming 
more and more homogeneous due to technology development. This idea is supported 
by several authors, including Quelch and Hoff (1986), Jain (1989), Heerden and Barter 
(2008), Schilke et al. (2009), Hartmann and Apaolaza-Ibáñez (2013), and Brei et al. 
(2011). Elinder (1965) and Levitt (1983) and Jain (1989) emphasise the role of border 
crossing and tourist activity. Wei and Yazdanifard (2014) argue that standardisation 
minimises consumer confusion among travellers. In addition, Meyer (2017) believes 
that the increasing degree of globalisation and large migration waves will lead to an 
increased role of standardisation. According to Kreutzer (1988) and Vignali (2001), 
standardisation increases global reputation.  
The second school of thought, which is referred to here as ‘go international’, argues that 
cultural convergence and the development toward market homogeneity are very slow 
while a large degree of differences in consumer taste, needs, and preferences persist 
(Czinkota and Ronkainen, 1998; Vignali, 2001; Vrontis et al. 2009; Alimiene and 
Kuvykaite, 2008; Wei and Yazdanifard, 2014; Son et al. 2018). In addition, Griffith et 
al. (2014) emphasize the role of consumer behavioural differences. These behavioural 
differences are due to differences in culture, religion, and norms in different parts of the 
world (Vignali, 2001; Friedman, 1986; Douglas and Wind, 1987; Onkvisit and Shaw, 
1987; Lannon, 1988; Cayla and Arnould, 2008; Vrontis et al. 2009; Moro et al, 2018). 
Due to all of these differences, supporters of the ‘go international’ school believe that 
adaptation to local market conditions is essential for a firm to succeed in new markets 
and also improves public relationships with local consumers (Vignali, 2001). In addition, 
(i) the presence of country-specific laws and customs (Levitt, 1983; Vignali, 2001; 
Vrontis et al., 2009; Alimiene and Kuvykaite, 2008), (ii) heterogeneous economic 
situations and consumer willingness to pay, and (iii) competitors (Kreutzer, 1988; 
Vignali, 2001; Leonidou et al., 2002), (iv) ecological differences (e.g. due to climate 
and geography) (Kreutzer, 1988; Vronits et al., 2009; Griffith et al., 2014) require some 
degree of adaptation. 
Schilke et al. (2009) reports that standardisation reduces differentiation, therefore it 
reduces the competitive advantage of firms (the opposite is true for adaptation). 
Concerning the role of economies of scale, Thackray (1985), Harris (1988), and 
Whitelock and Pimblett (1997) support the idea that the proportion of production cost 
compared to the total cost is very small, so the cost saving generated by standardisation 
is often irrelevant. Overall, this group of scholars believe that sales, profits, and market 
shares increase with adaptation, and with adaptation, firms are more flexible and 
competitive (Rosen, 1990; Walters, 1986; Samiee and Roth, 1992; Almiene and 
Kuvykaite 2008; Wei and Yazdanifard, 2014). 
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3.2 Think global, act local 
A third school of thought has emerged more recently that supports the idea that firms 
engage in both internationalisation and globalisation. Ohmae (1989), Taylor (1991), 
and Vignali (2001) present the idea of “think global, act local”. In a similar vein, Sandler 
and Shani (1992) suggest “Brand globally, advertise locally”. Many other scholars 
suggest the need to combine elements of both standardising and adapting strategies 
(e.g., Brei et al. 2011) and that a ‘middle of the road’ approach is more feasible and 
appropriate (e.g., Ryans and Donnelly, 1969; Colvin et al. 1980; Whitelock and Chung, 
1989; Whitelock and Pimblett, 1997 and Jain, 1989), overall highlighting the fact that 
there are positive relationships between both adaptation and standardisation with 
performance. Similarly, Alden et al. (1999) believe that globalisation and adaption are 
not mutually exclusive but rather are complementary approaches. Wei and Yazdanifard 
(2014) concluded that it “is illogical for companies to pursue complete homogenisation 
of the marketing mix, except under distinctly particular sets of situation and certain 
product categories”. They developed the so-called “AdapStand” approach, which 
encourages companies to standardise tactics where possible and adapt only where 
needed (Wei and Yazdanifard 2014; Vrontis et al. 2009). 
The discussion about internationalisation versus globalisation has been phrased in terms 
of ‘points of view’. Venaik and Midgley (2018) studied 231 MNC (Multi National 
Corporations) subsidiaries: 23% of their sample pursue standardisation, 38% pursue 
adaptation, and 39% pursue hybrid configurations. Some authors use the parallelism 
“Is the world flat or curved” (Friedman, 2005; Ghemawat, 2007; Jullens, 2013; Venaik 
and Midgley, 2019): although it is known that the world is curved, for many purposes it 
is appropriate to consider it to be flat. In the context of this review, market conditions 
(specifically differences between countries) will determine whether internationalisation 
or globalisation is appropriate. For example, the study by Jeong et al. (2019) shows 
that the level of adaption depends on internal factors (the degree of internationalisation, 
R&D intensity, and firm size), and external factors (market similarity and market 
uncertainty). 
Some papers debated whether or not the degree of standardisation varies in a given 
industry. Tan and Sousa (2013) report that the appropriate degree of standardisation 
depends on the industry and is more pronounced for industrial products (Samiee and 
Roth, 1992; Schilke et al., 2009; Kreiter and Helm, 2018). Other scholars observe that 
even within the same industry, there are firms with completely different strategies 
(Venaik and Midgley, 2019). With regard to the food industry, for example, Venaik and 
Midgley (2019) note that Nestlé largely standardised Nespresso coffee machines and 
capsules while PepsiCo developed country-specific snacks such as a spicy snack called 
“Kurkure” tailored to the Indian market. Rosen et al (1988) considers the nature of the 
product (durable or nondurable), with durable products being more suitable for 
standardisation.  
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Table 3-1: Overview of reasons for pursuing globalisation or standardisation 
Go Global (Standardisation) Literature 
Economies of scale and cost reduction Buzzell, 1968; Levitt 1983, Kreutzer 1988, Elinder 
1965; Ryans 1969; Peebles, et al., 1978; Quelch and 
Hoff 1986; Theodosiou and Leonidou, 2003; Pires, 
et al., 2006;  
Cultural convergence and homogeneous 
market 
Levitt, 1983; Elinder 1965; Ryans, 1969; Peebles et 
al., 1978; Quelch and Hoff, 1986; Jain 1989; Brei et 
al., 2011; Heerden and Barter, 2008; Hartmann and 
Apaolaza-Ibáñez, 2013; Schilke et al., 2009 
Technology development Levitt, 1983; Jain, 1989 
Competitive advantage Levitt, 1983; Ohmae, 1989; Kreutzer, 1988; 
Cavusgil et al., 1993; Poulis and Poulis, 2011 
Global reputation Vignali, 2001, Kreutzer, 1988 
Border-crossing and tourist activities Elinder, 1965; Levitt, 1983; Jain, 1989; 
Product life cycle is becoming shorter Theodosiou and Leonidou, 2003 
Better harmonisation through internal 
production and quality control 
Theodosiou and Leonidou, 2003 
Minimise consumer confusion among 
travellers 
Wei and Yazdanifard, 2014 
Saving financial resources (Slack 
resources) 
Donada and Dostaler, 2005; Voss et al., 2008; 
Kreiter and Helm, 2018 
Appropriate resource allocation Szymanski et al., 1993; Navarro et al., 2010; Kreiter 
and Helm, 2018 
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Table 3-2: Overview of reasons for pursuing internationalisation or localisation  
Go International (Localisation) Literature 
Cultural/Religion differences Vignali, 2001; Friedman, 1986; Douglas and Wind, 
1987; Onkvisit and Shaw, 1987; Lannon, 1988; 
Cayla and Arnould, 2008; Vrontis et al., 2009; Moro 
et al., 2018 
Taste, needs, preferences Czinkota and Ronkainen, 1998; Vignali, 2001; 
Quelch, 2003; Vrontis et al., 2009; Alimiene and 
Kuvykaite, 2008; Wei and Yazdanifard, 2014; Son et 
al., 2018 
Law/Customs Lavitt, 1983; Vignali, 2001; Vrontis et al., 2009; 
Alimiene and Kuvykaite, 2008 
Heterogeneous economic situation, 
consumer willingness to pay, and 
competitors 
Kreutzer, 1988; Vignali, 2001; Leonidov et al., 2002 
Public relationship Vignali, 2001 
Ecological differences (resources, 
climatic condition) 
Kreutzer, 1988; Vrontis et al., 2009; Griffith et al., 
2014 
Increasing sales, profit, and market 
share (being competitive) 
Rosen, 1990; Walters, 1986; Samiee and Roth, 
1992, Harris, 1985; Katsikeas and Samiee, 2002; 
Wei and Yazdanifard, 2014; Alimiene and Kuvykaite, 
2008 
Proportion of production cost compared 
to the total cost 
Thackray, 1985; Harris, 1988; Braidwood, 1984, 
Douglas and Wind, 1987; Whitelock and Pimblett, 
1997 
Reduce differentiation (as a competitive 
advantage) 
Schilke et al., 2009 
Consumer behaviour Griffith et al., 2014 
 
According to Moro et al. (2018), cultural aspect influence consumer behaviour and 
reaction although this effect can be different in each country. They suggest that the 
product characteristics sometimes need to be localised, but sometimes communication 
localisation is needed. Effects on consumer behaviour “are driven by global and local 
cultures as well as the final outcome of the dual effects” (Cleveland et al. 2015; Moro 
et al. 2018). In addition, Son et al. (2018) studied the case of the retailer Tesco entering 
Japan. Tesco started business in Japan with the standard retail system that they have 
in other countries. Subsequently, they collaborated with a local partner, but kept the 
idea of supplying discounted products. The strategy failed and Tesco withdrew from 
Japan mostly because they failed to understand the role played by fresh food for local 
consumers. Son et al. (2018) concluded that “The success or failure of global retailers 
depends on their capability and willingness to adapt to local markets.” A similar 
conclusion can be found in Burt et al., (2003); Dawson and Mukoyama (2014); Dupuis 
and Prime (1996); Wood et al., (2016); Yoder et al., (2016).  
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Furthermore, Jeong et al., (2018) note that most studies “focus on companies based in 
United States, thus preventing the generalization of finding”. Duman and Poturak 
(2014) suggest the need for more studies concerning European firms. Jeong et al. 
(2018) conclude that the country of origin plays a big role in the globalisation versus 
internationalisation debate. Specifically, products from a country with a good reputation 
require a lower degree of adaptation. 
In summary, the third school of thought supports the idea of a hybrid strategy. In 
other words, it is about the degree of adaptation, which depends on market 
conditions, industry, product, culture, and many other situational, internal, and external 
factors. Jeong et al. (2018) further develop and qualify this concept but put forward the 
idea of “all marketing mix strategies must be fit” (an idea which is mentioned by 
Porter, 1996). For example, this means that if a firm adapts the feature of a product, it 
should also consistently adapt the other elements of the marketing mix to avoid 
consumer confusion. This insight seems to be quite relevant for the case of DC-SIP 
where a firm adapts its product, but fails to adapt the package, advertising, and 
communication to consumers.  
 
3.3 Conclusions and limitations of the literature on international 
marketing and international business 
The literature review by Schmid and Kotulla (2011) reports that more than 300 articles 
on the topic of internationalisation versus adaptation have been published in the domain 
of international market research as well as in business/management journals. A 
significant literature exists that considers the situations in which and why firms 
standardise or adapt their marketing across nations and why and how firms standardise 
or adapt their marketing to enhance performance. Of the marketing mix (product, place, 
price, promotion etc.), a large share of studies (65% of those reviewed by Schmid and 
Kotulla (2011) focus on product. This literature suggests simple but important 
conclusions: 
A frequently asked question (in research and for managers) is whether to adapt or to 
standardise a given product across countries. 
Likewise, a frequently asked question is which elements of the marketing mix are to be 
standardised across countries and which are not to be (for instance, the brand could be 
standardised but not the product). 
 
This literature pursues two main research objectives:  
▪ To describe how and/or to positively-theoretically explain why firms actually 
standardise/adapt on the basis of situational factors. These research questions 
are pursued by building on the contingency approach: managers make decisions 
depending on the situation of their firm. An overview of the situations considered 
in the literature is provided in Figure 1 (Figure 1 reproduces Table 2 in Schmid 
and Kotulla, 2011). 
▪ To provide recommendations regarding standardisation/adaptation by firms 
and/or normative-theoretically ground, these recommendations are based on 
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performance. These research questions are pursued by building on the concept 
of ‘fits’ between the strategy of a firm and specific situations (better the fit – 
better the performance). Stated simply, the key question is: In which situations 
is a specific degree of standardisation/adaptation likely to increase performance? 
While the topic has attracted significant attention resulting in very numerous published 
contributions, Schmid and Kotulla (2011) note that this literature suffers from significant 
limitations. These limitations have two sources. One is the almost exclusive reliance on 
logical-intuitive thinking or data mining, respectively for theoretical and empirical 
contributions, rather than on an underlying theory. The other is the missing integration 
of the concept of fit with a normative theory so that, according to Schmid and Kotulla 
(2011), it is not possible to derive performance-enhancing strategies for given 
situations. Other studies also support the idea that this literature lacks a theoretical 
foundation (Tan and Sousa, 2013; Helm and Gritsch, 2014; Wei and Yazdanifard, 2014; 
Kreiter and Helm, 2018; Larimo et al. 2018). This situation is complicated by the lack 
of clear definitions of marketing mix “globalisation” and “standardisation” (Rosen, 1990; 
Whitelock and Pimblett, 1997). Several related concepts are implicitly used in the 
literature.  
Figure 3-1 Situational factors 
 
Source: Schmid and Kotulla (2011) 
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3.4 Product adaptation: A theoretical approach by Schmid and Kotulla 
(2011) 
To overcome these limitations, Schmid and Kotulla (2011) propose a framework that 
integrates normative-theoretical considerations and the concept of situation-strategic 
fit. Their framework is specifically applicable to the marketing dimension product, which 
seems to be most relevant in the case of DC-SIP. This framework explains the “foreign-
product profit” and considers product name, product feature, product design, product 
quality, and product packaging. The framework is depicted in Figure 3-2 (Figure 2 
reproduces Figure 3 in Schmid and Kotulla, 2011). 
Based on the foreign product profit, Schmid and Kotulla (2011) theoretically derive “four 
situational fits” for a specific product: (a) cross-national homogeneity of demand; (b) 
potential for cross-national economies of scale; (c) cost of modification of the product; 
(d) foreign price elasticity of demand. The optimal degree of product 
standardisation/adaptation to achieve performance depends on these four situations. 
According to Schmid and Kotulla (2011), in contrast to the situational variables that 
were previously considered by the literature, the four situations included in the 
framework directly affect the relationship between standardisation/adaptation and 
foreign product profit. These elements of the framework are linked to the following 
components that determine the foreign-product profits: total cost per unit, price per 
unit, quantity of product sold. Based on this framework, four propositions are derived. 
Each of the four propositions states that: “A fit between a high [medium, low] X and a 
high [medium, low] degree of international product standardisation enhances foreign 
product profits,” where X means, respectively: 
1. Cross-national homogeneity of demand for a specific product: (e.g., due to low 
cultural distance, cross-national image spill over effects, and supranational laws)  
2. Potential for cross-national economies of scale (where the potential for mass 
production –and so economies of scale- differ greatly depending on the kind of 
product, centralisation of production number of similar foreign markets operated, 
and market size, etc.) 
3. Cost of modification of a specific product (where the cost intensity of modification 
varies with the complexity of the product and the production facilities)   
4. Foreign price elasticity of demand (where high elasticity requires low prices to 
be pursued, and so contain costs with standardisation)  
The implications for DC-SIP are the following: DC-SIPs are more likely to occur when 
cross-national homogeneity of demand is low, potential for cross-national economies of 
scale are limited, the costs of changing the composition of the product are low, and the 
elasticity of demand in the foreign market is low. The latter condition might appear to 
be at odds with the demand in Eastern European markets (where high elasticity of 
demand is expected), where DC-SIPs have often been reported. The latter condition is 
predicated on the assumption that standardisation (i.e., a firm offering the same product 
variation in different markets) is less costly than adaptation (i.e., a firm offering 
different product variations in different markets) and so standardisation leads to lower 
prices than adaptation. In the specific case of DC-SIP, a lower-quality variation might 
on the other hand lead to a reduction in production costs and so the direction of 
condition #4 is reversed.  
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Additionally, the framework considers two moderators: (a) perceptual errors of the 
managers and (b) quality of execution. The first moderates the product-profit enhancing 
effects of the four situation-strategy fits negatively and the second positively. 
The review of the literature by Schmid and Kotulla (2011) does not mention the case of 
adapting product features and internationalising product name/package/brand (the 
specific case of DC-SIP) although this possibility cannot be ruled out on the theoretical 
grounds offered by the review.   
Figure 3-2 
 
Source: Schmid and Kotulla (2011) 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter reviewed the international marketing, international business and 
management literature to explain dual quality. This literature analyses the marketing 
mix strategies pursued by international firms: standardisation versus adaptation (versus 
a balance of standardisation and adaptation) across national borders. The literature is 
very large but can be organised into three main schools of thought:  
(1) Go global: This school stresses the advantages of globalisation and so 
standardisation. 
(2) Go international: This school stresses the advantages of international adaptation 
and so localisation. 
(3) Hybrid strategy: This school stresses that the optimal degree of 
adaptation/standardisation depends on market conditions, industry, product, 
culture, and many other situational, internal, and external factors. 
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Main motivations of the ‘Go Global’ school are benefits regarding cost reduction, 
improved resources allocation, cultural convergence, and technology development. 
Main motivations of the ‘Go International’ school are related to the persistence of a large 
degree of differences in consumer taste, needs, and preferences across markets, the 
existence of country-specific laws and customs, and heterogeneity in the ecological and 
competition environments. 
A third school of thought has emerged more recently that supports the idea that firms 
engage in both internationalisation and globalisation as there are positive relationships 
between both adaptation and standardisation with performance. 
With regard to the degree of adaptation versus standardisation of the marketing-mix-
dimension “product”, four “situational fits” play an important role: (a) cross-national 
homogeneity of demand; (b) potential for cross-national economies of scale; (c) cost of 
modification of the product; and (d) foreign price elasticity of demand. 
Based on this literature, the authors of this report conclude that dual quality could be 
rationalised within the discourse concerning the optimal marketing mix strategy adopted 
by international firms.  
As the literature reviewed covers different disciplines and methods (Industrial 
Organisation, international marketing, international business and management 
literature), it is an interesting question to ask whether and how the findings of the two 
chapters relate to each other and what can generally be learnt for the case of DC-SIP. 
Both literatures point to the fact that DC-SIP can be rationalised as the optimal strategy 
of a firm to maximise profits. A firm will adapt (or not adapt) the quality and composition 
of the product, and so offer (or do not offer) national variations depending on market 
conditions (characterising supply and demand) and on the ability of a firm to exploit 
differences and the separation in national markets. Differences in demand conditions 
can be exploited by firms to discriminate between consumers from different countries. 
But discrimination is only possible when barriers exist between national markets that 
prevent arbitrage (variations moving from one to another national market).  
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Summary 
This project aims to identify factors affecting quality perceptions of agri-food products 
by consumers in order to analyse which cues/attributes should be considered regarding 
the issue of differences in composition of seemingly identical branded food products 
because they play a relevant role in the construction of perceived quality, and therefore 
in the purchase intentions and decisions taken by consumers.  
Despite being a complex topic, the concepts of quality and perceived quality play a 
relevant role in European consumption dynamics due to the multidimensionality of the 
characteristics and attributes of each product, in particular, agri-food products. 
From the point of view of marketing management and consumer behaviour, quality 
seems to be linked to complex factors related to the satisfaction of consumer 
preferences that determine the decision to buy or not buy. Consequently, these 
variables go beyond the intrinsic or technical characteristics of the product.  
Therefore, the concept of quality cannot be traced back to an objective dimension only, 
but to a connection between objective and subjective variables that determines the 
competitiveness of the food product. Over time, different approaches have been used 
to study perceived quality and its role in consumer purchase choices: the information 
economy approaches, multi-attribute approaches, hierarchical approaches, and 
integrative approaches. 
One of the first approaches, developed by Nelson in 1970, is the information economy 
theory that divides products into search and experience on the basis of the effort that 
each consumer makes to find information: the quality of search product is measurable 
before the purchase through the acquisition of information whereas measuring the 
quality of the experience goods before the purchase is objectively impossible. 
The second approach - the multi-attribute one – is an evolution of the information 
economy approach and considers that consumer evaluation is based on quality cues. 
This approach involves a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic attributes: intrinsic 
attributes concern physical aspects of the product, their modification leads to a physical 
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modification of the product; extrinsic attributes are not part of the physical product (e.g. 
price, packaging, or brand). 
The third approach - hierarchical approach - studies the quality concept from a 
subjective point of view by using the means-end chain, a tool for understanding how 
consumers establish the links between what they perceive about the physical 
characteristics of the products and the reasons that lead them to purchase. 
Considering the previous approaches (information economy, multi-attribute and 
hierarchical ones), the Total Food Quality Model uses two dimensions to measure the 
food quality: horizontal and vertical dimensions. In the horizontal dimension the model 
divides the perceived quality process into two times (before and after purchase); the 
vertical dimension considers a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic quality cues. 
Lastly, the integrative approach divides the qualitative characteristics that contribute to 
defining an overall judgment of the quality of a product in quality cues and quality 
attributes. A quality cue is an attribute of the food product which can be perceived 
before purchase and consumption and which is believed to be indicative of its quality; 
quality attributes are those product attributes used by consumers to determine the 
quality after the consumption of the food product and can be divided into experience 
attributes - determined before and during usage (e.g. taste) - and credence attributes 
– based on beliefs (e.g. the product is a healthy one) (Tijskens et al., 2001). This model 
is based on the distinction of two different moments for the formation of the perceived 
quality: before the purchase the consumer perceives an expected quality through the 
quality cues, after the purchase, the consumer has a perceived experienced quality that 
he or she estimates through quality attributes (experience and credence attributes). 
The acquisition of a quality cue depends on a number of factors including the availability 
of time and the ability of the consumer to process the information, for example, on the 
basis of the cultural and educational level of the consumer.  
Therefore, in order to understand the process of consumer perception of quality, it is 
important also to consider studies about consumer behaviour and the factors that 
influence the purchase motivations. Because of the complexity of studying consumer 
behaviour, it is difficult to make an exhaustive list of all factors that affect the consumer 
buying process of foods product, but it is useful to consider the four main types of factor 
influencing consumer behaviour: cultural, social, personal, and psychological. 
Considering what has been discussed so far on the perception of quality in agri-food, 
the most appropriate approach to studying the issue of DC-SIP and the main factors to 
be included in the analysis seems to be the integrative one as it fully considers the 
process of purchase or re-purchase and cues, attributes, and external factors. 
Therefore, it is important to understand which key cues/attributes to consider in the 
purchase of agri-food products and in the issue of DC-SIP. 
For this purpose, the literature was reviewed to analyse models and factors used by the 
prevailing literature to study the concept of perceived quality for food products. The 
search was made on the Web of Science, using the keywords "perceived quality" and 
"food" as the topic of the paper. The analysis of the first 50 search results by relevance 
in terms of citations led to the identification of 6 key elements in cues/attributes of 
perceived quality: price, packaging and labelling, brand, origin, healthy, organic, and 
intrinsic factors. 
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These six factors are quality cues (intrinsic and extrinsic) before the purchase of the 
product which the consumer, through an inference process, uses to formulate an 
expected perceived quality. 
The role of these six factors does not end after the first purchase or consumption of the 
product: those that were cues become attributes to determine the perceived quality 
experienced before a possible re-purchase; the intrinsic factors (which before the 
purchase were mostly visual) become taste or organoleptic characteristics linked to the 
tasting; the other 5 factors (credence ones) continue to play a key role in the 
construction of consumer perception of quality, which despite being experienced, 
remains a subjective perception construction. At each purchase and on the basis of each 
consumption, the quality attributes can be transformed and the effect on the level of 
perceived quality can vary. 
The complexity of this phenomenon is linked to the fact that the factors (cues and 
attributes) systematically affect the perception of quality and therefore the intentions 
to purchase/re-purchase because each factor is correlated to the others (for example 
the brand influence, and is influenced by the price or the country of origin). 
It is important to understand the role of each factor in terms of DC-SIP and how the 
eventual consumer information of the double level of quality will affect each factor and 
therefore the decision to purchase. The non-information of the consumer essentially 
certainly affects the intrinsic factors of the product. On the other hand, the information 
of the DC-SIP will affect the trust in the brand and - depending on the reasons for the 
purchase - the tribe effect of the brand, the country of origin, and the halo effect of the 
country, and the perception of food as being healthy. In other words, it could affect all 
the main credence attributes. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This study analyses the factors affecting quality perception of agri-food products by 
consumers. The aim is to understand what the factors that should be considered in the 
issue of DC-SIP are, because their role in the construction of perceived quality and, 
therefore, in purchase intentions is relevant. 30 
Considering this objective, the first part of this study explains the theoretical 
background of the themes of quality, perceived quality, and the different 
approaches/models used by scholars to analyse these themes (Information economy 
approach, Multi-attribute approach, Hierarchical approaches, Integrative approaches, 
and the Total Quality Model). 
A specific review of the literature is then carried out with the aim of analysing models 
and factors used by the prevailing literature to study the concept of perceived quality 
of food products. In particular, research is carried out on the Web of Science using the 
keywords "perceived quality" and "food" as the topic of papers, the first 100 papers in 
terms of citations are analysed and 50 papers are selected for their pertinence in the 
 
30 For a more detailed analyses of the impact of DC-SIP on consumers’ purchase choices and welfare see 
Colen et al. (2019). 
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research area). This methodology leads to the identification of the main factors 
influencing the perception of quality of food products.  
The complexity of the food product purchasing process generates the need to introduce 
even the most important concepts about consumer behaviour, with the aim of 
understanding which characteristics influence the purchasing intention of consumer, 
that is, the characteristics related to the person (personal, social, cultural, and 
psychological factors), factors related to the macro environment, and the context, 
motivations, and nature of the need. 
This has led to realising that it is not only the organoleptic characteristics and raw 
materials (intrinsic cues/attributes) of a food product that influence consumer 
perception of quality and intention to purchase, but that a system of factors is involved 
and used by consumer as cues/attributes to estimate the product quality. The literature 
underlines the impossibility of generating an exhaustive and complete list of factors that 
determine consumer perceptions of quality and the impossibility of quantitatively 
measuring the weight of each factor on the perception of quality, especially when 
considered individually. In addition, the effect of the factors on the purchase intention 
of the consumer being a systemic one, which means that the factors both influence 
themselves and directly affect the perception of quality. 
However, the proposed methodology has led to the main critical factors influencing 
consumer perceptions in the DC-SIP issue being identified. Beyond the organoleptic 
characteristics, price, brand, country of origin, health, organic, packaging, and labelling 
have been considered. A paragraph on each of them is presented in order to understand 
the role it plays in consumer behaviour and in the process of building the quality 
perception. Finally, why this is relevant to the DC-SIP issue is discussed. 
 
4.2 Quality, perceived quality, and models: theoretical background 
The quality topic plays an important role in competitiveness of agri-food companies and 
in the consumption trend of the European market.  
The definition of quality is still complex although it is a topic widely discussed in the 
reference literature (Ertekin and Aydin, 2010; Baker, 1995; Sumutka and Neve, 2011; 
Flynn, Schroeder, and Sakakibara, 1994; Hitt and Hoskisson, 1997). The main problem 
arises from the multidimensional nature of the concept and of the features and 
attributes of each agri-food product. Going beyond the legislation, the concept of quality 
seems to be the summary of images and characteristics of a product or service which 
could satisfy consumer needs. So the quality is strictly linked to consumer preferences 
through the decision to buy or not to buy taken by the consumer. While contributing to 
a clarification of the concept, none of the definitions can be considered to be exhaustive. 
In fact, they are simply analysed from different perspectives. One of the main definitions 
of quality is by Deming (1994): “A product or a service possesses quality if it helps 
somebody and enjoys a good and sustainable market”. 
The concept of quality is analysed from objective and subjective perspectives in 
economic and management studies. The physical characteristics of the product and their 
agreement from engineers and food technologists defines the objective quality. The 
quality perceived by consumers is the subjective quality. The economic importance of 
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quality lies in the connection between the objective and the subjective quality. In fact, 
the ability of producers to make the physical characteristics of product meet the wishes 
of consumers and the possibility of consumers finding the wished for qualities in the 
product determine quality as a competitive parameter for food producers (Grunert, 
2005). Over time, studying the purchase choices in agri-food made by consumers, 
scholars have used different approaches (Grunert, 1997): the information economy 
approach; multi-attribute approach; hierarchical approaches; and integrative 
approaches. Each approach considers a product as a set of attributes (Lancaster, 1966). 
 
4.2.1 The information economy approach 
The information economy approach is one of the key concepts explaining the structural 
changes in the modern economy. This approach can be used to measure quality as the 
intensity of the attributes of a product. The analysis focuses on the discovery of these 
attributes in the presence of asymmetric information. The Market may fail when 
consumers cannot evaluate the attributes perfectly. 
One of the main contributions to the development of the Information Economy Approach 
has been made by Nelson (1970). His model derives in part from that of Stigler (1961) 
according to which the consumer is involved in a search process that presents costs 
related to information research. He argues that the consumer stops searching for 
information on the product when the cost of the research equals the expected return. 
Nelson divides products in search and experience on the basis of the effort that each 
consumer makes to find information. The quality of the search product is measurable 
before the purchase through the acquisition of information. On the other hand, 
experience goods are products whose evaluation of the quality before the purchase is 
objectively impossible. For this kind of good, the quality is evaluable after consumption. 
This category of good also includes those whose cost, linked to the search for 
information, is very high until it exceeds the product price, and products whose quality 
evaluation process is very complicated. Many products have both search and experience 
attributes. For example, search attributes are the price, the colour, and the appearance 
while the taste and the freshness are experience attributes.  
The Nelson theory was extended by Darby and Karni (1973) who introduced a third type 
of attribute. Credence attributes are those whose existence cannot be verified even after 
consumption. Two typical examples of credence attributes are related to the animal 
breeding system (Intensive/non-intensive) or to the type of feeding (example: biological 
feed) (Darby, Karni, 1973). It is possible to divide the characteristics of search, 
experience, and credence products on the basis of the amount of costs that the 
consumer has to assess the quality before and after the purchase of the product 
(Krouse, 1992; Moser et al. 2011). 
 
4.2.2 Multi-attribute approach 
An evolution of the previous approach is that consumer evaluation of the product is 
based on the quality cues.  
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Olson and Jacoby (1972) distinguish intrinsic and extrinsic attributes. The former differs 
from the latter because they concern physical aspects of the product; their modification 
leads to a physical modification of the product. Examples of intrinsic qualities are colour, 
appearance, and thickness. The extrinsic quality cues are, for example, the price, the 
brand, and the country of origin. 
In one of their studies, the two authors examined the importance that consumers give 
to attributes in order to judge the quality of a brand (Olson and Jacoby,1972). The study 
highlights the greater importance given by consumers to the intrinsic attributes of 
products. However, this model does not consider the possible relationships between the 
various attributes and the possibility that the consumer can notice the presence of an 
attribute through the observation of another (Grunert, 1989). 
 
4.2.3 Hierarchical approaches 
The previous approach provides insight into the quality perception process. The 
hierarchical approaches deepen the issue of quality perception and try to analyse quality 
from a subjective point of view. It is built on the means-end chain. The means-end chain 
is a tool for understanding how consumers establish the links between what they 
perceive the physical characteristics of the products to be and the reasons that lead 
them to purchase the product. More precisely, the construction of the hierarchical map 
of values requires the construction of the means-end chain, which highlights how 
“product characteristic (concrete or abstract) is linked to consequences (functional or 
psychosocial) of consumption, which in turn may be linked to the attainment of life 
values (instrumental or terminal)” (Grunert, 1997).  
The means-end chain represents a conceptual model that interprets the decision-
making process of consumers, relating product knowledge to self-knowledge, 
considered as the knowledge of the consumer needs by the same consumer (Gutman, 
1982). The model assumes that consumers choose a product because of its ability to 
yield the desired effects, and indirectly to satisfy certain personal values. The attributes 
of the product represent the "means" that the consumer uses to reach a certain "end". 
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Figure 4-1: The Total Food Quality Model 
 
Source: Brunsø et al. 2002 
 
4.2.4 Total Food Quality Model 
The total Food Quality Model (Figure 4-1) is a model with two dimensions (horizontal 
and vertical), and was inspired by the approaches previously examined: the information 
economy approach, the multi-attribute approach, and the means-end chain.  
In the horizontal dimension the model divides the perceived quality process into two 
times: before and after purchase. 
Furthermore, it is important in this case to consider the distinction between experience 
and credence attributes. Focusing on repeatedly purchased agri-food products, it is 
therefore appropriate to make a distinction between two different conditions: first 
purchase and subsequent purchases. The two phases considered by the model – before 
and after purchase – represent a simplification. In fact, continuous purchasing may 
result in a change in quality perception by the consumer over time. The biggest change 
about quality perception occurs in connection with the first purchase. During the first 
purchase, consumer is influenced by informational cues only; it represents the first 
experience with the product and may cause changes in the perception of quality. 
In the case of first purchase, the consumer considers the quality expectations through 
the observed characteristics (vertical dimension of the model). If the consumption 
experience corresponds to the expectations, there are the conditions for the consumer 
to repeat the purchase. In subsequent purchases, quality expectations originate from 
the consumer experience. The frequent consumption of a product results in the 
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activation of a learning process, which in fact allows for increasingly higher quality 
expectations. 
About the experience attributes, they come from the situations of consumption that may 
change over the time. On the other hand, when the information about quality become 
available, the credence qualities attributes can always change causing a change in 
quality perception.  
In the mind of a consumer quality has a dimension and a weight that change over the 
time. This quality dimension, affected by owner experience, acquires a greater weight 
through time. For example, the attributes of taste and healthiness in the pre-purchase 
phase may have the same weight in the mind of the consumer, but in the period after 
purchase and during consumption taste may have a higher weight than healthiness. The 
healthiness attributes are still conceptual and based on information. 
The attributes defining perceived quality and the inference-making are also important 
in understanding the quality differentiation. Companies need to communicate the 
differentiated qualities to consumers; consumers need to evaluate quality by inferring 
from of several complex attributes.  
 
4.2.5 Integrative approaches 
These approaches are also based on the concept that the perceived quality of a product 
is a function of two distinct time phases: before and after purchase. Based on these two 
moments, Steenkamp (1989) divides the qualitative characteristics that contribute to 
defining an overall judgment of the quality of a product in quality cues and quality 
attributes. Before purchasing, individuals form an opinion of the quality of product, 
which is called ‘expected quality’, that is based on quality cues of the product. A quality 
cue is an attribute of the food product which can be perceived before purchase and 
consumption and which is used by consumers to build the perception of expected 
quality. 
After purchasing and consuming the product, the quality perceived is called ‘experienced 
quality’. In this case the quality perception is due by quality that can be divided into 
experience attributes - determined before and during usage (e.g. taste, freshness) - 
and credence attributes – based on beliefs (e.g. brand or country of origin). 
The consumer proceeds to collect and categorise the quality cues (Steenkamp, 1989) 
that will serve to infer the quality attributes of the products. The quality cues are divided 
into intrinsic and extrinsic (Olson, Jacoby, 1972). The former differs from the latter 
because they concern the physical aspects of the product in the sense that their 
modification leads to a physical modification of the product. 
The acquisition and categorization of quality cues depends on a number of factors 
including the availability of time and the ability of the consumer to process the 
information taken from the quality cues, which for example depends on the cultural and 
educational level of the consumer (Steenkamp, 1989). 
The model of quality perception developed by Fernqvist and Ekelund (2014) combines 
the studies of Steenkamp and Van Trijp (1996), Steenkamp (1990), and Olson (1977), 
and clearly summarises what was previously observed. The model shows how the 
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product is perceived as a set of characteristics that are subdivided into intrinsic and 
extrinsic. Furthermore, it highlights how the "experiential" quality is formed, which is 
also influenced by quality expectations. Moreover, these expectations are formed 
through the process of inference of the intrinsic characteristics of the product, which 
occurs through the observation of the intrinsic quality cues, while the process of 
inference on the extrinsic characteristics occurs through the evaluation of extrinsic 
quality cues. 
 
4.3 Consumer behaviour and purchase motivation 
Consumer behaviour is the research branch that studies the place, the reasons, and the 
manner in which people do or do not buy a product. Engel, Blackwell, and Miniard (2001) 
define consumer behaviour as ‘those activities directly involved in obtaining, consuming, 
and disposing of products and services including the decision processes that precede 
and follow these actions’. Therefore, studying consumer behaviour is important for 
many reasons. It is important for any organisation before launching a product. It is also 
important to understand the constant changes in the standard of living, trends, fashions, 
technology, and consumer attitudes towards the purchase of products (Kumar, 2004). 
Understanding the variations in these factors is important because the marketing of a 
product mainly depends on these factors.  
Before extending the models by including factors that influence consumer behaviour, it 
is useful to consider the role of consumer behaviour in the marketing process applied 
by companies. Companies use the information for example about the complex consumer 
decision making phase obtained through consumer behaviour studies to define 
marketing strategies, and then elaborate their sales forecasts. In general, companies 
study consumer behaviour in the market using a sensing process that helps them gain 
a competitive advantage (Rani, 2014).  
Therefore, satisfying consumer needs and wants is the goal of organisations; this is one 
of the primary goals considered when in the realization of a product or a service, the 
organisation envisions that factors influencing consumer behaviour.   
There are several factors that influence consumer behaviour in particular situation. 
Generally, consumers differ in age, income, instruction, tastes, and other factors. So 
consumers engaged in a purchase decision are influenced by these characteristics. 
Consumer characteristics include four main factors that are mainly responsible for the 
different types of behaviours: education, gender, age, and income (Rani, 2014). 
However, it does not mean that consumers with the same education, gender, age, or 
income are similar because the influence of the psychological factors varies significantly 
from individual to individual. 
So the four main factors influencing consumer behaviour are cultural, social, personal, 
and psychological one.   
Cultural: Culture is the central factor in the wants and behaviours of an individual 
developed through socialisation processes with family and other key institutions. 
Cultural factors have a significant effect on the buying decision of an individual, such as 
religion or social class (De Mooij, 2010). 
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Social: Consumer behaviour is also affected by social factors such as family, reference 
groups, status, and social role (Rani, 2014). 
Personal: Decisions taken by buyers are mainly influenced by personal characteristics 
such as age, gender, profession, income, and lifestyle (Rani, 2014). 
Psychological: Psychological factors such as consumer perceptions, beliefs, motivation, 
and attitudes also have a significant impact on the buyer decision. Motivation is what 
will drive consumers to develop a purchasing behaviour. Perception is the process 
through which an individual selects, organises and interprets the information he receives 
in order to do something that makes sense, and belief is a conviction that an individual 
has about something. These general factors influence the choices of consumers during 
the purchasing process (Kassarjian,1971; Schmitt, 2012). 
Therefore, consumer behaviour is a complex, dynamic, and multi-dimensional process, 
and the environment where a person lives influences their consumer behaviour. So the 
external factors – such as cultural and social ones –do not affect the decision process 
directly but these are also instrumental and exert an influence on consumer behaviour. 
Studying the importance of the psychological process which the consumer goes through 
during the pre-purchase and post-purchase stages is emphasised by Engel et al. (2001), 
and it is important in a definition of marketing strategies. These authors study the buyer 
decision making process and the characteristics of individual consumers as well as 
groups trying to understand the wants and needs of people. Needs are what is necessary 
to survive; wants are things that are not necessary for survival but add comfort and 
pleasure to the life of consumers. The concept of consumer needs and wants is 
incorporated by Solomon (1996) into the definition of consumer behaviour: ‘Consumer 
behaviour is the process involved when individuals or groups select, purchase, use, or 
dispose of products, services, ideas or experiences to satisfy needs and wants’. He 
introduces the idea that consumers may make purchase decisions to satisfy their needs 
and wants in groups, and not just simply as individuals. This is significant in 
understanding the role of consumer needs and wants in the purchasing process.  
Focusing on the purchasing process of food products, many scholars identify other 
factors linked with those previously discussed, trying to complete the models on 
consumer purchase intentions. For example, Stávková and Turčínková (2005), in a 
study in the Czech Republic, state that routine behaviour (to satisfy the needs)  is typical 
for purchases of breads, rolls, meat, milk, butter, eggs, and some beverages (mineral 
water, beer, tea, and coffee) while consumers seems to be influenced by other factors 
such as innovations and advertising when buying foods such as sweets and biscuits, 
yogurts, cheese, salami, canned meat products, semi-finished products, and some 
beverages (tea, wine, and mineral water). Consumers, who were strongly interested in 
their health, purchased cereal bakery products, fish, poultry, yogurts, cheese, and 
mineral water. When analysing the reasons for changes in consumption patterns, it was 
demonstrated that the reasons differed according to the affiliation with the individual 
groups of consumers. There were different reasons for individual social groups, 
individual age categories, and different localities. If it omits these identification groups, 
the most frequent reason for changes in consumption patterns in all categories of foods 
was a healthy lifestyle followed by a wider assortment.  
However, because of the complexity of studying consumer behaviour, it is difficult to 
draw up an exhaustive list of all of the factors that affect the consumer buying process 
Economic rationale behind differences in the composition  
of seemingly identical branded food products in the Single Market:  
A review of the literature 
 
 
 
86 
for food products. Multiple factors are present and vary according to the reference 
context. 
 
4.4 Factors affecting perceived quality: review of the literature 
This paragraph reviews the literature while at the same time aiming to analyse models 
and factors used by the prevailing literature to study the concept of perceived quality 
for food products. In particular, a search was made on the Web of Science using the 
keywords "perceived quality" and "food" as the topic of the paper, the first 100 papers 
in terms of citations were analysed and 50 papers were selected on the basis of 
pertinence with the established research objective. The 50 papers analysed are grouped 
by factor of influence of perceived quality (Table 4-1). 
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Table 4-1: Factors affecting perceived quality 
 
Factors  
Reference Product Effect  
Price 
Hansen (2005) shrimps, cheese + 
Machin, Gimenez, Vidal, Ares (2014) food + 
Acebron, Dopico, (2000) beef + 
Gilg, Battershill (1998) agrifood, direct sales   + 
Stavkova, Stejskal, Toufarova (2008) commodity food - 
Aschemann-Witzel (2018) food - 
Lusk, Crespi, Cherry, Mcfadden, Martin, 
Bruce (2015) 
food + 
Just, Sigirci, Wansink (2014) food  - 
Grunert, Bredahl, Brunso (2004) meat + 
Grunert, Valli (2001) beef and yogurt + 
Packaging 
and 
labelling 
Achilleas, Anastasios (2008) organic food  + 
Magnier, Schoormans, Mugge (2016) raisins, ch. bars, coffee + 
Caporale, Monteleone (2004) beer + 
Lange, Issanchou, Combris (2000) orange juice V 
Dornyei et al. (2016) food V 
Altintzoglou, Heide (2016) Norwegian fish  V 
Brand 
Soberman, Parker (2004) private labels + 
Ha, Jang (2010) ethnic food  + 
Ness et al. (2010) organic food + 
Fernqvist,  Ekelund (2014) food + 
Ozsomer (2012) food + 
Anselmsson, Bondesson (2013) food + 
Fandos, Flavian (2006) olive oil and ham - 
Aurier, De Lanauze (2012) ice cream, frozen meals + 
Grunert, Bredahl, Brunso (2004) meat + 
Grunert, Valli (2001) meat and dairy  + 
Origin 
Aprile et al. (2016) local food products + 
Espejel, Fandos, Flavian (2009) jamon de teruel (pdo) V 
Bronnenberg, Dhar, Dube (2007) local branding + 
Krystallis et al. (2007) Greek meat  + 
van der Lans et al. (2001) extra virgin olive oils + 
Acebron, Dopico (2000) ternera gallega beef - 
Chryssochoidis, Krystallis, Perreas (2007) Greek food products + 
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Fernqvist, Ekelund (2014) food  + 
Ozsomer (2012) food and no food + 
Moskowitz et al. (1997) turkey V 
Grunert, Bredahl, Brunso (2004) meat  + 
Grunert, Valli (2001) meat and dairy  + 
Healthy 
and organic 
Hansen (2005) shrimps and cheese + 
Fernqvist, Ekelund (2014) food  + 
Krystallis, Maglaras, Mamalis (2008) functional foods + 
Barrett, et al. (2007) organic tomatoes  + 
Olsen, Slotegraaf, Chandukala (2014) green new products  + 
Lee, Hwang (2016) organic food  + 
Hidalgo-Baz et al. (2017) yogurt chocolate + 
Williams, et al. (2012) fruit and vegetables  + 
Lombardo, et al. (2017) early crop potatoes + 
Grunert, Bredahl, Brunso (2004) meat quality  + 
Grunert, Valli (2001) meat and dairy  + 
Intrinsic 
factors 
Espejel, Fandos, Flavian (2009) jamón de teruel + 
Krystallis, et al. (2007) Greek meat  + 
Acebron, Dopico, (2000) beef V 
Jover, Montes, Fuentes (2004) red wine + 
Fandos, Flavian (2006) pdo product + 
Chamhuri, Batt (2015) fresh meat and fruits + 
Martinez-Carrasco et al. (2012) tomatoes + 
Coelho, et al. (2015) fruits wine + 
Ikeda, Nagai, Sagara (2004) green tea beverage + 
Gan, Yan, Linforth; (2016)  cheddar cheese  + 
Anacleto (2014) bivalve molluscs + 
Grunert, Bredahl, Brunso, (2004) meat  + 
Grunert, Valli (2001) meat and dairy  + 
+ indicates a positive effect on perceive quality, -indicates a negative effect, V indicates an 
undetermined effect 
Source: the authors  
 
4.5 Critical factors in the DC-SIP issue: how do they influence the 
purchasing process? 
The analysis of the literature and the topics presented highlight the complexity of 
consumer behaviour in the purchase of food products. In fact, when the consumer 
decides to buy a specific product, he is primarily influenced by characteristics related to 
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the person (personal, social, cultural, and psychological factors). Furthermore, he is 
influenced by other factors related to the macro environment and the context. The role 
of the motivations that lead the consumer to the purchase is also important in 
understanding the nature of the need that determines the purchase (for example, within 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs) or what wants the consumer has and the advantages they 
seek. 
All this makes it impossible to generate an exhaustive and complete list of factors that 
determine consumer perceptions and how perceived quality is constructed. 
Certainly, the present research shows that even after the first purchase, consumer 
perception of the quality of a product is not only influenced by intrinsic attributes and 
the organoleptic characteristics of the product, but a series of credence attributes are 
involved that the consumer uses to estimate the product quality. 
The methodologies used in the reference literature highlight the impossibility of 
quantitatively measuring the weight of each factor on the perception of quality, 
especially when taken individually. The effect of the factors on the purchase decision of 
the consumer is systemic, which means that as well as directly influencing the 
perception of quality, the factors influence themselves. 
In analysing the problem of DC-SIP, it is important to consider what the main factors 
that influence the perception of quality by the consumer are, using the literature to 
understand the role they assume in the process of purchasing food products. 
The literature review about the models to analyse the perceived quality (Tab. 1) is used 
to select the factors affecting the quality in agri-food products, in the first purchase, 
and in the re-purchase phases. 
In the case of first purchase, the perceived quality is estimated by the consumer through 
intrinsic cues (mostly visual) and extrinsic cues (price, packaging and labelling, brand, 
origin, health, and organic) (Fig.2). In contrast, in the case of re-purchase, the quality 
perceived by the consumer becomes experienced, the intrinsic cues become intrinsic 
attributes such as taste or organoleptic characteristics linked to the tasting. The other 
5 factors continue to play a key role in the construction of consumer perception of 
quality, which despite being experienced, remains a subjective perception construction 
(Fig. 3). 
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Figure 4-2: Quality cues for purchasing decisions and quality attributes for agrifood 
product re-purchasing decisions 
 
4.5.1 Price 
The company uses the price to summarise the value built for the consumer. Having the 
consumer as a reference, the company should first reflect on price sensitivity and on 
the variation in demand when there is a price change. The setting and formulation of 
price policies related to the determination of consumer value must be based on a 
preliminary analysis of the value. The value is relative because it is continuously subject 
to comparison with competing product offerings; it is dynamic because the perceptions 
that determine it are subject to constant change; and it is multidimensional because it 
consists of a set of heterogeneous factors that are summarised in costs and benefits. 
From the point of view of the consumer, the price is a major factor impacting on 
purchases that also influences decisions in store (Dolekoglu et al., 2008; Batra, Sinha, 
2000; Pauwels, Hanssens, Siddarth, 2002; Ailawadi, Pauwels, Steenkamp, 2008; 
Danziger, Hadar, Morwitz, 2014).  
Perceived price is what the consumer sacrifices for the purpose of acquiring a product 
(Zeithaml, 1988). Consumers may know the exact price of a product purchased or just 
remember (encode) - in relation to a past purchase – whether it is expensive or 
inexpensive.  
The consumer also assesses non-monetary costs to estimate the quality of product 
before paying the price asked. It is possible to categorise non-monetary costs in time, 
search costs, convenience, and brand image; the combination of these non-monetary 
costs and monetary costs affects the perceived sacrifice made by the consumer.  
Studies of price and willingness to pay for food products can be divided into two 
branches: the econometric tradition and the consumer behavioural tradition. 
The econometric tradition - that represents an objective view on price and price 
reactions - considers the price elasticity starting by analysing purchase statistics and 
measures the willingness to pay using the consumer responses to different price levels 
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(Lee, Hatcher, 2001). This approach can be used to investigate how consumers respond 
to changes in market conditions.   
The consumer behavioural tradition is a subjective view of price and price perceptions. 
It is focused on consumer behavioural studies and it aims to find the reasons for 
consumer reactions to changes in market and price conditions. 
The Total Food Quality Model (Grunert, 1997) considers the purchasing intention as 
effected by price perception and information processing. In fact, even if two consumers 
perceive the same cost cues in the market place, they may not infer the same cost from 
the cues; it is due to different factors such as brand loyalty, planning behaviour, and 
price involvement. Therefore, this model considers two features affecting the price 
information processing: cue perception process and price integration process. The first 
concerns price cognition (how the consumer perceives price), the second concerns the 
willingness to pay (how consumers evaluate perceived price). 
Price is one of the attributes in which the systemic view and the self-influence of factors 
is very evident. Considering the DC-SIP, the sensitivity to price and the reaction of the 
demand to the price are certainly influenced by the purchase reasons: it can be assumed 
that if the consumer buys for want reasons, they are willing to pay a higher price. If the 
consumer buys a product not only for its intrinsic characteristics, but - for example - for 
the perception of the country of origin of the product, for the global values that the 
brand communicates, or for belonging to a tribe, the weight of the price on the intention 
purchase is reduced compared to the purchasing process of a consumer who buys the 
food product for need reasons. 
 
4.5.2 Packaging and labelling 
The role of packaging as a communication tool able to influence consumer purchasing 
behaviour is highlighted in various researches in the food sector (Pomarici, 2003, Bland, 
2004). The packaging value perceived by the consumer is also based on a set of 
intangible elements - brand, information (advice for the preparation and use of the 
product, ingredients, etc.), service (recyclability or possibility of reuse of the packaging 
after use, mono-portion packs, etc.) - by which packaging assumes a fundamental role. 
In its communicative function, packaging can be analysed from several perspectives. In 
the sociological field, some authors (Mauss, 1985, Levi-Strauss, 1979, 1992) 
recognising in the consumption a particular form of language and therefore also different 
purposes from that of the satisfaction of individual needs - have also interpreted 
packaging as a communication tool (Douglas and Isherwood, 1984; Di Nallo, 1984; 
Paltrinieri, 1998; Parmigiani, 1997; Floch, 1992, 1997; Codeluppi, 1992, 2002). Another 
important contribution comes from semiotics studies, which analyse the signs and 
related communication processes (Eco, 1975; Ferraresi, 1999; Pastore and Vernuccio, 
2003) and whose application to packaging has recently been extended to market 
research, as in the case of tobacco (Musini, 2005) and wine (Violoni, 2004). In this 
context, packaging allows a multi-sensorial and bi-directional communication between 
an issuer and a receiver. 
Even marketing studies not only highlight its technical-logistic role (containment, 
protection, transport, conservation), but also the communicative (Collesei and Ravà, 
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2004) during different times and places of the purchase and consumption activity. By 
using colours, images, dimensions, shapes, words, etc., the packaging can communicate 
to consumers before, during, and after the experience of purchase and consumption, 
influencing the quality perception of the consumer. 
In general, the packaging has evolved from a stage when, while respecting certain 
aesthetic and functional characteristics, it was a mere container of the product to 
become a strategic driver of the marketing and sales policies of industrial and 
commercial enterprises. The packaging is one of the main factors promoting connection 
between product, brand, and the consumer. The capabilities of the package go beyond 
those of a simple container to include: effectiveness in communication; efficiency in 
size; impact resistance; sustainability; recyclability; and flexibility. The challenge for 
the consumer goods industries is to design effective and attractive packaging, taking 
into consideration the identity of the modern consumer and the dynamics of purchasing 
and then integrating the creation of the packaging into the process of product 
development (Silayoi, Speece, 2004; Kuvykaite, Wells, Farley, Armstrong, 2007; 
Dovaliene, Navickiene, 2015). 
The packaging is strongly related to the product label. The modern consumer needs to 
access information related to production and/or distribution processes that are often not 
tangible (organic products, fair trade, product traceability, etc.). This kind of information 
allows the basket of characteristics that identify the product and the quality of the agri-
food goods to be evaluated (Lancaster, 1971; Aprile, Annunziata, 2006). Without other 
information, during the purchasing decision process, labels become a tool of acquiring 
information and guiding purchase choices. In fact, there is a relationship between the 
objective characteristics indicated on the label and the reactions of consumers (Cavicchi, 
2008, Bialkova, 2010; Grunert, 2011; Di Pasquale, 2011; Veneziani et al., 2012; Vianelli 
et al., 2012, Siriex et al., 2013). 
Each label is composed of a set of characteristics that convey information about the 
product. However, the space available to companies is limited by the dimension of the 
package as well as by the current legislation. 
Currently, in the modern globalised market, these kinds of uses can be partially 
overcome thanks to the possibility of using Mobile Marketing services such as QR codes 
(Quickly Response). It combines the possibility of providing information with that of 
promoting and enhancing the product and/or the brand. This system as applied to food 
labels becomes a tool for knowing all the information about the product and the 
company that could not be included on a label (e.g. place of origin, history of the 
producer, production/breeding/cultivation techniques). 
In general, the information contained on the label influences the consumer perception 
of quality by using both the direct information required by law (e.g. place of production, 
ingredients, information on the production process), and additional information chosen 
by the manufacturer (e.g. organic, gluten free, fair trade, exclusion or inclusion of 
particular ingredients). These aspects certainly have a significant impact on the 
perceived quality level and, therefore, on the purchase decision. Again, the systemic 
correlation between the various cues that determine the perception of quality emerges. 
In the case of DC-SIP, the packaging and the label certainly have the role of 
communicating the intrinsic characteristics and raw materials of the product, the brand 
and the values it conveys (possibly to generate the effect of belonging to a tribe), the 
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nation of origin, and the production process. However, it also becomes important for 
the problem of perfect information: in fact, the packaging and the label can also be used 
to communicate any differences with the products marketed in other countries to the 
consumer (how? using specific marks or signals on the packaging?). In any case, it 
would be important to understand what would change in consumer purchase intentions 
in the case of perfect information. However, it seems complicated to imagine the effects 
without specific empirical analyses that directly involve consumers and that also include 
the contextual elements and the consumer purchase motivations. It can be assumed 
that if wants motivations linked for example to the halo effect (about COO) or to 
belonging to a tribe are being referred to, the communication of characteristics that 
make the product different from the original can modify consumer purchase intentions. 
 
4.5.3 Brand 
The growing importance and complexity of the concept of brand have been highlighted 
in recent decades by the large number of definitions proposed and research aimed at 
identifying the factors and the values of a brand. As defined by the American Marketing 
Association, the brand is “[a] name, term, design, symbol, or any other feature that 
identifies one seller's good or service as distinct from those of other sellers.” Kotler 
(2002) provides a definition of brand similar to that just described: “a name, term, sign, 
symbol or design, or combination of the same, used to identify the products or services 
of a seller or group of sellers and distinguish them from those of their competitors,” and 
twenty-five years ago Aaker (1991) defined the brand as “[a] set of assets (or liabilities) 
linked to a distinctive sign (brand, name, logo) that is added (or subtracted) from the 
value generated by a product or service.” 
The brand is defined as a multidimensional and complex concept as it integrates the 
culture, corporate values, and the value proposition that should inspire every expression 
of the enterprise consistently and continuously (Arnold, 1992). 
Brand identity is based on the brand core purpose and its core values, which provide a 
system of guiding principles (Collins, Porras, 1996). Aaker and Joachimsthaler (2000) 
identify three dimensions of brand identity: 
▪ brand essence, which reflects the promise made to the consumer based on 
functional benefits, symbolic or emotional, and represents what the brand wants 
the market to identify; 
▪ core identity, the identity composed of all values based on the mission and the 
strategic orientation; 
▪ extended identity, the additional attributes that do not concern the core, but 
rather specify the meaning. 
The relevance of the brand is in its function connecting consumer and enterprise. 
However, it can highlight features and benefits related to the company and the 
consumer. Through an appropriate strategy of brand management, the company 
obtains identification and protection of their products or services through differentiation 
and consumer recognition. A company uses its brand to capitalise on its investments 
which accumulate over time into significant asset value. 
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Considering the models aiming to analyse perceived quality, as previously stated the 
Total Food Quality Model asserts that before purchasing, consumers bases their product 
expectations on available information. In many situations, consumers could benefit from 
more information about different quality aspects when they take decisions about 
purchasing or repurchasing food products. The possible ways consumers may find 
further information about a food product are the labelling, and generic marks and brand 
names; in fact, distinguishing between mandatory label, brands, or generic marks allows 
differentiation between many different labels.  
Furthermore, the role of brands and generic marks derives from the degree of perceived 
risk associated with the purchase. Lastly, the brand or generic mark must be perceived 
as being reliable. The reliability of a brand is mainly related to its history (if it has been 
in existence for a long time) and its likelihood of being linked to a high level of quality. 
All of these elements can be summarised within the concept of brand reputation. In 
addition, the brand reputation plays an important role in the quality perception process. 
In fact, several studies demonstrate that international brand image or reputation is 
certainly related to quality (Bauer et al., 2007). Brand image is defined as the 
understanding an individual believes to be true about a certain brand (McDaniel et al., 
2012). A good reputation is also built up through experience and the history of the 
brand. 
Considering the DC-SIP issue, among all of the numerous and relevant functions that 
the brand carries out, it is important to highlight the role of the brand as a symbol of 
belonging to a "tribe". In fact, some consumers choose to purchase a specific product 
because it is marketed with a brand that allows them to belong to a community. In the 
literature various definitions are used to describe these groups of consumers, named 
brand communities, brand sub-cultures of consumption, or brand tribes (Fournier 1998; 
Cova and Pace 2006; Bazaki and Veloutsou 2010). Although brand tribes are not always 
so formal, their participants often have a sense of togetherness and belonging (Hamilton 
and Hewer 2010). 
In this case, the motivations for the purchase of the product by the consumer exceed 
the simple need to be satisfied and move towards the top of Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs, towards want reasons. It can be assumed that changing the characteristics of 
the product and the level of information of the consumer has an effect on the trust in 
the brand that is considered to be a global brand. Therefore, this could reduce the 
intention to purchase the product which no longer represents a product equal to all the 
others in the world and cancel the effect of belonging to a tribe. 
 
4.5.4 Origin 
Through the years the international economic and marketing literature has deepened 
the issue of the country of origin of the product as a variable influencing the decision-
making processes of consumers during the purchase phase (country of origin effect) 
(Usunier, 2006; Rosenbloom and Haefner, 2009).  
The first studies are characterised by a single-cue approach: they study the effects of 
the country of origin (COO) of the product on consumer choices without considering 
other variables of consumer behaviour. 
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Studies then moved on to a multi-cue approachable to assess the impact of the country 
of origin in relative terms. The variable country of origin encompasses a multiplicity of 
factors that influence the purchasing decisions made by consumers. 
With the strengthening of the dynamics of global market in recent years (such as the 
growing competition from emerging economies and the research of cost savings through 
the standardisation of production processes), the concept of country of origin is used as 
a strategic key by the companies to gain competitive advantage.  
Nowadays new research trends reformulate the concept of country of origin in more 
modern terms, that is, as country image, brand origin, and place of origin, offering ideas 
for further interesting branches of research. 
Schooler (1965) is the first author who analysed and attempted to prove the tangible 
effects of country of origin of products on consumer behaviour.  
However, the first studies of COO intensify the effects of these factors, the nation of 
origin of the product being the only suggestion (cue) on which the respondents based 
their evaluation. In fact, the more numerous the attributes included in the model, the 
more moderate the effect of the country of origin of the product is (Johansson et al., 
1985; Ettenson et al. 1988). 
Thanks to the meta-analysis developed by Peterson and Jolibert (1995) on 52 
publications concerning the COO effect, it was possible to quantify the differences 
between the two different approaches. With regard to the assessment of consumers on 
the perceived quality of the product, the average effect of the country of origin in single-
cue studies affects 30% while in multi-cue studies this effect is reduced to 16%. 
Furthermore, the result obtained considering the effect of the country of origin on 
purchase intentions is interesting because even in this case the effect is reduced from 
19% to 3% when the origin is evaluated in combination with other attributes. 
A more recent study (Usunier, 2002) explains the reasons why the COO effect is less 
significant than was initially assumed. In order to have some influence on the purchasing 
process of the consumers, the consumer has to consider relevant information on the 
origin of the product in relation to his choice (and this varies according to the category 
of product considered). Furthermore, the importance attributed to the origin of the 
product must be such as to induce the consumer into investing time in researching and 
comparing products with different origin. In other cases, when high psychological 
involvement in the purchase phase is lacking, information on the country of origin is 
often overshadowed by other characteristics such as price, brand, and warranty. 
Even if the COO effect is reduced according to this second branch of studies, that the 
phenomenon is analysed in more depth. Studies have addressed the many variables 
related to the product, to the consumer, and the reference economic environment. 
Obermiller and Spangenberg (1989) argue that the relationship between COO and 
behaviour of foreign consumers is due to three main components that interact with each 
other: the cognitive, the affective, and the normative spheres. In the cognitive 
component, the country of origin (or its image) acts as an indicator of the quality of the 
product and of its individual attributes (e.g. reliability, design, etc.). More specifically, 
information on the country of origin of the product can have two effects (Han, 1989): 
the halo construct and the summary construct. The halo effect acts when the consumer 
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has not gained any direct experience with goods coming from a country, they only have 
a generic image of that country (for example, information about the economy, social, 
and political situations, cultural status, etc.) on which they evaluate before purchasing. 
The halo-effect corresponds to a process in which additional product information is 
disregarded or missing and where the impact of the COO on the overall product 
evaluation is indirect and relatively weak (Hossain, 2015). In this case the country of 
origin is defined as a halo that people are not familiar with and use it as an indicator for 
product evaluation. This shows that when people have little knowledge and information 
about products, they use country of origin as indirect evidence. So, consumers use 
country of origin as an alternative for the performance of the product while they their 
experience of products in a same country of origin is unsafe (Rezvani, 2012). 
On the other hand, the summary construct is based on previous experiences with 
products from that country which, through a process of abstraction, allow the consumer 
to formulate a personal evaluation. 
There is an emotional component when the country of origin of the product can evoke 
an affective value in the consumer (e.g. after a holiday spent in that country) or a 
symbolic value (e.g. when the image of the country is associated with a certain national 
identity or social status). 
Finally, in the normative component, the purchase is linked to being willing or not willing 
to support the economy of a given country based on the level of sharing of its policies 
and conduct. 
There are numerous variables that influence the intensity of the effects of COO. Valdani 
and Bertoli (2010) formulate a classification of different variables referring to various 
aspect: 
▪ variables that qualify the consumer; 
▪ variables that concern the product and/or the country of origin; 
▪ variables linked to brand. 
The aspects most investigated in the literature regarding the first category are the 
demographic and cultural characteristics of the consumer (age, sex, income, educational 
level, degree of ethnocentrism, etc.). 
Many studies underline the relationship between income and education and the 
preference for foreign products but this relationship tends to reverse in terms of age. 
This can be explained by the greater propensity of young or more educated people to 
interact with different cultures than their own (Shimp and Sharma, 1987; Smith, 1993; 
Bailey, Pineres, 1997; Ahmed, d'Astorus, 2004). 
There does not seem to be any unequivocal opinion on the effect produced by the 
consumer genre: some studies say that men prefer to buy domestic products 
(Johansson et al., 1985, Ettenson et al., 1988); other studies do not find any obvious 
correlation (Anderson, Cunningham, 1972). 
Again, other researches deepen the role of patriotism (Han, 1988) and ethnocentricity 
(Shimp and Sharma, 1987; Brodowsky, 1998; Balabanis, Diamantopoulos, 2004) by 
consumers who tend to prefer national products over others regardless of other 
Economic rationale behind differences in the composition  
of seemingly identical branded food products in the Single Market:  
A review of the literature 
 
 
 
97 
features. This propensity can induce consumers to overestimate the quality of domestic 
products and to underestimate the quality of foreign goods (Watson, Wright, 2000). 
Therefore, it is important to underline how the level of ethnocentrism of a country, 
greatly influences the marketing strategies that foreign companies have to adopt if they 
want to enter this market. If there are high levels of "resistance" to foreign products, 
companies that want to include the segment of ethnocentric consumers have to reduce 
the emphasis on the origin of the product and stress other qualitative characteristics in 
their offer. Other aspects studied in the literature concern the level of involvement and 
the perceived risk in the purchasing process. Some authors argue that the more the 
purchase is considered to be important, the less importance seems to be given to the 
country of origin of the product because more attention is given to all the other 
attributes of the good (Ahmed, d'Astous, 1993). With regard to the risk perceived in the 
purchasing process, the consumer perceives a lower risk if they buy goods from their 
own country (Lumpkin et al., 1985). 
Finally, some studies highlight the relevance of the COO effect on consumer behaviour 
according to the phase of the decision making. In particular, as the qualitative 
perception of the product moves towards the real purchase intention, the importance of 
the country of origin tends to decrease. It is possible to explain these differences by 
considering the complexity of the concepts of perceived quality and purchase intention. 
In fact, the latter is influenced by a greater number of variables (e.g. price, guarantee, 
disposable income, availability, etc.) that reduce the effects of the COO (Verlegh and 
Steenkamp, 1999). 
When the socio-demographic characteristics change, the results of the analysis on the 
intensity of the COO effect can change significantly, there by conditioning a possible 
generalisation of the totality of consumers in a country (Sharma et al., 1995; Wetzels 
et al., 1996). 
From an economic, political, and cultural point of view, the image of a country is able 
to influence the purchasing intentions of a foreign consumer regardless of the judgment 
of the quality of the products (Wang and Lamb, 1983). 
Regarding the image of a country, some studies argue that consumers express 
evaluations and judgments by using a "hierarchy between countries" built in their minds. 
This scale is constructed by considering the level of economic development of the 
country (Manrai et al., 1998; Ahmed and d'Astorus, 2004). 
Furthermore, the effect is greater when referring to products of country with a particular 
production tradition (e.g. Italian fashion, French perfumes, Swiss chocolate, etc.) 
(Baumgartner and Jolibert, 1977; Roth and Romeo, 1992). 
The effect of the COO is not equal for all types of products. Therefore, a country can be 
appreciated for some types of goods and not for others.  
Several authors have noted how the effect of the country of origin increases as the 
technological complexity of the product increases (Kaynak and Cavusgil, 1983; 
Hadjimarcou and Hu, 1999; Ahmed et al., 2004).  
However, companies can take advantage of the effects of the COO if they are combined 
with promotional and communication policies in order to enhance their image (Bradley, 
2001). 
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Another theme concerns the relationship between country of origin and product life 
cycle. In marketing campaigns, the reference to the origin of the product produced by 
company is emphasised more often in the early stages of the life cycle, especially in the 
"go to market" phase while it tends to lose importance in the phases of growth and 
maturity (Niss, 1996). 
The main reason to aim for a COO strategy compared to a brand-focused strategy in 
the "go to market" phase is due to focusing on the country of origin being more 
immediate and results in a quicker return on sales. Over time, once the product has 
become well known in the target market, the company will progressively move towards 
marketing using a brand strategy. 
Another aspect that is discussed in the COO studies is the relationship between product 
brand and country of origin. The importance assumed by the brand in the consumer 
perception process induces scholars to investigate this issue from various perspectives. 
Han and Terpstra (1988), Wall et al. (1991), and Tse and Gorn (1993) argue that the 
country of origin has a greater impact than the brand in the purchasing process. 
However, other scholars (Ahmed et al., 1994; Verlegh et al., 1999) consider the effect 
of the brand to be more relevant than the COO effect. 
This discussion on the role of the country of origin involves all of the other factors 
(brand, price, packaging, labelling), again demonstrating a close correlation between 
them. The research presented clearly shows that COO has an effect on the purchase 
intentions of the consumer; the effect may derive from real and direct knowledge of the 
country consumers have or from the halo effect that the country generates. Therefore, 
consistently with the other factors, it can be assumed that if in the case of DC-SIP, the 
product recipe, the raw materials, or even the entire country of production is modified 
and communicated to the consumer, the COO or halo effects change. On the other hand, 
if the consumer is not informed of the differences, he or she starts from a presumption 
of equality of the product linked to trust in the brand and to the values the country of 
origin evokes. 
 
4.5.5 Healthy and organic 
The perception of health is very extensive and can be approached from different 
scientific perspectives including psychological, social, nutritional, and medical ones. 
From a consumer point of view, health includes two main dimensions: eating healthily 
and staying away from unhealthy foods. The first dimension, eating healthily, is related 
to nutritional aspects such as a healthy diet, functional foods, less oily foods, and other 
factors related to health and nutrition. The second dimension, avoiding unhealthy foods 
concerns food security. 
Both health dimensions express qualities of the food that consumers cannot evaluate or 
judge by themselves. 
It is useful to present examples from several studies that explain the role of the 
perception of food health in the consumer perception of quality. A study of consumer 
perceptions of fish and motives for purchasing (Nielsen, Sørensen & Grunert, 1997; 
Valette-Florence, Sirieix, Grunert & Nielsen, 2000) highlights how healthiness and 
physical well-being is one of the most significant reasons why these consumers buy 
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fresh fish. According to these consumers, the fact that fresh fish is an untreated product 
(a natural product), contains vitamins and minerals, and is low in fat are all attributes 
which contribute to healthiness and physical well-being. In a study of apples (Bech-
Larsen, 2001), respondents were asked to mention differences between apples and 
alternative foods. The results of the study demonstrate that organic/not sprayed and 
vitamins all contribute to the feeling of being healthy and not ill, leading to a long, 
healthy life, a good feeling, and a high life quality. The examples presented also 
underline the fact that health due to food is subjective.  
As with the quality dimensions (health) presented above, organic cues of product also 
represent another factor that refers to perceived quality. Food safety, human health, 
and environmental concerns along with physical attributes such as nutritive value, taste, 
freshness, and appearance affect organic food consumer preferences. (Shafie & Rennie 
2012). Consumers also associate organic food with ordinary processes, care about the 
environment and animal welfare, and the non-use of pesticides and fertilisers. 
Increasing attention to organic food has encouraged many studies to compare aspects 
of organic against conventional food in terms of human health, food safety, and 
environmental concerns along with other sensory attributes such as nutritive value, 
taste, freshness and appearance. (Barrett et al. 2007). Although physical estimations 
on whether organic food tastes better than conventional food have yielded inconsistent 
results (McEahern and McClean, 2002), many consumers believe that organic food 
tastes better (Roitner-Schobesberger et al, 2008). Therefore, consumer perceptions 
about organic food are highly subjective.  
This factor is also important for DC-SIP because the variation of the ingredient or recipe 
by the company (and any communication to the consumer) can generate a variation in 
the perception of quality, health and safety, impacting on the purchasing intentions of 
the consumer. 
 
4.5.6 Intrinsic factors 
The selection of this factor aims to include the main intrinsic elements of the perceived 
quality of the food. In fact, most of the studies analysed considers specific organoleptic 
properties/ingredients depending on the category of product being analysed. 
For example, in analysing the perceived quality of beef, Brunsø et al. (2002) found the 
following to be Intrinsic quality cues:  cut (steak, roast, cubed, minced), colour (light 
red, medium red, dark red for roast and steak, lighter red and darker red for cubed and 
minced), fat lumps (major, minor), fat rim (yes, no), marbling (high, low), and fat 
content (high, low). 
Therefore, these aspects are complex and cannot be generalised because they are 
closely related to the type of product that the consumer intends to purchase. 
In any case, it is important to introduce a factor that summarises the intrinsic quality 
cues to highlight that the visual, olfactory, and tactile elements of the product in each 
specific case play an important role in the formation of quality perception and therefore 
in the possible evaluation of the DC-SIP. 
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4.6 Conclusions 
As seen, discussion of the DC-SIP considers the literature and research on product 
standardisation and differentiation and on the cues/attributes that determine the 
concept of quality perceived by consumers. 
In the hypothesis of different products in different countries, it is also necessary to 
reflect on the motivations that could cause a company to communicate or not 
communicate these differences. 
Certainly, the first problem would be linked to "how" to communicate differences to 
consumers on product packaging or through institutional advertising. In any case it 
would be necessary to hypothesise a tool that can be applied easily. 
In addition to the tool, the motivations that could exclude the will by companies to 
communicate differences between products and the effects of communication on cues 
and on perceived quality must also be evaluated. 
The previous discussion on quality cues for purchasing decisions shows that providing 
consumers with information about the product not only affects the perception of intrinsic 
factors, but can also impact on all the credence cues and ultimately on the perceived 
quality. 
In this process, the brand and the consumer purchase motivations play a primary role. 
For example, consider the case of a brand recognised by the consumer as a global 
brand, to which he associates values of belonging to a tribe that go beyond the spatial 
boundaries between territories. In this situation the company will have no interest in 
communicating that the ingredients or the recipe of the product are different in the 
different markets since what could be a simple variation linked to the strategies of 
differentiation of the company can also have a negative impact on the value of the brand 
and be interpreted as a betrayal by the company that proposes a global brand but not 
a global product. 
Similar considerations can be made with reference to the attribute of origin. The COO 
of a product itself conveys values linked to the cultural aspects of the nation. Among 
these are certainly the recipes and methods of production of the products. Therefore, 
the communication of a variation of these can annul the halo effect of the country of 
origin and reduce trust in the brand and in the "made in" that it communicates. 
Still, in the same way communicating differences to the consumer can impact on the 
perception of health of the product. In this case, the reduction or increase in the quantity 
of an ingredient or the change in one of the raw materials could be interpreted by the 
consumer as a variation that increases the danger or in any case reduces the 
wholesomeness of the agrifood product. 
Therefore, in general, if it refers to wants-like purchase motivations in which the 
extrinsic attributes have a revealing role, the company could be unwilling to 
communicate to the consumer the variation of ingredients and recipe (intrinsic 
attributes). In fact, this can negatively impact on the perception of price, of health, of 
origin, of the values of the brand, and so on the perception of quality and therefore on 
the purchase intentions of the consumer. In fact, the attributes that determine the 
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perceived quality move in a systemic way and influence themselves: the variation of 
one can generate effects on all of the others. 
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In this Section, the main results from the review of the literature are summarised in a 
single economic model in order to discuss the possible effects of regulating DC-SIP 
based on the findings of the literature analysis. A standard IO setting was adapted to 
cover the main issues in DC-SIP. Of course, some of the modelling choices are arbitrary. 
A scenario was deliberately developed where the DC-SIP issue is taken to the extreme 
so that the policy implications are evident. As a consequence, the model is an illustrative 
example and is neither a simulation nor a prediction of actual policy outcome. 
The analysis is based on a multi-country (Chapter 2), price-quality competition model 
(Chapter 1) where consumer demand follows a simplified total food quality model 
(Chapter 4). The discussion illustrates the adaptation of the marketing mix of a 
multinational company (Chapter 3). The computation of the market equilibrium allows 
the running of comparative statics exercises simulating the implementation of three 
types of regulation. Two policy options tackling the objective component of DC-SIP (i.e., 
preventing sales of product of different composition) are compared and one tackling the 
subjective components (i.e., providing information to consumers). The equilibrium 
under the three policy was computed and it is concluded that even if regulation can 
increase efficiency, there are still strong redistribution effects. Consequently, in the 
absence of compensation, no policy option is a Pareto optimal solution. 
 
5.1 Building an ‘extreme scenario’ of DC-SIP 
A scenario where DC-SIP is particularly severe is considered. Under such extreme 
assumptions the benefits from regulation are expected to be high. As a consequence, if 
the model finds that a policy is ineffective or even inefficient, the conclusion is expected 
to hold in other less extreme scenarios, a fortiori. 
The model builds on vertical quality literature (Section 1.3.4) by assuming that 
consumers agree on a preference ranking of the available products in the model. It is 
assumed that under perfect in formation the DC-SIP product is perceived as inferior 
compared to the original variety by all consumers. Examples are the substitution of 
costly ingredients with cheaper ones or lower proportion of high-quality components 
(such as fruit or meat) in the recipe. Of course, this is not always true for DC-SIP 
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because differences in composition do not necessarily result in lower quality. However, 
it is argued that vertical quality implies a stronger demand for consumer protection. 
Following Paroush (1978) (Chapter 2), the existence of two separated markets with no 
arbitrage is assumed.31 Two countries (A and B) and three firms LA, LB and M selling 
branded products are considered. LA, LB are local enterprises selling only in country A 
and B respectively. Firm M is an international company originally based in country A, 
now selling in both countries. Firms can sell only one branded product per country.  
The aim is to explain (i) why firm M may decide to sell different varieties of the product 
in A and B, (ii) whether informing consumers about the difference in composition is 
profitable, and (iii) what the effects of DC-SIP on welfare are. In addition, the model is 
used to assess what the possible unintended consequences of three regulation options 
are: (i) information disclosure (ID), (ii) product of reference (PoR), (iii) one-market, 
one-quality (1M1Q).  
An ID policy eliminates the asymmetric information problem that is at the foundation of 
the subjective component of DC-SIP. It might include labelling, mandatory information 
on websites, advertising, or any other form of communication. Our key assumption is 
that the policy provides consumers with complete information for an unbiased choice 
(Section 1.3.6). PoR regulation forces firm M to sell a product in country B of the same 
quality as the one they originally sold in country A before going international. 1M1Q 
regulation stipulates that firm M sells a product of the same quality in both markets, 
whatever the quality level. 
A three-stage game was used to model the policy outcome. In stage 1, the regulator 
chooses one off our possible alternatives: one of the three policy options or do nothing. 
In stage 2 firms set quality, and in stage 3 they compete on price.  
 
5.1.1 Technology and cost functions 
The setting follows the specification by Motta (1993) and Szymanski and Valletti (2005). 
Firms have a fixed cost of quality improvement that takes the form:  
 
where C is the fixed cost of quality improvement, u is the quality level, and the subscript 
j = LA, LB, MA, MB refers to the products of local firm LA, of local firm LB, of the 
international firm selling in country A, and of the international firm selling in country B, 
respectively. Firms have a constant return to scale technology with constant unit 
production cost. Without further loss of generality, these costs are taken to be zero. The 
profit functions of the firms are obtained by subtracting the cost of producing quality 
from the revenues. 
 
31 According to Szymanski & Valletti (2005), arbitrage might reduce the incentive to differentiation (Chapter 
2). We expect firms to be more willing to indulge in DC-SIP when no arbitrage is assumed. 
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In order to simplify the presentation, it was assumed that firm M supplies goods of 
higher expected quality than the local firms in each country. This assumption is 
consistent with a strong reputation of the international firm. 
 
5.1.2 Consumer behaviour 
DC-SIP was modelled by introducing an adaptation in the standard Mussa-Rosen (1978) 
demand functions. In the standard Mussa-Rosen model, each consumer at most buys 
exactly one unit of only one variety among those available (they can decide to buy 
nothing). Consumer preferences are represented by the following monetary indirect 
utility function: 
 
Where Ui,J is the utility expressed in monetary terms of the ith consumer buying product 
j, bj is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the consumer buys product j and zero 
otherwise, and 𝜃i is an individual taste parameter measuring the marginal willingness to 
pay for quality. The higher 𝜃i is, the higher the price that a consumer is willing to pay 
for a good of a given quality level. The parameter can be interpreted as the marginal 
rate of substitution between income and quality, so that higher values of 𝜃i are 
associated with lower marginal utility of income (and higher income). Consumers differ 
only in 𝜃i, which is distributed uniformly between [0,vk] with unit density and k=A,B. 
The utility of a consumer who does not buy any product is zero. Each consumer chooses 
the brand that provides the greatest indirect utility. Note that in each country only two 
products are available: the one by the local firm (LA or LB) and that by the international 
firm (MA or MB). If both products yield a negative utility, the consumer does not buy.  
In order to model DC-SIP, the following modifications are introduced to the standard 
model. It is assumed that the motivation of consumers to purchase is their willingness 
to enjoy a given attribute X.  
In order to build the extreme scenario, it was assumed that X is an experience attribute 
(Chapter 4) and that there is no repeated purchase. The experience nature of the 
attribute implies that the quality of the good is revealed after consumption and therefore 
the consumer is able to assess the quality difference perfectly. Therefore, consumers 
experience full disappointment (they know they receive a lower quality product) and at 
the same time, the possible incentive for DC-SIP strategies is not attenuated by 
reputation concerns. 
The absence of repeated consumption is a heroic assumption in food markets. The 
proposed model is such that the consequences of DC-SIP are severe and there are no 
market incentives preventing opportunistic behaviour by firm M.  
The variable uMB measures the presence and the intensity of the attribute in a product 
that is supplied by firm M in market B (which is defined as ‘quality’). Following the total 
quality model (Grunert 2005, Chapter 4), it was assumed that consumers cannot 
observe uMB perfectly. Their purchasing decision is driven by the expected quality eMB, 
which is the estimation of utility from consumption based on internal and external 
quality cues (Chapter 4). For simplicity, it was assumed that the set of extrinsic quality 
cues is summarised by the quality level uMA that is the quality that firm M supplies in 
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country A (meaning that consumers in country B expect a product of the same quality 
level as in country A). The intrinsic quality cues in the quality level uMB the actual quality 
that firm M supplies to consumers in country B is summarised. The model is consistent 
with a halo effect (Chapter 4) so that the quality assessment is clouded by the reputation 
of the international brand. The following estimator of the expected quality is assumed: 
eMB = 𝛼uMA+(1-𝛼)uMB 
where eMB is the expected quality and 𝛼∈ [0,1] is a parameter defining the magnitude 
of the halo effect. For 𝛼 = 1, consumers in country B expect a quality that is equal to 
that supplied in country A. Their purchasing decisions are based on the expectation that 
the quality in the two countries is the same. For 𝛼 = 0, consumers are perfectly informed 
about the actual quality of the goods before purchasing. For any value 𝛼∈ (0,1), 
consumers use both extrinsic and intrinsic quality cues for their purchasing decision. By 
construction, for any 𝛼> 0, uMB< eMB<uMA, which means that consumer purchasing 
decisions are based on an overestimate of quality.32 
This simple setting allows two important variables to be measured: the disutility of DC-
SIP and the impact on consumer choice. Di,j is the measurement of the ex-post 
disappointment that a consumer experiences when buying a product j that is different 
from the expected one. It is measured as the difference between the experienced utility 
Ui,j(uj) and the expected utility Ui,j(ej). The disappointment of consumer i from the 
consumption of product M in country B is: 
 
Di,MB is a monetary measure of the loss of utility due to the consumption of a product of 
lower quality than expected. It is always non-positive. Di,MB= 0 for either 𝛼 = 0 (perfect 
information) or uMB = uMA (no difference in composition). In this perspective 𝛼 can be 
interpreted as the subjective component of DC-SIP and uMB - uMA as the objective 
component. 
A key point in DC-SIP is that the consumer must change purchasing decision if perfectly 
informed. In order to measure this effect, a binary variable ωi,MB was defined that is equal 
to 1 if: 
Ui,MB(eMB) > Ui,LB > Ui,MB(uMB) 
where Ui,LB is the indirect utility that the consumer derives from purchasing the local 
product in country B. A unit value of ωi,MB implies that (i) consumer i buys product MB 
because its expected utility is greater than that of product LB and (ii) if perfectly 
informed, consumer i prefers LB because the experience utility of the local good is 
greater.  
The value of ωi,MB depends on the equilibrium prices of the goods. On the other hand, 
Di,MB is price-independent. 
 
32 The fixed cost of providing quality of MB and the profits of firm M are computed based on the actual quality 
uMB. 
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Following Mussa & Rosen (1978) and Motta (1993), it is possible to compute qh,k which 
is the demand functions for the products supplied by firm h in country k, with h=L,M 
and k=A,B. Table 5-1 reports the specifications of the demand functions. 
 
Table 5-1: Demand functions for the multinational firm M and the two local firms LA, LB 
 Country A Country B 
Firm M 
  
Local Firms 
  
 
The expected quality eMB instead of the actual quality uMB is used in the demand functions 
for Country B, meaning that the purchasing decisions are affected by the DC-SIP 
problem. For simplicity, it was assumed that there is no DC-SIP problem in country A. 
 
5.1.3 Modelling two markets 
In the illustration example, it is assumed that no arbitrage is possible between the two 
markets A and B, that is, it is not possible to buy goods in one market and then sell it 
in the other. A discussion of this hypothesis can be found in Chapter 2. 
It is assumed that consumers in Market A have a greater willingness to pay for quality 
than those in market B. For simplicity vA = 4 and vB =2. In Section 5.7 the effects of a 
change in the numerical calibration are discussed. 
Finally, it is assumed that Country A is the ‘home country’ of firm M. Products sold by 
firm M in country A are perfectly known by local consumers. In addition, consumers in 
country B expect the products supplied by firm M to be of ‘high quality’. This expectation 
is rational because of the higher willingness of consumers in A to pay.33 
 
5.2 Equilibrium under perfect information 
As a benchmark, the computation of the market equilibrium under perfect information 
was presented. Consumers are perfectly informed about the quality of the goods in all 
markets (i.e., 𝛼 = 0). Table 5-2 reports the equilibrium in the two countries. 
 
 
33 A model of perfect information (no DC-SIP) with similar assumptions was solved by Motta (1993, p. 116-
117). 
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Table 5-2 Equilibrium under perfect information. 
Country vk uMk* uLk* pMk* pLk* qMk* qLk* q0K* yMk* yLk* csMk* csLk* swk* 
A 4 4.053 0.772 6.890 0.656 2.100 1.050 0.850 6.255 0.391 10.638 0.425 17.709 
B 2 1.013 0.193 0.861 0.082 1.050 0.525 0.425 0.391 0.024 0.665 0.027 1.107 
A+B         6.646    18.816 
 
where csMk* and csLk* indicates the surplus that consumers obtain from the product of 
the international and local firms in country k, respectively. The columns yMk and yLk refer 
to the profits of firms M and L in country k. The column q0k* reports the demand gap, 
that is, the quantity that is not produced because consumers refrain from buying any 
products. The column swk* reports the social welfare. Where meaningful, the table 
provides the aggregate value for the two countries.34 
The model predicts that the international firm M supplies products of different quality in 
the two countries because of the different marginal willingness of consumers to pay for 
quality. Of course, the difference in quality does not imply a DC-SIP problem because 
consumers are perfectly informed about the quality of the product. 
 
5.3 Equilibrium under DC-SIP 
In this section the unregulated market equilibria in countries A and B are computed. 
Consumers use the extrinsic cue (the quality in market A) to estimate the expected 
quality so that eMB ≥ uMB by construction. Table 5-3 reports the equilibrium in country B 
as a function of the parameter 𝛼 (equilibrium in country A remains as in Table 5-3). 
 
 
34 Following Mussa and Rosen (1978), consumer surplus is computed as the integral of the utility function 
over the interval of 𝜃l where consumers buy the product. Social welfare is computed as the summation of 
profits of firms in both countries, and all consumer surpluses.  
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Table 5-3: Equilibrium in country B under imperfect information 
𝛼 eMB uMB* uLB* pMB* pLB* qMB* qLB* q0B* yMB* yLB* csMB* csLB* swB* swA+B* 
0.0 1.013 1.013 0.193 0.861 0.082 1.050 0.525 0.425 0.391 0.024 0.665 0.027 1.107 18.817 
0.1 1.223 0.909 0.202 1.065 0.088 1.043 0.521 0.436 0.698 0.025 0.290 0.027 1.041 18.750 
0.2 1.455 0.806 0.209 1.293 0.093 1.037 0.518 0.445 1.016 0.026 -0.013 0.028 1.058 18.767 
0.3 1.709 0.704 0.215 1.542 0.097 1.033 0.516 0.451 1.344 0.027 -0.514 0.029 0.886 18.596 
0.4 1.983 0.603 0.219 1.813 0.100 1.029 0.515 0.457 1.684 0.027 -0.944 0.029 0.796 18.505 
0.5 2.277 0.502 0.223 2.106 0.103 1.025 0.513 0.462 2.033 0.028 -1.394 0.029 0.696 18.405 
0.6 2.592 0.401 0.226 2.419 0.106 1.022 0.509 0.469 2.393 0.028 -1.862 0.030 0.589 18.299 
0.7 2.927 0.301 0.229 2.752 0.108 1.020 0.508 0.472 2.762 0.029 -2.350 0.030 0.471 18.180 
0.8 3.282 0.200 0.231 3.106 0.109 1.018 0.510 0.472 3.141 0.029 -2.857 0.030 0.343 18.053 
0.9 3.658 0.100 0.233 3.480 0.111 1.016 0.507 0.476 3.531 0.029 -3.384 0.030 0.207 17.916 
1.0 4.053 0.000 0.235 3.874 0.112 1.015 0.509 0.477 3.931 0.029 -3.931 0.030 0.059 17.768 
 
 
5.3.1 Equilibrium quality levels 
As 𝛼 increases, consumers increasingly rely on the exogenous quality expectation and 
less and less on the actual product attributes. The simulation concludes that as 𝛼 
increases, the actual quality uMB* decreases and the perceived quality eMB increases. 
This implies that the composition of MA and MB diverges, that is, the difference between 
uMA and uMB increases with 𝛼.35 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the results. For 𝛼 = 0, there is no DC-SIP problem, and the 
equilibrium quality levels are equal to the case of perfect information. As 𝛼 increases, 
the weight of the quality level uMA in Country A in the predictor of the quality in Country 
B increases. Therefore, eMB converges to uMA. Eventually, for 𝛼 = 1, eMB = uMA, meaning 
that consumers of the multinational firm in Country B expect a quality that is equal to 
that in Country A. 
 
 
35 The value of uMA is constant (equal to 4.053, from Table 5-2) while uMB decreases as 𝛼 increases. 
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Figure 5-1: Equilibrium quality levels as a function of 𝛼 
 
 
The experienced quality of MB (uMB) decreases with 𝛼. In fact, firms have an incentive 
to provide a quality product if by doing so they can charge higher prices and/or sell 
more. As 𝛼 increases, the marginal benefit of providing quality decreases while the 
marginal cost is unchanged.36 As a consequence, the optimal quality level decreases 
with 𝛼. For 𝛼 = 1, consumers expect quality uMA regardless of the actual quality of MB. 
In this case, there is no benefit in providing a positive quality level.  
Noticeably, for a high level of 𝛼 it is possible for uMB < uLB, meaning that firm M provides 
a product of lower quality than firm LB. All the same, consumers consider MB as the 
high quality good because of the high expected quality due to the international 
reputation of firm M. 
The quality of good LB increases slightly with 𝛼. This is because under DC-SIP, the 
multinational firm is positioned as a high quality – high price brand, selling to the market 
segment with the highest willingness to pay. As 𝛼 increases, firm M increases prices and 
therefore there is the possibility for LB to attract consumers with average willingness to 
pay by increasing its own quality and price too.  
Figure 5-1 provides a clear illustration of the consequences of DC-SIP. Consider 𝛼’, an 
arbitrary value of 𝛼. For any given 𝛼’, the vertical distance between uMA and uMB is the 
difference in composition between the products sold in Country A and B, respectively, 
by firm M (the distance between point A and point D in Figure 5-1). This is the objective 
 
36 The partial derivative of demand qMB for the actual quality uMB is: 
 
which is equal to zero for 𝛼 = 1. 
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organoleptic difference. Noticeably, this difference can be broken down into two parts. 
The segment from point A to point C in Figure 5-1 is the difference in composition that 
is due to the different willingness to pay for quality in the two countries. The dashed 
horizontal line indicates the equilibrium quality level of product MB under perfect 
information. As a consequence, the difference between A and C is not due to market 
imperfection. Because consumers in Country B are not willing to pay as much those in 
Country A, firm M provides a good of lower quality. On the other hand, the difference 
between point C and point D is the strategic reduction in quality caused by the DC-SIP 
problem. Because the estimation of the expected quality is affected by the value of uMA, 
profit maximisation requires firm M to reduce quality below the perfect-information 
level. Consequently, firm M takes full advantage by the fact that consumers still consider 
MB to be the high quality good even if actual quality is low. 
The distance between eMB and uMB (points B and D in Figure 5-1, respectively) measures 
the difference between consumer expectation (based on the international reputation) 
and the quality they experience after consumption. Given the assumptions of the model, 
eMB is lower than uMB, meaning that consumers in Country B expect a product that is not 
exactly equal to the one that is sold in Country A. For any 𝛼<1, consumers are aware 
that a difference exists. Nevertheless, they expect high quality from the international 
firm. Noticeably eMB - uMB = (uMA - uMB) ≤ uMA - uMB, meaning that the mere comparison 
of ingredients might overestimate the deviation from consumer expectations. 
In summary, the model suggests that the quality difference between the goods in the 
two country uMA - uMB might overestimate the magnitude of the DC-SIP problem. In fact, 
(a) part of the differentiation might be the consequence of standard product adaptation, 
and (b) consumers might be aware that differences are possible and adjust their 
expectations accordingly. 
 
5.3.2 Welfare effects of DC-SIP 
The illustrative model concludes that DC-SIP may have non-negligible welfare effects. 
Figure 5-2 illustrates the results of the numerical simulation. As expected, the profits of 
firm M increase with 𝛼 (yMB in Figure 5-2, panel a). The multinational firm benefits from 
consumer overestimation of the provided quality. The surplus of consumers who buy 
good MB decreases with 𝛼. The result is driven by the disappointment caused by the 
experience of a lower level of quality than expected. As 𝛼 increases, consumer 
expectations increase while actual quality decreases. Therefore, the disappointment 
increases. Noticeably, csMB becomes negative for high levels of 𝛼. The actual quality of 
the good is so low that the benefits from consumption are not worth the price.  
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Figure 5-2: Welfare effects of DC-SIP 
Panel (a)     Panel (b) 
 
 
The model supports the possibility of a DC-SIP deadweight loss. The decline in CSMB is 
steeper than the increase in yMB. As a consequence, social welfare decreases with 𝛼.  
The consumer surplus of consumers of LB and the profits of the local firm increase with 
𝛼 (Figure 5-2, panel b. Note that the y-axis scales of panel a and b are different). Firms 
and consumers benefit from the increase in quality and price of the local good. 
In summary, the model suggests that DC-SIP is socially inefficient and has strong 
redistribution effects. Surplus is transferred from the consumers of good MB to the 
international firm M and – to a much lesser extent- to producers and consumers of the 
local good. 
 
5.3.3 Changes in consumer purchasing decisions. 
According to the European Commission, DC-SIP is an issue if   
‘[…the variation in quality] has the potential to alter the economic behaviour 
of the average consumer who would take a different purchasing decision if 
he/she were made aware of such difference.’ (commission notice C(2017) 
6532 final). 
Our illustrative model provides insights into consumer purchasing decision. A rational 
consumer changes their purchase decision after information disclosure if 
Ui,MB(eMB)>Ui,LB>Ui,MB(uMB). The condition requires the utility from the consumption of 
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good LB to be lower than the expected utility from good MB and higher than the 
experienced utility from MB.  
Figure 5-3 reports the percent share of consumers with ωi,MB =1 (i.e., who would buy 
LB instead of MB if aware of the difference of composition with respect to MA, Section 
5.1.2). The model predicts that for any 𝛼≥0.2, all consumers would change their 
purchasing decision. For 𝛼 = 1, the share of consumers who would like to change is 
41%. The result is driven by the modelling choice of building an ‘extreme DC-SIP’ 
scenario. The consequences of DC-SIP are so severe that information disclosure triggers 
a change in purchase even if the bias is small.  
The estimate ignores all possible ‘trust-breach’ effects. Consumers do not change 
behaviour because they feel bad about being cheated by the multinational company. 
Their decision is driven by quality and price assessment only. 
 
Figure 5-3: Percent share of consumers changing purchasing decision if aware of 
difference in composition. Market prices are given. 
 
 
The function ωi,MB is computed by assuming that information is revealed after purchase. 
This implies that consumers take quality and price of all product as given. Firms set 
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their strategy by considering the imperfect evaluation of MB quality by consumers, as 
reported in Table 5-3. Consumers buy the product, experience the actual quality of the 
goods, and are then asked if they want to change, given the price-quality combinations 
they observe at the moment of the purchase. Figure 5-3 shows that the share of 
consumers who would regret the purchase is large. 
The function ωi,MB is a simple way to assess the impact of DC-SIP on consumers. 
However, it cannot be used to predict the effects of information disclosure or other 
changes in the market because it does not refer to an equilibrium situation. For example, 
if firms knew that products can be returned after purchase, they might decide to set 
price and quality as if 𝛼 = 0 in order to avoid the cost of taking back the product. At the 
equilibrium, ωi,MB would be equal to zero for all i. In the next Section 5.4 measurement 
of policy effect is discussed. 
 
5.4 Information disclosure regulation 
A qualitative assessment of the impact of information disclosure (ID) regulation is 
provided in this section. ID regulation is defined as any form of public intervention 
aiming at providing consumers with sufficient information to assess the differences in 
composition of seemingly identical products across the Single Market. ID regulation may 
consider several measures such as labelling, mandatory information disclosure on 
websites, consumer information/education programs, or any other way of informing 
consumers. ID regulation is expected to alter the market equilibrium through a change 
in consumer behaviour. Because informed consumers behave differently, firms adjust 
their strategies accordingly. 
In the illustration example, ID regulation is modelled as an exogenous decrease in the 
parameter 𝛼.37 A perfect policy imposes 𝛼 = 0 while imperfect intervention arbitrarily 
reduces the parameter. Table 5-3 and the discussion in Section 5.3.2 illustrates the 
simulated effects of ID regulation. 
ID is expected to result in lower prices, lower expected quality, and higher experienced 
quality of product MB compared to the unregulated market. Firm LB supplies cheaper 
and lower quality goods.  
The policy is socially efficient, as social welfare is monotonically decreasing in 𝛼. It 
determines a redistribution of surplus: the surplus of consumers buying MB increases, 
all other groups suffer from a reduction in welfare. From a policy perspective, this point 
is relevant because a new regulation might harm third parties (the local firm and its 
consumers) who were not responsible for the DC-SIP issue. 
The model predicts that if an ID regulation is implemented, the market shares of both 
the international and the local firms increase (qMB* and qLB* in Table 5-3). The number 
of consumers who decide to buy no product decreases in a regulated market. Figure 5-4 
reports firm market shares and the demand gap in country B as a function of 𝛼. In the 
illustrative numerical example, the market share of product MB is 50.8% for 𝛼 = 1 and 
 
37 It is assumed in the entire discussion that ID regulation provides unbiased and correct information.  
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52.8% for 𝛼 = 0 (i.e., under a perfect ID policy). The demand gap (the share of 
consumers who do not buy anything) is 23.9%, 50.8% for 𝛼 = 1 and 21.3% for 𝛼 = 0. 
 
Figure 5-4: Market shares in Country B as a function of 𝛼 
 
 
The illustration example suggests that ID regulations might have a limited impact on 
market shares, resulting in remarkable adjustments in prices and quality instead. This 
finding does not contradict the results from Figure 5-3. In fact, the variable ωi,MB was 
computed by fixing prices and quality. On the other hand, in the policy simulation 
presented in this review, firms are allowed to adjust their strategy.  
In an unregulated market, consumers have higher quality expectations from product 
MB. As a consequence, firm M can charge higher prices. The firm focuses on the 
consumers with the highest willingness to pay for quality and extracts the largest surplus 
possible from them. As a result, the market share of firm M increase under the ID 
regulation.  
The strategic reaction of firm LB to the strategy of firm M for the unregulated market is 
to attract consumers who find MB too expensive and so prefer a cheaper product. In 
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the absence of regulation, firm LB chooses higher prices and higher quality than it would 
under perfect information. As a consequence, the market share of LB slightly increases 
under the ID regulation.  
Under the policy, the lower prices of firm LB gains consumers who are not willing to pay 
high prices for the product. As a result, the share of consumers who are not buying 
either MB or LB increases.  
In this model, DC-SIP results in firms focusing on smaller and more profitable segments. 
The apparent paradox of ID regulation increasing the market shares of firm M is 
explained by the joint determination of price and quality. The effect of the price decrease 
offsets the market share loss due to lower perceived quality.  
The result has strong policy implications. Despite the magnitude of consumer 
disappointment (as in Figure 5-3), it is not necessarily true that implementing ID 
regulation determines a major change in consumer choices. Firms are expected to 
adjust prices and quality in order to keep their market. The illustrative model provides 
an example of possible increase in the share of firm M. In addition, the model suggests 
that ID policy might favour market access for consumers who were previously excluded. 
Figure 5-5 illustrates the percentage changes in market share from the illustrative 
model. 
 
Figure 5-5: Percent change in market share due to the adoption of a perfectly efficient 
ID regulation as a function of 𝛼 
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5.5 Product of reference (PoR) regulation 
A regulator willing to maximise the aggregate surplus of the two countries (swA+B) may 
consider a policy imposing that the quality of product MB must be equal to that firm M 
supplies to country A under perfect information. In then numerical example presented 
in this Chapter, this regulation requires uMA=uMB=4.053 (from Table 5-3). 
Table 5-4: Equilibrium under a ‘product of reference’ regulation 
Products uMB* uLB* pMB* pLB* qMB* qLB* q0B* yMB* yLB* csMB* csLB* swB* 
M & LB 4.053 0.235 3.874 0.112 1.015 0.509 0.477 -4.282 0.029 2.207 0.030 -2.016 
LB only  1.000  1.000  1.000 1.000  0.500  0.500 1.000 
 
Table 5-4 illustrates the outcome of the model under the product of reference regulation 
(country A is not affected by the regulation). The first row of the table reports the 
computation of the equilibrium under the assumption that both firms stay in the market. 
Compared to the perfect information equilibrium, firms provide higher quality for higher 
prices. Consumers benefit from the regulation. However, firm M makes a negative profit 
because they are forced to overprovide quality in a market where the marginal 
willingness to pay for it is low. Firm M has no incentive to sell in country B once the 
regulation is in place. Therefore, at the equilibrium the local firm is a monopolist. Row 
two of Table 5-4 illustrates the monopolistic equilibrium. The numerical example 
concludes that the regulation is only socially efficient if the value of 𝛼 exceeds 0.2. In 
this case, the social welfare in the regulated market is higher than the unregulated one. 
Noticeably, if the bias is very low (i.e., for 𝛼 equal or less 0.1), the regulation also harms 
consumers. The policy is always beneficial for the local firm. 
The numerical example stresses the unintended consequences of a strict regulation on 
quality. If the costs for providing the imposed quality are too high compared to 
consumer willingness to pay, the outcome of the policy is a reduction in trade. 
Noticeably, the demand gap increases in the monopoly outcome, meaning that a group 
of consumers is driven out of the market. In fact, the monopolistic local firm increases 
quality and price in order to supply consumers who have a high willingness to pay. 
Consequently, the local product is too expensive for those consumers who have low 
willingness to pay. 
 
5.6 One-market, one-quality (1M1Q) regulation 
In this policy scenario, the international firm is constrained to choose one level of quality 
for all countries, that is, uMA = uMB. In contrast to the PoR regulation, the firm is free to 
choose any quality level. Table 5-5 reports the outcome of the model. 
Under the regulation, the international firm chooses a quality level (in this case 2.4) 
that is between the unconstrained perfect information values of the two countries (4.053 
and 1.013). Firm M achieves negative profits in country B for this quality level. 
Therefore, the equilibrium is a monopoly of the local firm in country B and an 
unconstrained duopoly in country A (just as in the PoR case, see Table 5-4, row two for 
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the computation of welfare effect in Country B at the equilibrium). Although the ‘one-
market, one-quality’ regulation is less binding than the ‘product of reference’ one, it can 
still result in a trade reduction. Just as for the PoR case, the policy is socially efficient 
only if 𝛼 exceeds 0.2. The effect on consumers depends on the level of 𝛼 too. In this 
example, for 𝛼<0.2 the loss in consumer surplus from DC-SIP is lower than the one from 
firm B’s monopolistic market power. 
 
Table 5-5: Outcome of a ‘one-market, one-quality’ regulation 
Country uMk* uLk* pMk* pLk* qMk* qLk* q0K* yMk* yLk* csMk* csLk* swk* 
A 2.400 0.649 3.755 0.508 2.146 1.072 0.783 5.177 0.334 6.974 0.372 12.857 
B 2.400 0.224 2.228 0.104 1.024 0.513 0.463 -0.599 0.028 1.375 0.029 0.833 
A+B        4.578    13.690 
 
The results of the policy analysis are driven by the assumptions in the model. In 
particular, the choice of the numerical values of the parameters vA and vB determines 
the outcome. A sensitivity analysis is illustrated in the next section. 
 
5.7 Sensitivity analysis. 
In this section, a sensitivity analysis was run and the model outcome was computed 
with a different parameter choice. If the differences between the two countries is 
attenuated (i.e., if the difference between vA and vB gets smaller), the policy options 
become more efficient. The following discussion presents the results of the model 
assuming that vB = 3 instead of 2. 
Table 5-6: Equilibrium under perfect information (vB=3) 
Country uMk* uLk* pMk* pLk* qMk* qLk* q0K* yMk* yLk* csMk* csLk* swk* 
A 4.053 0.772 6.890 0.656 2.100 1.050 0.850 6.255 0.391 10.638 0.425 17.709 
B 2.280 0.434 2.907 0.277 1.575 0.786 0.638 1.980 0.124 3.366 0.135 5.605 
A+B        8.235    23.314 
 
Table 5-6 reports the equilibrium assuming perfect information and no regulation. 
Compared to the case of vB = 2 (Table 5-2), the equilibrium in country B exhibits higher 
product quality, prices, profits, and consumer surpluses for all products. As a 
consequence, social surplus is also higher. 
The qualitative outcome of imperfect information is robust to the parameter values. 
Table 5-7 reports the calculation. The parameter change affects the magnitude of the 
percent variation of profits and surplus. In general, the percent variation (positive or 
negative) of each variable due to an increase in 𝛼 is smaller in module as vB increases. 
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Table 5-7: Equilibrium in country B under imperfect information (vB=3) 
1-𝛼 eMB uMB* uLB* pMB* pLB* qMB* qLB* q0B* yMB* yLB* csMB* csLB* swB* swA+B* 
0.0 2.280 2.280 0.434 2.907 0.277 1.575 0.786 0.638 1.980 0.124 3.366 0.135 5.605 23.314 
0.1 2.252 2.052 0.433 2.867 0.275 1.575 0.790 0.635 2.410 0.123 2.636 0.134 5.304 23.013 
0.2 2.270 1.824 0.434 2.892 0.276 1.575 0.789 0.636 2.891 0.124 1.801 0.135 4.951 22.660 
0.3 2.332 1.595 0.437 2.983 0.279 1.573 0.788 0.638 3.421 0.124 0.861 0.135 4.542 22.251 
0.4 2.441 1.366 0.442 3.141 0.284 1.571 0.787 0.643 4.000 0.126 -0.182 0.136 4.080 21.789 
0.5 2.595 1.137 0.448 3.366 0.291 1.568 0.783 0.650 4.631 0.127 -1.326 0.138 3.570 21.279 
0.6 2.795 0.909 0.456 3.658 0.298 1.564 0.783 0.654 5.307 0.129 -2.569 0.139 3.006 20.716 
0.7 3.041 0.681 0.463 4.020 0.306 1.559 0.780 0.661 6.037 0.131 -3.912 0.141 2.398 20.107 
0.8 3.333 0.453 0.472 4.449 0.315 1.555 0.778 0.667 6.815 0.134 -5.353 0.145 1.741 19.450 
0.9 3.670 0.226 0.479 4.948 0.323 1.551 0.775 0.674 7.647 0.136 -7.646 0.146 0.283 17.992 
1.0 4.053 0.000 0.487 5.515 0.331 1.546 0.774 0.680 8.527 0.138 -8.528 0.146 0.283 17.992 
 
The outcome of the policy options changes when the difference between the two 
countries is small. The table below reports the outcome of the product-of-reference 
policy. For vB=3, firm M achieves positive profits in country B under the regulation. In 
this case, public intervention does not result in a monopoly by the local firm. 
Table 5-8: Outcome of the ‘product of reference policy’ (vB=3) 
Products uMB* uLB* pMB* pLB* qMB* qLB* q0B* yMB* yLB* csMB* csLB* swB* 
LB & MB 4.053 0.487 5.515 0.331 1.546 0.774 0.680 0.315 0.138 2.207 0.146 2.805 
 
In this scenario, the outcome of the policy is an increase of the quality of both products 
in country B compared to the case of perfect information (country A is unaffected). 
Prices are also higher and quantities are lower. The regulation reduces the profits of the 
international firm and increases those of the local firm. The measure is always beneficial 
for consumers of product LB while the surplus of consumers of product MB only increases 
if 𝛼 exceeds 0.1. The policy is only socially efficient if 𝛼 is at least 0.7. 
For vB=3, the policy ‘one-market, one-quality’ allows firm M to gain positive profits in 
country B. Consequently, M is expected to trade in both countries.  
Table 5-9: Equilibrium under a ‘one-market, one-quality’ regulation (vB=3) 
Country uMk* uLk* pMk* pLk* qMk* qLk* q0K* yMk* yLk* csMk* csLk* swk* 
A 3.051 0.710 4.972 0.578 2.123 1.063 0.814 5.901 0.362 8.495 0.383 15.142 
B 3.051 0.464 4.034 0.307 1.559 0.779 0.662 1.636 0.132 4.273 0.141 6.182 
A+B        7.537    21.323 
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Table 5-9 reports the results of the simulation. As expected, the policy results in lower 
quality (for both products) in country A. In country B, firm M always provides higher 
quality while the local firm only provides higher quality under the regulation if 𝛼 is 
greater than 0.7. Consumers in country A are harmed by the regulation while consumers 
of product MB are benefited and consumers of product LB are harmed if 𝛼 is below 0.7. 
The policy is socially efficient for any 𝛼 equal to 0.5 or higher. 
 
5.8 Results and policy implications 
Our numerical simulation identified possible unintended consequences of public 
regulation of the DC-SIP issue. Without careful analysis, the policy may result in trade 
reduction, harm to consumers (especially in country A), and profit loss even for the local 
firm in country B. These negative effects are caused by two factors. They are the 
consequences of constraints imposed on the international firm forcing overprovision of 
quality in country B (1M1Q and PoR policies) and under-provision in country A (1M1Q 
only). In addition, the local firm in country B may be induced to lower the quality of 
product LB to the detriment of local consumers and its own profits (ID and 1M1Q).  
The first-best option is an ID policy that is able to eliminate the information bias 
completely. This approach restores market efficiency and maximises social surplus. 
However, the policy may be difficult to design as the information requirements may be 
complex and may differ from consumer to consumer (Chapter 4). 
Enforcement of specific quality levels such as the ‘PoR’ or the ‘1M1Q’ policies is only 
socially beneficial if the difference between the two markets are sufficiently small (i.e., 
if the difference between vA and vB is small) and if the information bias is sufficiently 
large. The condition for avoiding welfare-reducing regulation are stricter for the 
‘product-of-reference’ policy than for the ‘one-market, one-quality’ policy.  
 
5.9 References 
Grunert, K. G. (2005). Food quality and safety: consumer perception and demand. 
European review of Agricultural Economics, 32(3), 369-391. 
Motta, M. (1993). Endogenous quality choice: price vs. quantity competition. The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, 113-131. 
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978). Monopoly and product quality. Journal of Economic 
Theory, 18(2), 301-317. 
Paroush, J. (1978). On quality discrimination. Southern Economic Journal, 592-597. 
Szymanski, S., & Valletti, T. (2005). Parallel trade, price discrimination, investment 
and price caps. Economic Policy, 20(44), 706-749. 
 
 
 
 List of abbreviations 
DC-SIP Difference in Composition of Seemingly Identical Branded Product 
EU  European Union 
ID  Information disclosure 
IO  Industrial organisation 
PoR  Product of reference 
US  United States 
1M1Q  One-market, one-quality 
 
 List of figures 
FIGURE 0-1: THE STRUCTURE OF THE REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 12 
FIGURE 1-1: DRIVERS OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DC-SIP ....................................................... 15 
FIGURE 3-1 SITUATIONAL FACTORS .......................................................................................................................... 68 
FIGURE 3-2 ......................................................................................................................................................... 70 
FIGURE 4-1: THE TOTAL FOOD QUALITY MODEL ........................................................................................................ 82 
FIGURE 4-2: QUALITY CUES FOR PURCHASING DECISIONS AND QUALITY ATTRIBUTES FOR AGRIFOOD PRODUCTRE-PURCHASING 
DECISIONS ................................................................................................................................................... 90 
FIGURE 5-1: EQUILIBRIUM QUALITY LEVELS AS A FUNCTION OF 𝛼 ................................................................................. 117 
FIGURE 5-2: WELFARE EFFECTS OF DC-SIP ............................................................................................................. 119 
FIGURE 5-3: PERCENT SHARE OF CONSUMERS CHANGING PURCHASING DECISION IF AWARE OF DIFFERENCE IN COMPOSITION. 
MARKET PRICES ARE GIVEN. .......................................................................................................................... 120 
FIGURE 5-4: MARKET SHARES IN COUNTRY B AS A FUNCTION OF 𝛼 .............................................................................. 122 
FIGURE 5-5: PERCENT CHANGE IN MARKET SHARE DUE TO THE ADOPTION OF A PERFECTLY EFFICIENT ID REGULATION AS A 
FUNCTION OF 𝛼 .......................................................................................................................................... 123 
 
 
 List of tables 
TABLE 3-1: OVERVIEW OF REASONS FOR PURSUING GLOBALISATION OR STANDARDISATION ................................................ 65 
TABLE 3-2: OVERVIEW OF REASONS FOR PURSUING INTERNATIONALISATION OR LOCALISATION ............................................ 66 
TABLE 4-1: FACTORS AFFECTING PERCEIVED QUALITY .................................................................................................. 87 
TABLE 5-1: DEMAND FUNCTIONS FOR THE MULTINATIONAL FIRM M AND THE TWO LOCAL FIRMS LA, LB ............................ 114 
TABLE 5-2 EQUILIBRIUM UNDER PERFECT INFORMATION. ........................................................................................... 115 
TABLE 5-3: EQUILIBRIUM IN COUNTRY B UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION ................................................................... 116 
TABLE 5-4: EQUILIBRIUM UNDER A ‘PRODUCT OF REFERENCE’ REGULATION ................................................................... 124 
TABLE 5-5: OUTCOME OF A ‘ONE-MARKET, ONE-QUALITY’ REGULATION ....................................................................... 125 
TABLE 5-6: EQUILIBRIUM UNDER PERFECT INFORMATION (VB=3) ................................................................................ 125 
TABLE 5-7: EQUILIBRIUM IN COUNTRY B UNDER IMPERFECT INFORMATION (VB=3) ......................................................... 126 
TABLE 5-8: OUTCOME OF THE ‘PRODUCT OF REFERENCE POLICY’ (VB=3) ....................................................................... 126 
TABLE 5-9: EQUILIBRIUM UNDER A ‘ONE-MARKET, ONE-QUALITY’ REGULATION (VB=3) ................................................... 126 
 
 
   
GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre 
nearest you at: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
On the phone or by emaill 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: 
https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publications. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting 
Europe Direct or your local information centre (see https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en). 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
K
J-0
2-1
9-7
1
1
-EN
-N
 
doi:10.2760/164019 
ISBN 978-92-76-10936-5 
